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Introduction 
This study is about childhood; more specifically it is about childhood in residential 
public care. It sets out to show how, despite well-intentioned policies and practices, 
children who are subject to the care of the state are, albeit inadvertently, located 'on the 
margins' by virtue of the very policies and practices which are designed to ensure their 
welfare and best interests. This is because those policies and practices seek to ensure that 
such children are provided with a form of care that is constituted out of prevailing 
conceptualisations of what childhood should be. Since such conceptualisations regard 
childhood as a definitive, universal state of transition towards adulthood that is of its very 
nature tooted in the 'natural' family, the effect is to locate these children always 'on the 
other side' of what should or ought to be, signi4ing for the mainstream what family life 
'is'. Being 'in. care' is therefore always 'second best'; even if the experience is positive, it is 
rarely desirable. 
The study seeks to examine the knowledges which construct childhood and to 
demonstrate that, far from being universal and definitive, childhood is an historically and 
culturally-specific construct. It will be suggested that certainty and 'truth' about childhood, 
particularly in social work, rather than providing security, stability for 'future adults', 
actually serve to limit and constrain the possibilities and potentialities for both children 
and adults. For children in public care, the consequences can be more serious; they may 
not only experience a childhood which is characterised by absence, loss and 
postponement, but may find themselves as adults consigned to the margins of society. It 
will be further suggested that it is only by embracing uncertainty and ambivalence about 
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childhood and regarding sceptically the knowledges which construct it that it is possible to 
begin to 'think differently', not only about childhood, but about family and the social 
world. In this way, 'public care' may become something else and something more, 
conceived and constructed in such a way as to offer children 'differently positive and 
meaningful' child-rearing experiences. 
In order to elucidate and substantiate the above theses., the study draws primarily from 
postmodern, and particularly post-structuralist thought. Given these are not themselves by 
any means 'fixed' terms of reference, it will be useful to clarify their usage in other 
disciplines and settle on an understanding for the purposes of this study. 
Postmodernism represents a shift from the modernist thinking that had its roots in the 
project of Enlightenment which coalesced at the end of the eighteenth century. In short, 
a belief in social and economic progress, universal reason and the coherent, rational 
subject. was to shape social scientific, political and scientific theory throughout the 
nineteenth and most of the twentieth century (Williams: 1996). Postmodernism chaUenged 
the universalism of reason and progress and instead emphasised the relativity of 
knowledge, truth and the fragmented nature of the self. 
As a cultural phenomenon, 'postmodern' can mean many things simultaneously, nor are 
the meanings necessarily consistent; rather, they may often be contradictory. In 
architecture, the modernist style of the Bauhaus group, founded in 1919 by Walter 
Gropius was based on the idea that art should serve the needs of the modern industrial 
world and that there was no distinction between fine art and practical crafts. The style 
emphasised the functionality of buildings and an appreciation of the aesthetic quality of 
basic materials, obviating the need for elaborate ornamentation and representationalism 
and purged of narrative Gencks: 1975). Here, postmodernism emerged as a reaction to the 
anti-representational, technocratic and austere practices of the Bauhaus, or International 
Style as it became known, towards eclecticism and a return to narrative, traditionalism, 
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overt symbolism and the vernacular (Venturi: 1977). Similarly, in painting, modernism 
meant an abandonment of representation and a turning toward self-reflexivity and pursuit 
of the formal possibilities of painting itself through impressionism, cubism and 
abstraction. For Clement Greenberg (1980), postmodernism in art could only be seen as 
an abandonment of the higher modernist project of self-discovery and a return to 
figurative narrative of a lower, non-progressive order. 
Conversely, for most literary critics postmodernism is taken to mean the self- 
reflexiveness in the writing of, for example Samuel Beckett and the so-called Theatre of 
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the Absurd and the metafiction first seen in the 1960's and 197A (Bertens: 1995). Also in 
photography, it is the shift away from realism toward anti-representational styles that are 
postmodern in, for example, the work of Cindy Sherman and Richard Levine (Crimp: 
1987). 
Postmodernism then, can mean opposite things in different places; for those 
postmodernists who see the movement as one away from representationalism, this has 
sometimes meant more than a questioning of the premises upon which the discipline is 
founded. Here, one might again talk in terms of the dscourse that a particular discipline 
inhabits in that it is the very idea of, for example 'art' that is in question, its separateness, its 
enclosure within an autonomous realm and its exclusiveness that render it ineffectual and 
powerless in terms of political action (Bertens: 1995). It makes sense of itself to only itself 
thus remaining distant and seemingly irrelevant to the wider social world. It is here that a 
specificallypost-structuralist analysis has its beginnings and from where this study will begin 
to explore some of the discourses of social theory and social work. That is, to explore 
representation as representation and not as 'truth'. In general and for the purposes of this 
study, post-structuralism may be regarded as the postmodern approach that has been most 
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influential within philosophy (and in particular continental philosophy), literary theory and, 
increasingly, the social sciences. ' 
Structuralism acknowledged that language is a sign-system with rules that account for 
the social production of meaning and was largely derived from the work of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913). As the primary instance of a sign-system, the structural linguistics of 
Saussure served as a model for application across the whole range of social scientific and 
anthropological disciplines. (A fuller discussion of linguistic structuralism and its 
relationship to post-structuralism can be found in Chapter Three). Post-structuralism grew 
out of this approach but rejects the Emits of the closed system with governing rules, 
preferring to see meaning/signification as constantly deferred and displaced in the endless 
play of signification. Most significant is a challenge to the idea that language represents 
reality, that it merely mirrors our direct encountering of the world. Whereas for the 
empiricist, knowledge emerges from this direct experience and is simply given expression 
through language; for the postmodern theorist, and more specifically, the post- 
structuralist, language does not represent the social world, it consfitwes it. Knowledge is thus 
always and already contorted through language, by its location in history, place and 
context. The very notion of human consciousness, of the knowing self, autonomous, free 
and unblemished by any 'external' context is thus rendered unstable and insecure; post- 
structuralism gives way to the idea of the constructed human subject, constituted by and 
through language. 
In this sense, as far as the 'subject' is concerned, it might be argued that if the subject 
in modernity is determined from 'withiný, the postmodern subject is determined from 
'without'. For Nfichel Foucault (1971,1977,1978) this means that fundamental notions 
To clarify- for the purposes of this study postmodemism is thus regarded as a general complex cluster concept which 
in broad terms includes an "opposition to transcendental arguments and standpoints; rejection of the picture of 
knowledge as accurate representation; ... rejection of principles, distinctions, and descriptions that arc thought to be 
binding for all times, persons and places ... and a suspicion of grand narratives" (Nfignus: 726: cited in Audi 
(ed): 1999). To this extent the terms postmodernism and post-structuralism may hereafter be used interchangeably, 
except where the approach, concept or idea is specific to structuralism or post-structuralism. 
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which we accept as being permanent truths about human nature and the social world must 
be seen as historically and culturally specific and it is the shiffing and permutating patterns 
of power in relation to the subject that warrants investigation. That, however, is not to 
imply that,,, ýhere any 'fundamental rationale' or conspiracy to such change other than that 
it worked Foucault's work seeks to unmask the politics that are at work in representations 
and undermine the hegemony of any one discourse over another, particularly where it 
exists at the exclusion of that which constitutes the 'Other'in society. 
As a way of describing the social world (as opposed to explanations which seek an 
underlying cause or 'truth), post-structuralism pursues the rejection of the project of 
Enlightenment articulated by postmodernity further, and demands that even everyday 
understandings of concepts like 'childhood', 'family', 'welfare' and 'children's needs, as 
well as the social configurations, discourses and institutions in which they arise are 
interrogated; they may not always, (or not only) be what they appear to be. They can 
however, signify or mean something else and something more than is often taken for 
granted. Indeed, 'taken for grantedness" may itself be proved to be a powerful 'alibi', 
enclosing meaning and signification in such a way as to render alternative readings 
obsolete, or in a way, censoring meaning. For the post-structuralist, there are no 'origins' to 
meaning, no universal truths to be discovered, no signifiers which can 'transcend' 
discourse, either within or post Modernity. However, that is not necessarily to indicate 
conspiracy, but to draw attention in this study to the constant working and reworking of 
much of the discourse of 'childhood' and its correlates 'child abuse', 'child protection' and 
'child welfare', and to suggest that it is often those things which we regard as eminently 
'reasonable', as having a 'common-sense logic' about them that require closer scrutiny, 
their very 'taken for-grantedness' giving cause for enquiry. 
The study is in two parts. Part One consists of Chapters One, Two and Three and sets 
out the historical context and the conceptual framework. In Part Two, consisting of 
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Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven, the conceptual framework is applied to the field of 
study, childhood in residential care. 
In Chapter One the study will introduce a number of perspectives on child welfare and 
begin to suggest that notions of childhood and children's needs as natural categories are, in 
fact, constructed within a variety of discourses. It will also be argued that the conventional 
accounts of these perspectives are over-orderly, simplifying what are complex and often 
contradictory networks and configurations of meaning. The Chapter concludes by 
proposing an alternative, postmodern critique for the study. In Chapter Two, Foucault's 
ideas on discourse and the way power is exercised in society will be explored further, with 
particular reference to the discourse of 'children's needs'. The tools for analysis will be 
developed in Chapter Three by elucidating Derrida's deconstructive 'method' and in 
Chapter Four correlations will be drawn between the post-structuralism of Foucault and 
Derrida with regard to the historical variability of childhood, proposing that the 'idea' of 
childhood as a distinct phase is philosophically tenuous and that child development in 
particular, despite its centrality within social work discourse, is ultimately 'unreliable' as a 
universal concept, especially with regard to children and young people on the margins of 
society. Through an intimate, deconstructive examination of legislative and policy 
frameworks and guidance for professional practice in residential care, Chapters Five and 
Six argue (against the orthodoxy), that the application of child development 'knowledge' 
and its supremely effective articulation of children's 'needs', far from promoting an 
'inclusive' approach to the care, welfare and protection of children subject to 'corporate 
parenting' of the state, effectively ensure the maintenance of some on the 'outside' of 
what can then be determined as the mainstream or norm. Further, it will be suggested that 
this has implications not only for children in 'public care', but for all children. Throughout 
the discussion, the study will show how the establishment of a singular, distinctive, 
universal and coherent 'childhood' which is characterised by temporality, transition and 
irrationality has had a pivotal role within Modernity and the idea of the unified 'subject'. 
11 
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As a consequence, it will be further proposed that children who are in public care, have a 
crucial and symbolic role for the 'mainstream' (the 'natural family') and are determinedly 
secured within a prefiguring 'discourse of childhood' which effectively evacuates them 
from speaking in the 'here and now'. On the basis on the deconstructive work of the 
preceding chapters, Chapter Seven concludes that the orthodox perspectives on child 
welfare are indeed inadequate. Whilst concurring with others that there has, within 
advanced Modernity, been an erosion of values-based practice in social work, the chapter 
argues that that this should not be confused with notions that we are within a 
'postmodern era'. Further, if values are to be at the heart of professional practice, they 
need to be understood differently, that is, as based upon contingent forms of knowledge 
about childhood. Finally, the Conclusion summarises that main theses of the study and 
indicates some of the implications for policy, professional practice and further research. 
PART ONE 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
CIL, 4=R ONE 
WELFARE, THE STATE AND THE FAMILY 
Introduction 
This chapter begins by setting out an historical context to the thesis. This is drawn from 
what might be called the 'standard narrative' accounts of the emergence of the welfare 
state and, more particularly, a 'welfare response' to children and child maltreatment 
through the interactions between the state and the family. It is this context that forms the 
backdrop to the subsequent analysis of childhood in public care in later chapters. In 
addition, the chapter describes some of the differing perspectives and critiques of the 
welfare state and draws attention to some of the underlying assumptions which, despite 
their contribution to understanding the complex relationship between the state and the 
family, have largely regarded childhood as a fixed invariable in their analyses. The study also 
introduces Foucault's notion of intersecting discourses, which in this study are seen as 
constructing contemporary understandings of childhood. Finally, the chapter begins to 
introduce an alternative conceptual framework, drawn from the post-structuralism of both 
Foucault and Derrida, the primary sources for this analysis. 
Welfare Perspectives Outlined 
In Western, liberal states it is generally accepted that children are generally better 
provided for and 'healthier' than they were say, fifty or a hundred years ago. This progress 
is also generally seen as commensurate with a better understanding of what childrees 
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needs are, based on an increasing knowledge of child development and the psycho- 
dynamics of the family. Further, these and other social, economic and medical 
developments of the twentieth century shaped the role of the state in relation to the 
family in the form of welfare provisions and social work interventions which protect 
children, support vulnerable families and safeguard child welfare. One way or another, 
liberal frameworks, whether the 'classical liberal', laisseZj5irr approach of the mid- 
nineteenth century, or those of a broadly 'social democratic' hue in the political consensus 
of the post-war period, or the neo-liberalism of the 1980< and 1990"s, all regard welfare as 
something of a concession within a capitalist ethic of wealth production; the question is 
simply one of degrees, that is, to what extent the state should compromise the operation 
of a free market and individual autonomy and responsibility in order alleviate the effects of 
unemployment and poverty. Social work is seen as intervening in a variety of ways along a 
continuum from support, prevention, therapy, protection and control depending on 
individual family circumstances combined with the moral, social and political milieu of the 
time. Put simply, liberal approaches, one way or another, rely on the family as an 'ideal 
type', from which deviation and subsequent intervention can then be calibrated. 
Radical social work theory and practice emerged in the late 1960? s' and 197C4 and was 
largely a response to concern about controlling elements of social work practice within the 
aforementioned liberal agenda. Here, welfare is seen as merely an instrument of the state, 
maintaining the subordinate class towards the production of labour. In broader terms, 
radical social work drew on Marxist theory and saw welfare spending as creating markets 
for private sector producers and appropriating the working class into the capitalist system 
by presenting a benevolent front - just enough to stifle popular discontent -a kind of 
insurance policy for the dominant classes against the threat of revolýtionary action. 
Feminist analyses, which in some ways were affiliated to radical approaches extended the 
critique of welfare further by placing gendered family relations on the political agenda. 
Welfare policies were analysed as inherently sexist within patriarchy, maintaining 
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subordination and emphasising the 'natural' role of women within the family for child- 
rearing and caring (for the eldery and infirm of the family). 
The Emergence of Welfare in the Liberal State 
The provision of welfare services is a relatively recent phenomenon - in the mid- 
nineteenth century there was little welfare provision in the wake of the development of 
industrial capitalism. Inasmuch as the welfare needs of the population were met at all it 
was through the market and a liberal philosophy of laisseZ-faitr - private landlords provided 
housing, private tutors provided education and private doctors provided medical care - all 
for a price that few could afford. Those who could not afford the price relied upon charity 
and the philanthropy of the middle classes. As a response to this seemingly intractable 
dilemma (which was both economic and moral) for the emergent liberal state, the Poor 
Law reforms of 1834 sought to distinguish between the deserving and non-deserving - 
poverty was individualised, the result of bad luck for the deserving or feckless indolence 
for the non-deserving. The workhouse system was intended to dissuade the work-shy and 
provided minimal refuge for the unfortunate: "Into such a house none will enter 
voluntarily; work confinement and discipline will deter the indolent and vicious; and 
nothing but extreme necessity will induce any to accept the comfort which must be 
obtained by the surrender of their free agency" (1833 Report of the Poor Law 
Commissioners, cited in Dearlove and Saunders: 1985). The problem was that the efforts 
of governments to improve conditions of the working class was incompatible with the free 
operation of the market for labour which produced low wages and the market for 
consumption, goods and services which led to high rents, living costs etc. Despite this 
dilemma, there can be little doubt that the potential threat posed by waves of discontent 
among working class families in the new industrial centres eventually induced a pragmatic 
response from the state in respect of welfare provision, notwithstanding a commitment to 
the capitalist social order and an overriding 'market imperative'. 
Welfare, the State and the Famffy 
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Gradually, and by no means as part of any 'project' of 'social reform', a laissez-ffidir 
approach was eroded; reform, that was more often in response to middle-class sensibilities 
than human need, forged the basis for the welfare state. The Factory Acts of the 1840's 
and 1850's regulated child labour and from 1850 Boards of Health began to exercise 
regulatory powers over the sanitary conditions of working class areas. Education Acts 
passed from 1870 onwards culminated in the provision of free, universal education for all. 
Thus, in the context of a new economic liberalism and an increasingly organised 
worldng class the need to attend to 'genuine' worldng class grievance and distinguish more 
clearly between the deserving and non-deserving poor could no longer be postponed or 
left to market forces alone. As far as children were concerned, it is within this 
conceptualisation that they emerge briefly as 'victims' and that child cruelty is perceived as 
a 'social problem', albeit still very much in Poor Law terms. The NSPCC (established in 
1884) provided the main thrust for change and was instrumental in paving the way for the 
Protection of Cruelty to and Protection of Children Act 1889. The Act made wilful ill- 
treatment, neglect or abandonment of a boy under 14 years or a girl under 16 years an 
offence punishable by imprisonment or fine. The provisions of legislation were further 
extended to empower local authorities with responsibility for the removal and assumption 
of rights over a child who was deserted, orphaned, or whose parents were unfit to have 
care. 
Although there were elements of 'prevention' emerging by the end of the nineteenth 
century, particularly in the work of the NSPCC who undertook a supervisory role with 
families, the general emphasis remained on families taking full responsibility for their 
members with intervention framed in terms of rescuing the child and punishing the 
parents. 
However, by the time of the Liberal government's terms of office from 1905 - 1914 the 
state was beginning to take a much broader, preventative approach to welfare needs. 
Welfare, the State and the Famior 
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Children's needs in particular figured highly on the political agenda for a variety of reasons, 
not all of which were motivated out of an apparent increase in 'humanitarianism'. 
Childhood and Nationhood 
It was at this time that British industrial supremacy was beginning to be challenged by 
competitors and there was a generalised concern about national decline and malaise. 
Further, recruitment for the Boer war had raised concerns about the general unfitness of 
the working class; the socialist movement was gaining widespread support; Britain's birth 
rate was lagging behind those of Germany and America and there was public concern 
about the effects of poverty, heightened by Seebohm Rowntree's social survey of poverty 
in town life (1901). In response, a number of measures designed to alleviate the grievances 
of the respectable working class were taken in the form of pensions, health insurance and 
education. The Health Visiting Service was introduced along with school meals and regular 
medicals for school children. 
The 1908 Children Act was heralded as a 'children's charter': existing laws relating to 
the prevention of cruelty to children were strengthened, the sale of cigarettes to minors 
was prohibited for the first time, and juvenile courts were introduced and remand homes 
established. The reforms however, reflected more than a new-found concern for the 
welfare of children; in terms of the liberal economy, the concern for industrial efficiency 
and a desire to maintain the empire they "hit the right political note; statist as opposed to 
philanthropic, but minimalist as distinct from socialist" (Frost and Stein: 1989: 31). 
In this period 'nationhood' and 'childhood' become inextricably intertwined; the health 
of the nation depended upon the health of its future 'citizenship'; in order to ensure the 
former the 'needs' of the nation were to be met through the constitution of and provision 
for the 'needs' of the child (see Hendrick: 1997). Such needs required the child to hold the 
promise of future prosperity. Legislation extended what had been largely bourgeois- 
derived and 'expert-formulated' notions of childhood to the whole population. Further, as 
potential dfi. Zens of the liberal-capitalist state, such needs for care, protection and welfare 
Wclfarc, the State and the FamRy 
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came to be reconfigured within a framework of 'rights'; that is, as legitimate claims to, for 
example, protection from harm which must be met were children to fulfil their future role: 
The incapacitated child, vulnerable, innocentý ignorant and dependent, was 
entirely suited to be a member of the twentieth century family, the 'haven' witl-ýn 
the liberal-capitalist system, sustained by a popular vote ... In an age of fierce imperial, political, military and economic national rivalries, in addition to domestic 
anxieties regarding poverty, class politics, social hygiene and racial efficiency, 
children were being reconstructed as material investments in national progress. 
Hendrick: 1997: 51 
The establishment of a framework of child welfare legislation constructed the idea of 
children's rights which the state was ultimately required to ensure. This in turn served to 
further secure the separation of childhood from adulthood. Notions of children's 
incapacity and vulnerability was all the more strengthened and universalised which in turn 
made it all the more legitimate for the state to intervene in child rearing as the guardian of 
children's well-being. 
Social Democratic Welfare: Consensus, Liberalism and the Rise of Social Work 
In the inter-war period the main piece of child welfare legislation was the 1933 Children 
and Young Persons Act which was primarily concerned with offenders, reflecting the idea 
that delinquency was a consequence of bad parenting and environment. However, the Act 
also extended the grounds in which children were seen to be in need of state care and 
protection and required juvenile courts to consider the child's welfare in decision-making. 
In a way, the child's weýfarr and needs began to become public knowledge; a 'given' about 
the nature of childhood and family life that legitimised intervention. Local authorities were 
also now able to 'board out' children into foster care as well as sending them to 
institutions. The child 'of the family' was becoming one which had an emerging 
relationship to the state as a conduit for regulation and reform in the form of a collective 
responsibility borne by the state. 
With the outbreak of war in 1939, women's labour was needed both in the armed 
forces and in order to take jobs usually done by men. Briefly, 'separation' of the child from 
the family became acceptable and there was a significant expansion in day nursery 
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provision. However, once the war was over, anxieties were raised about the implications of 
dislocated families and separation for children's well-being. Hendrick (1997) cites the 
experience of evacuation as a central theme in veriýing various theories about the 
'psychological child' (Hendrick. 1997) such as 'maternal deprivation' and 'separation 
anxiety', which, it was alleged, could lead to character disorders in later life (Bowlby: 1946). 
Such notions were given widespread approval at a time when public policy was to 
encourage women to return to the home and helped pave the way for the welfare state in 
implying the necessity of preventative health and welfare provision in order to ensure 
family and social stability. The evacuation experience also revealed the extent of poverty 
and deprivation of urban life to the concern of a wider population. Consequently, these 
and other concerns meant that "as a political rationality, 'Welfarism' was structured by the 
wish to encourage national growth and well-being via the promotion of social 
responsibility and the mutuality of social risk... " (Parton: 1996: 8). By the outbreak of the 
Second World War children were entitled to free education up to the age of fourteen and 
the National Health Service Act of 1946 established the principle of free and universal 
medical care. 
The 1948 Children Act reflected a climate of liberalism, economic and social 
reconstruction and a belief in the partnership between the state and the family! It was 
widely believed that poverty and deprivation would be overcome through economic 
prosperity and it was this atmosphere of optimism and political consensus that 
underpinned the growth of the welfare state and state social work in the post-war period. 
In part, it was the shared experience of austerity and sense of solidarity during the war 
years which occasioned this broad-based compromise of the interests of capital and labour 
in which the welfare state was a key component. This broadly 'social democratic' approach 
Though it should be pointed out that this image was maintained, in part at least, by the passing, in the same year, of a 
Crim; nal justice Act which dealt more firmly with young offenders. The logic was much, 4h6 same, however. in the 
optimistic context of the welfare state, sociological justifications for crime would quicklyýdisappeaf, leaving the state 
with the simple task of administering condign punishment to those who, in spite of the opportunities available to 
them, continued to offend. 
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believed in a mixed economy of welfare in which a degree of intervention that did not 
compromise the overall capitalist project, but gave it a 'human face', was regarded as 
desirable in the interests of society as a whole. For both capital and tabour, sustained 
economic growth was the key with government acting to create the right conditions for 
this, mediate between unions and employers and administer the welfare state (Pierson: 
1991). 
The 1948 Act established Children's departments which were given specific duties 
towards the child 'in care': "... to exercise their powers with respect to him (sic) so as to 
further his interests and afford him the opportunity for the proper development of his 
character and abilities" (cited in Hendrick: 1994: 218). Certainly influenced by Bowlby 
(1944), Local Authorities were also given further encouragement to provide foster care 
instead of institutional care and greater emphasis was placed on restoration, wherever this 
was deemed appropriate. In broad terms, the aim was for a more generalised welfare 
provision which would enable the child to be maintained within the family and to return 
to it as soon as possible where it was not. Within social work agencies there was a growing 
sense of compatibility between worker and client; the character of social work seen as 
benign and paternalistic with an emphasis on the 'natural' family meeting the shared needs 
of its individual members towards the well-being of not only the individual child, but ideas 
of 'nationhood' in the liberal state, where the child of the family was the child of the 
nation-state, upon whom future prosperity depended. 
It is during this period of consensus that therapeutic, conciliatory and preventative 
aspects of social work begin to emerge and thrive, loosely framed in legislation as a means 
of keeping in check possible infringements of individual rights and family autonomy. The 
child 'in care', came in legislation to symbolise an 'ideal type'; a whole plethora of 
psychoanalytical, social and medical understandings were synthesised and crystallised in the 
1948 Act. Where the state was able to legitimately intervene on the basis of consensus 
around the needs of the child in the 'public care, a construction of childhood was ascribed 
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to it; what should, or should not be for the child 'in care' was everything that should be 
taken for granted by the 'natural' child in the 'natural' family. 
Having largely established the 'natural' state of childhood, about which there was some 
consensus, social work entered the stage on cue, now legitimately able to exercise 
discretionary powers within the arena of 'family' in a capacity of supporting that to which 
all families should aspire (to what was 'naturally' appropriate and necessary for the child to 
ffilly develop); and if they occasionally did not aspire, legitimate action could be taken to 
secure removal. Post-war social work 'casework' was broadly founded upon psycho- 
analytical theory and reflected notions of individual or family pathology where the 'deviant' 
who, in the nineteenth century would have been characterised as 'morally defective', 
became now seen as in need of a psycho-therapeutic/psychiatric-type intervention. 
Deviance and delinquency became symptoms of damage in early life, often with little 
differentiation between the 'offender' and the 'deprived; both could be conceptualised as 
'victims'. The Welfare State provided the rationale upon which social work was able to 
intervene in the family; not only did it mediate between the mainstream and the excluded 
but also between the various disciplines which provided 'knowledge' about the 'nature' of 
family life and childhood; it 'knew' what the 'interests' of the child were. "Social scientific 
knowledge was given a pre-eminence in ordering the rationality of the emerging 
professions, which were seen as having a major contribution to developing individual and 
social welfare and thereby operationalising increasingly sophisticated mechanisms of social 
regulation" (Parton: 1996: 8). In effect, it was possible for social work to be construed as 
politically neutral, giving appropriate value to a liberal ethic of family autonomy and 
individual freedom. In a period of consensus it acted to consolidate a childhood that was 
'naturalised'. intervening only where 'needs', 'dysfunction' or 'preventative mental health' 
required. Welfarism transformed relations between the 'social' and the 'state'; economy, 
welfare and progress were conceptually part of the same whole. In consequence, the health 
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of the child within the family was of particular concern; intrusion into the family could be 
facilitated without undermining autonomy and responsibility. 
Throughout the 1950's and 1960's the system of welfare was developed and extended 
by both major political parties in a period of relative affluence and optimism about the 
progress of the welfare state towards ultimately eradicating mass poverty and deprivation 
through continued economic growth. With the renewed emphasis on family bonds and 
the importance of attachments for children, policy and practice towards the family was 
predominantly about prevention; that is, avoiding the need for children to enter the care 
system in the first place. The 1963 Children and Young Persons Act reflected this 
disposition towards family support; even if children did enter the care system, the 
opportunity for rehabilitation was seen as something that should be regularly revisted. In 
consequence some children, who might otherwise have been adopted, spent significant 
periods in care, or 'yo-yoing' between care and the family home (FIarding: 1996). Gradually, 
consensus about the ambitions of the welfare state and the role of social work began to 
erode; there was a reappraisal from both sides of the political divide as, on the Left, it was 
realised that welfare was an inadequate response to the worst excesses of capitalism, 
serving the interests of the dominant groups more than the working class, and on the 
Right, welfare was seen as undermining individual autonomy, initiative and responsibility, 
as well as threatening private sector profitability. This reappraisal occurred at a time when 
there was a slowing down in economic growth, an increase in social deprivation and 
unemployment which combined with an unease about the viability of the 'project of 
welfare'. In part the very consensus about and containment of children within what was 
'one' 'childhood' (rather than ckildkoods) was what paradoxically contributed to a growing 
(and ongoing) dissensus and fragmentation about how to best manage welfare, family, and 
'child' within the context of differing perspectives on gender, socio-structural relations, 
most notably drawn from radical and feminist analyses. 
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Child Abuse, Dissensus and Radicalism 
The erosion of certainty about the 'nature' of childhood and family - concomitant with 
a fragmentation of consensus about the role of the welfare state and a slowing down of 
the economy - was manifested (perhaps constituted) through events surrounding the so- 
called 'discovery' of child physical abuse in the 1960's and 1970's and sexual abuse in the 
1980's. Subsequent events culrninated in the Children Act 1989 and the child protection 
processes that then emerged. 
In Britain events proved to be a variation on an American theme'. The issue was first 
acknowledged in an article in the British Medical Journal by Griffiths and Moynihan (1963) 
which cited Kempe's (1962) evidence of the 'battered baby syndrome' in the U. S and 
argued that many children were being misdiagnosed as having accidental injuries in Britain. 
Further impetus came from paediatricians and forensic pathologists, most notably 
Professor Keith Simpson who, in the British Medical journal (1965) argued the syndrome 
was a "widespread crime that can easily escape detection" (Simpson: 1965: 393) thus 
incorporating a criminal definition at least in terms of response, if medical in diagnosis. 
Responses to the problem in both Britain and the US affirmed a medical perception 
and calls were made for closer liaison with radiologists and paediatricians from social work 
agencies. Support also came from various voluntary agencies representing bourgeois values 
who were socially distanced from the emerging definition of the 'abuser' (Parton: 1985); 
most significant in Britain were the NSPCC who were instrumental in placing the issue on 
the political agenda and in pioneering therapeutic approaches to dealing with 'abusing' or 
'dysfunctional' families. The tendency toward medical explanations of child abuse whereby 
both victim and perpetrator can be characterised as in need of 'treatment' allowed for the 
2 'Ihe so-called 'discovery' of child abuse originated in the US with John Caffey (1946), a specialist in paediatric 
radiology who discovered inexplicable bone fractures and subdural hernatoma in small babies and opened up a debate 
about the possible role of parents in how these injuries were acquired. Events culminated in Kernpe's (1962) 
'discovery' of the battered baby syndrome. By emphasising the injuries to the child attention was drawn away from 
socio-economic factors that may impinge on families and the labelling of the problem as a syndrome ensured its 
initial location in a medical, rather than a socio-legal framework. Pfohl (1977) argues that this enabled radiologists to 
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possibility of 'therapy', thus legitimating and facilitating social work access to the private 
arena of the family. In the almost obsessive pursuit of 'causes' of abuse or on the pretext 
of the long-term psychological effects on the victims or with claims to be able to 'predict' 
abuse, access to the family is achieved where an otherwise overtly 'policing' and punitive 
function would be regarded as unacceptable in the liberal democracy. In constructing a 
unique %ridge' between the criminal and the victim, professionals such as the police and 
social workers, who historically and ideologically have evolved often conflicting toles, 
found they were able to co-operate in an area of common ground towards a shared 
objective. By virtue of doing so the 'policing' of families becomes further refined and 
notions of privacy effectively redefined (Harris: 1994). 
As the level, nature and scope of social work interventions increased, so concern about 
the controlling elements of social work practice increased. It was proposed that where 
liberal values did not correspond with client's values because, for example, of a different 
emphasis on family life, marriage or gender relations, social work practice could act in an 
oppressive and controlling way, failing to take account of structural inequality. Radical 
social work was a direct response to this predicament, formulated in the late 196d's' and 
early 1970's from a broadly Marxist perspective. Here, social work was seen as endorsing 
the oppressions experienced by those deemed superfluous or dangerous and represented 
the controlling arm of the state, intervening to keep the working class in place. 
Therapeutic and progressive liberal rehabilitative methods drawn from a psycho-dynamic 
perspective were regarded by Marxists as just as oppressive as policies previously derived 
from a 'Poor Law' mindset - more to do with the need to respond to increased 
antagonism and hostility provoked by the state's approach towards the 'undeserving' than 
any higher concern for the vulnerable and excluded. 
"reap the rewards associated with diagnosis" (PfohL- 1977: 333) since radiology in the US at the time was marginalised 
in the medical profession. 
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Feminist critiques which focused on the gender-specific consequences of the welfare 
state also began to take hold in the early 1970 ýS. 3 These were driven by the second wave of 
feminism in the twentieth century from the mid-1960's onwards (Friedan: 1963; Gavron: 
1966). Here, the social reproduction of labour (including child care but also caring for 
others) was identified as being rooted in a whole set of gendered processes which 
maintained a family form in which marriage and family were key sites of oppression. The 
welfare state, as something organised around the interests of capital and of men was, in 
this way, seen as having consequences for women in terms of benefit provisions and 
omissions and in the fundamental assumption that women were the economic dependents 
of men (McIntosh: 1978). Further, this focus on the 'private' as well as the 'public' spheres 
of oppression meant that sexual relations, the division of labour within the home and the 
treatment of women and children by men within the family were all politicised and formed 
part of a new consciousness regarding gender relations (Delphy and Leonard: 1992). This 
movement effectively served to redefine social problems and showed how where women 
failed to meet their role as carets problems often became pathologised and represented in 
terms of an inability to cope, adjust or achieve. Further, attacks on the patriarchal family 
form from feminists also served to redefine adult-child sexual activity as abusive and raised 
concerns about the long-term consequences of such activity on a child's psycho-sexual 
development. 
Such concern with sexual abuse and violence within the family served to challenge 
idealised notions of family life and the 'sanctity' of the blood-tie. This recognition of the 
family as the arena for violence and abuse led to tensions between the respect for privacy 
and autonomy, characteristic of the liberal democracy, and the need to protect children, 
not only from the maltreatment of adults in and of itself, but by maintaining them within 
the safety of a coherent, intact and sanctified idea of 'childhood'. Moreover, feminist 
3 For a comprehensive account of the various strands of this ferninist critique see Wilams (1989). 
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critiques which challenged the 'blood-tie' also served to reinforce the idea of children as a 
gseparate entity' from the family; one who had legitimate 'rights' to protection from harm. 
Radical and feminist critiques were not without their achievements, despite the fact that 
welfare remained within a dominant liberal, 'mixed economy' discourse. 4 Social work was 
steered clear of more explicitly repressive policies towards approaches which 
accommodated the idea that family problems were as much to do with social structure and 
organisation as individual pathology - despite a continued focus on the individual in terms 
of 'treatment' or 'therapy'. Gradually, what had broadly been psycho-social (but weighted 
towards the 'psy) understandings of family problems and child abuse began to be 
broadened out to include a more developed 'sociological' perspective. Garbarino and 
Gilliam's (1980) 'ecological' understanding of child maltreatment placed emphasis on 
impoverished environment as stimulating psychological stress and socio-structural. 
approaches argued that society itself set the pre-conditions for child maltreatment (Parton: 
1985). The adoption of positive and rehabilitative models of social work ensured a strategy 
of state regulation could legitimately continue to operate within the arena of family life 
with some disquiet, but without too much resistance. However, although resistance to 
repressive policies achieved change, it crucially failed to control how such change was 
meted out - it was left to the 'experts' - the social workers, the psychologists and the 
medical profession to decide matters. It was more a case of seeing the individual as 
'damaged' or the family as 'dysfunctional' as a result of poverty, deprivation and 
consequent bad parenting, rather than as inherently feckless and therefore undeserving. 
4 One response to concerns about 'oppressive practice' was the emergence of 'empowering' practice, which was 
incorporated into mainstream social work (see Adams: 1990). The concept had its origins on the ffinges of social 
work, of indeed within wholly autonomous self-help groups. Empowerment aimed to eradicate the powerlessness 
incited by negative valuations associated with an individuals affiliation to a particular group and to ensure equality of 
access to services which did not emphasise surveillance and control but were at first facilitative and preventative (see 
Ahmed. 1990). Once incorporated wholesale into the philosophy and practice of social work (i. e. immersed 
irretrievably within the discourse) such processes can arguably be seen as representing a subtle, yet sophisticated 
transformation in the exercise of power and regulatory imperatives of the state. Masquerading as 'progressive 
practice' and liberation from the classist, racist or sexist assumptions of state policy, empowerment draws individuals 
into changed processes of self-regulation under a populist guise of choice and self-determination, thus colluding in a 
particular structuring of social relations and ensuring that any subsequent failure to adjust of adapt can be well and 
truly located within the individual. 
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Radical and feminist critiques may not have succeeded in overthrowing a capitalist or 
patriarchal order, but they did succeed in going some way towards changing welfare 
policies and practice. More particularly, in Cleveland, for example, it was the power and 
influence of the middle classes (since it was they who were suspected of abuse in this case), 
espousing principles of family privacy, autonomy and control of excess bureaucracy which 
was able to curb the excessive intrusion and surveillance of the state. 
Many of the above tensions and dilemmas were to find expression in the Children Act 
1989; more fundamentally, the Act was concerned with defining and refining the 
boundaries and parameters of state intervention in family life, an issue focused in the 
public consciousness by the media as a result of the reports into the deaths of children and 
the Cleveland Inquiry. 
Child Abuse Inquiries 
Public inquiries into the deaths of Maria Colwell (HMSO: 1973); Kimberley Carlile 
(Greenwich: 1987); jasmine Beckford (1985: Brent); Tyra Henry (Lambeth: 1987) and 
others, impacted on policy greatly and were crucial in providing the motivation for new 
processes of management and identification of 'risky' families. The first coherent attempt 
to 'manage' child abuse was inaugurated with a DHSS circular after the report of the 
enquiry into the death of Maria Colwell. Maria had been in care but was returned home by 
Social Services and the courts, only to die at the hands of her step-father. The DHSS 
circular stressed the need for teamwork, case conferences and child protection registers. 
Subsequent circulars in 1976 and 1980 aimed to promote better understanding between 
police and other agencies, rationalise management and broadened the criteria of abuse - 
although it still did not include sexual abuse. Significantly, responsibility for the death of 
Maria Colwell and other children often appeared to be apportioned more to the child care 
agency than the individual perpetrator. Social service departments were castigated for their 
fOure to protect the child and for an over-emphasis on maintaining the 'natural' family at 
the expense of protecting the child (although the opposite criticism was levelled in the case 
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of Cleveland). At the same time, policy began to shift towards the prevention of further 
abuse by providing children with permanent substitute care either in adoptive placements 
or long-term foster care. The DHSS guide 'Working Together' (1988) was drafted in 1986; 
amongst agencies now to be included in child protection were hospital staff, midwives, 
health visitors, school nurses, G. Ps, police, teachers, voluntary organisations who were all 
required to be 'aware of the signs of abuse' (para. 3.8). The guide emphasised the need for 
inter-agency cooperation - explicitly in the case of sexual abuse - not stated as such in the 
1986 draft and reflected the impact of the Cleveland enquiry in the interim period. 
When in Cleveland (1987) the inadequacy of medical assessment alone was raised, along 
with the perceived over-zealous tendency to intervene, the focus was shifted further 
towards social assessment, placing the social worker centre stage with their interpretative 
knowledge of the subjective reality of family life. Cleveland's crisis combusted in 1987 
when the police decided to no longer act on uncorroborated medical diagnosis. 121 cases 
of suspected sexual abuse of children with an average age of 6-9 years caused much public 
alarm and media attention. The children were diagnosed on the basis of 'anal dilation'. 
When the police withdrew, the social services decided to continue to act on referrals from 
the paediatrician. 26 of the 121 were eventually deemed wrongly diagnosed. 5 Whilst the 
subsequent report brought child sexual abuse into a wider arena, it was the management of 
child protection upon which emphasis was placed. Suspicion of abuse was now seen as 
requiring a 'social as well as medical assessment' (Vorking Together': DHSS Guide: 1988: 
para. 5.13). However, neither the reports, nor subsequent government guidance were 
primarily concerned with how to either detect or prevent abuse; the emphasis was on a 
rationalisation of agency response, better inter-agency co-operation and the shift from a 
medical to socio-legal assessment. Here, "the issue was not prevention and detection of 
the most elusive crime, but the etiquette of intervention" (Campbell: 1988: 210). The 
The paediatrician at the centre of the raw, Dr Marietta Higgs, came in for particular vilification at the hands of the 
press. She was presented as an irrational feminist zealot; the Sunday Telegraph in 1987 ran a story suggesting she was 
projecting her own hatred for her father notwhclubw of the children she examined (see Campbell: 1988). 
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common thread throughout many of the above child abuse reports was the assumption 
that by refining procedure and legislation, abuse as defined can be prevented and 
unnecessary or excessive interference avoided. 
The Children Act 1989 
As the parameters of state intervention were rolled back in the 1980's in both 
economic and social terms, the family was posited as the institution wherein appropriate 
values would be instilled; its integrity and autonomy central to this role, with the state 
interventionist only in enabling the maintenance of familW relations and protection of the 
vulnerable child. Perhaps predictably, when the perceived permissiveness of the 1960's was 
being held to blame for the erosion of traditional family and moral values it was the social 
work profession which came to epitomise the excessively liberal, permissive attitudes 
responsible for undermining morality as well as draining public funds. It was in this 
political climate that local authorities found themselves at the forefront of criticism as 
burdening the wealth-creating potential of the free market enterprise economy. The social 
services in particular were seen not just as a high cost activity but also as encouraging 
reliance on state services and acting as a disincentive to individual and family responsibility. 
It is in this context of a state explicit in ideology and moral pontificating, yet minimalist in 
terms of intervention and support that economic policy mirrors social policy; the free 
market the cornerstone of the former; the family the cornerstone of the latter. Regulation 
of the family is thereby expressed in terms of individual 'freedom'; that is, freedom 
expressed and experienced in rrIation to unnecessary state interference. "In such 
circumstances, the law becomes crucial in defining and operationalising both 'natural' 
rights and 'natural' responsibility" (Parton: 1991: 202). Thus, generalised welfare provision, 
particularly child care, becomes seen as too costly in economic terms; having too little 
coherence in political terms and too much ambivalence in moral terms. Freedom, in the 
context of neo-liberalism in the 1980's, far from being seen as a threat to social order and 
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stability, was precisely that which would ensure it, where it was defined as freedom from 
the interference of the state. 
The Children Act gave rise to a legalistic, procedure-dominated model of child 
protection which served to define and legitimate particular notions of 'rights', 'freedoms' 
and 'responsibilities' presented in terms of protecting the 'naturalness' and autonomy of 
the traditional nuclear family and childhood within it. In this way, children of the famil, ý, Y' 
were effectively defined as the responsibility of the family, and the Western liberal state in 
a way in which other children are simply not. That is, an active, personal and collective 
responsibility, characterised as 'natural' but constructed upon socially determined concepts 
of rights and duties, defined through political imperatives and statutory dudes but very 
distinct from, for example, a felt, moral responsibility towards all children or towards 
children in dire need in other parts of the world: 
If child protection were based on considerations other than law and policy -a 
hierarchy of need for example, it is inconceivable that we should be so exercised 
by the murder of a single Maria Colwell ... yet so acquiescent in the systematic destruction of young lives in other parts of the globe. 
Harris: 1993: 3 
The effect of much of the above was to emphasise notions of individual rights (of both 
children and parents) arising out of both the nature and autonomy of the family, which 
demanded that when the state was required to intervene in order to protect the child, this 
was within the much clearer legal framework of the Children Act. " In this way, legalism in 
child protection gave at least the appearance of defining more clearly family failure, and in 
effect redefined, reconstituted what family life 'should' be. Child protection then 
6 To an extent the notion of children's rights was accommodated in the Children Act 1989 in that the child's wishes and 
feelings must be taken into account and separate legal representation is required in court procedures and that a local 
authority must provide a complaints procedure for cl-ýIdren who are looked after' by them. At the same time, 
adult/child sexual relations ate manifestly construed as abusive. This contradiction is accommodated by what Harris 
calls the notion of "child-as-vulnerable-cidzen! ' (10: 1993) requiring appropriate legal protection. In addition, the 
parental rights lobby found expression in the Act through the abandonment of the status of 'voluntary care' whereby 
responsibility had been assumed by the state after a given period of time via mere administrative process. 
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turns on a formulation in welfare law wl-&h specifies minimum rights for the 
child, visits minimum responsibilities on the family, and allocates powers and 
duties to the state to be exercised in the event of family failure. It is this network 
of lights, duties and powers which both creates and reflects the relations between 
child, family and state. 
Harris: 1994: 5 
Moreover and in spite of the apparent intention towards minimalism and constraint in 
terms of codifying procedures, prescribing duties and circumscribing power, legalism, as an 
'ethos' became very pervasive, dominating other aspects of provision so that the potential 
for child protection shaped all interventions. In this sense, a legalistic approach to child 
protection represented a more diverse, extensive manifestation of regulatory imperatives. 
For example, increasing numbers of local authorities began to have teams specialising in 
child protection and investigative work and the area was increasingly seen as a 'field' in its 
own right. An ethos of scrutiny, surveillance and prediction came to both predominated 
and permeates all aspects of child care - for example, in the replacement of day nursery 
provision with family centres, thus facilitating monitoring and observation of families. In 
many ways what was once 'child care' became reconstructed as 'child protection' rather 
than the latter as a component of the former. In part, this shift resulted from the widening 
of definitions of abuse to include neglect and emotional deprivation. ' But at the same time 
as the scope for protection widened, resources were being reduced and generalised, 
preventative measures had a waning credibility. Choices needed to be made between but 
between generalised prevention and prediction in child protection itself. The trend 
towards locating high risk families was seen as enabling protection whilst ensuring 
autonomy and focusing limited resources appropriately. The assumption has been that by 
becoming better able to predict high risk families and their degree of 'dangerousness' we 
are both able to minin-iise risks to children and eliminate unnecessary intervention in the 
family. Again, in order to facilitate this process a much clearer legal context was demanded. 
It would also be naive to see child protection as solely about policing 'high risk' families 
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since this fails to account for the principles of partnership and cooperation with parents 
embodied in the Act, which was achieved largely through the efforts of the parental rights 
lobby. Social regulation is not only top-down nor uni-directional, the Act is characterised 
by its attempt to accommodate the diversity of pressures and interests discussed. It is this 
very tension that is at the core of contemporary responses to child abuse. 
Introducing a Discourse of Childhood 
In many ways, child protection in the 1980's and 1990's became a 'unifying symbol' 
(Harris: 1994), a common banner beneath which the political Left and Right were able to 
come together, albeit very from different routes, in pursuit of a shared goal - the 
apparently politically neutral act of protecting the child. 'Child protection' thus became a 
valid pursuit for a variety of strange bedfellows, each able to justify their position from 
their own perspective so that whether one believes in social work as benign or controlling, 
children's rights, 'family values' or state paternalism, each can be accommodated within the 
same 'conceptual framework' of child protection. 
Similarly, what is significant about the variable interpretations of the role of the state, 
welfare and family life described in this chapter is that whilst each came with its own 
understandings of child abuse which sought to validate the originating perspective, all 
came to be immersed, to some extent, within a prevailing understanding of childhood 
offered by liberal professionalism. So, "feminists discover (child abuse) is all an expression 
of patriarchy; utopian socialists that it is a perversion of capitalism; conservatives that it is a 
symptom of moral decay" (Dingwall: 1989: 49). Though often in conflict and contradiction, 
the above interpretations all revolve around naturalised versions of childhood. Thus, on 
the basis of increasing 'knowledge', progress and better understanding, the perspectives all 
debate the extent to which children 'in childhood' experience, suffer, manipulate, subvert 
7 See also Wessages From Research' (Department of Health: 1995) which highlighted the way in which local authorities 
work with children and families in need tended to draw them unnecessarily into the net of child protection, 
sometimes regardless of any actual, or potential 'abuse'. 
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or are damaged by these various versions of reality, since in 'natural' childhood the 
innocent and the depraved, the needy and the over-indulged, the victim and the 
delinquent, the functional and the dysfunctional, the attached and the disordered are 
encapsulated within the same whole; that being one, definitive and universal childhood. 
The contradictions this inevitably raises were (and are) acknowledged, debated, reasoned - 
but only along the lines of competing perspectives that regard childhood as the constant. 
So, debates tend to revolve around concerns about 'the demise of family values', 'the 
rights of the child', the failure of education, the oppression of women and children, etc. - 
not for one moment was the certainty and distinctiveness of 'childhood' itself thrown into 
question; interest was, until very recently, focused on simply discovering more 
(psychologically, socially, developmentally) about what is largely accepted as a 'given'; that 
childhood 'is'. 
In the twentieth century, this 'nature' of childhood was largely been derived from 
psychoanalysis and developmental psychology, most notably consolidated in the work of 
jean Piaget (see Piaget: 1953). Such accounts continue to dominate everyday 
understandings about children and are reflected in attitudes and behaviour towards 
children. Prout and James offer the example of "the common parental lament 'its just a 
phase s/he's going through, -' (which) relies heavily on an implicit piagetian model of child 
development, providing a biological explanation for a breakdown in social relationships" 
(Prout and James: 1997: 12). Further, developmental psychology continues to form the 
backbone of social work professional knowledge about children and professional child 
care practices, in an often unequivocal way as this study will come to show in subsequent 
chapters. This 'psychological child' (Hendrick: 1997) is necessarily attached to the 'natural' 
family; it contains a 'truth' which informs not only the development of the fully 
functioning adult in the future, but also the maternal and paternal roles, reinforced and 
extrapolated in the theories of maternal deprivation and attachment presented by Bowlby 
(1946/1953) which also still pervade professional child care practice. In this way, increasing 
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or 'new' 'knowledge' about childhood in the twentieth century no longer undermined the 
possibility of thinking of the child as 'natural' - ft reinforced ft. Indeed, it is the very 
accumulation of knowledge within certain parameters that serves to both discover more at 
the same time as fixing childhood to nature. In other words, further 'discoveries' about 
cl-ýildhood become self-validating pursuits where 'what counts' as knowledge is prefigured 
and circumscribed by a pre-existing framework of understanding that is no longer open to 
question. This way of understanding knowledge Foucault describes as discourse and is 
discussed more fully in the following chapter. 8 For now, suffice to say that discourse is 
that which limits the possibilities of knowledge in any given area of thought; it is both 
what contains, constrains and constructs thinking about social phenomena; thus " 'truth' 
becomes a function of what can be said, written or thought" (McHoul: 1993: 33). In this 
way, the 'history of childhood' is read in terms of the present, understandings of children 
and their treatment in the past may logically be characterised as a gradual and progressive 
awakening to the truth about the nature of childhood as knowledge casts the light of 
reason on the past. The effect of all of the above has served to reinforce the specificity 
and uniqueness of childhood as &stinctfivm adulthood. Childhood in the twentieth century 
became increasingly immersed within a psychological/ 'needs' discourse that served to 
'neutralise' any instability; or, more accurately, any instability could now be rationalised as 
mitbin the child's 'nature'. It is as if in a 'moment' (that never was) of certainty about 
childhood, when it was almost possible to say wbat it was, it became simultaneously 
possible to construct different worlds around it that were often in conflict and 
competition; it was possible to conceptualise the 'given' (childhood) in a variety of 
contexts. These 'worlds' (discourses), however, were in the same space and orbit; they 
orbited childhood. An illusory stability to the signifief 'childhood' meant that it was 
8 This being the sense of the term 'discourse' used throughout this discussion; as such it is distinct from discourse in 
the sense of Inguistic systems' where an analysis seeks to establish underlying, universal 'rules' about how they work 
(as in a structuralist approach e. g. Levi-Strauss (1966), Saussure (1959)); or, in what might be loosely defined as a 
'sociological' sense as the material substance of what makes up 'common sense' understandings or 'knawledges' of 
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conceptually possible, within a particular configuration of signification to validate and 
sustain a variety of perspectives and interests. The child 'in childhood' became primarily an 
object of concern, not least in respect of a conceptualisation as 'citizens' (albeit with 
limited enforcement powers in respect of rights). Children held within them the dreams 
and aspirations of many different interest groups. This study will come to explore further 
the contention that the notion of the 'natural child' is a construct whose subject (the child 
in childhood) is constituted out of intersecting discourses of 'family', 'childhood', 'needs, 
'state' and 'welfare'; that is, childhood is a culturally and historically specific concept. 
Similarly, the social construction of child abuse, aside from obviously violent acts, is fed by 
a particular correlation between 'deviance' and 'control'; clearly, it is not so much the 
behaviour of adults towards children in these circumstances which is of significance so 
much as the social meaning and status of the behaviour. When social workers provide 
services to families 'in need', often at the request of families themselves, they do so in 
order to assist, support and advise but also as a means of inspection and monitoring, in an 
almost permanent state of 'assessment' as to whether a family has slipped across the 
threshold into an area requiring statutory intervention. 
Foucault's notion of discourse is significant for this study in terms of the way in which 
a naturalised childhood served as the common denominator for a number of competing 
and conflicting perspectives on the state. Tied to childhood, both liberal and radical 
frameworks of understanding were able to utilise the 'interests' of the natural child as the 
cornerstone of the 'natural' family in the pursuit of political and ideological goals. 'Me 
possible exception to this might be seen as feminist analyses, which, by problematising 
family relations as patriarchal, began to challenge some of the underlying assumptions 
about the 'nature' of family life. Without doubt, feminism challenged the universalism of 
social and political thought as male-centred and the oppositional categories of 
the social world and the methods in which these are used (for in overview of some of these approaches see 
McCarthy (1992) and for a particular strand Garfinkel (1967)). 
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man/woman (see Williams: 1996). Whilst this also extended into a critique of family, sexual 
relations and the child's position within this, the tendency was not arguably to undermine 
the child's nature as such, but to point to the threat posed to that nature within the 
patriarchal family. Such conceptualisations, whether implicitly or explicitly, relied on 
(required) the 'natural' child to stabilise the discourse. Whether they were damaged by 
'bad' parents in terms of psychological/sexual/physical harm, or by 'bad' society/state in 
terms of disadvantage/oppression/deptivation, or, indeed a combination of both 
(enviromnent/neglect/developmentaI delay), children were destined to suffer one way or 
another, in their state of natural incapacity. 
As far as social work policy and practice is concerned, a 'perspective' on child welfare 
can be seen as an expression of a particular set of values and beliefs that gives a legitimacy 
to actions in a way which is validated and understood as 'making sense' from nitbin, for 
example, a discourse of liberal professionalism. Needless to say, the individual social 
worker is at liberty to conceptualise themselves as 'radical', 'subversive, 'paternalistic', 
'benevolent', 'controlling, 'empowering. More likely, they may regard their motives and 
actions as embodying one or more of these, even in the same instant and in undertaking a 
single act, for example, removing a child from a. - Such diversity is unproblematically 
embraced within the discourse of 'social work' without any underlying 'policing' and 
control imperatives being compromised or any 'rupture' within the discourse. Similarly, at 
a macro level of social and historical analysis, a particular welfare perspective may inform a 
response to child abuse and may be classified in terms of the contemporaneous political, 
social and moral milieu but to proceed to over-categorise carries the inherent risk of over- 
simplifying the multi-faceted exercise of power. 'O For example, whether an historically- 
specific policy response to child maltreatment can be characterised as articulating a belief 
9 Removing a child could all at once be regarded as liberating and empowering (for the child), controlling and 
oppressive (for the parents); more helpfiffly (for this study, at least) it can be regarded as not one or the other, but 
both, simultaneously. 
10 For this kind of typology see Harding- 1991. 
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in one, or a combination of principles of 'family autonomy', 'state paternalism', 'children's 
rights' or 'laissez-faire', it will not provide us with the possibility of understanding any of 
the aforementioned outside of the totality of the discourse of childhood. 
In this way, different perspectives on welfare and the relationship between the state and 
the family are not mutually exclusive and should not be seen isolated and separable themes, 
but rather as part of the same whole. 'Common-sense' understandings of shifts and 
changes of in definitions of child abuse and the activity of child protection are in and of 
themselves problematical, being part of the same discourse, constituents of the same self- 
enclosed totality. Moreover, the very idea of a progressive humanitarianism, responding to 
the worst excesses of capitalism via the welfare state is thus re-positioned as 
epiphenomenal, rather than central to the development of child welfare. Shifts and 
changes in policy and practice, put alongside the critiques of welfare offered by Radicalism 
and feminism reflected firstly resistance, but ultimately an accommodation within an intact 
discourse, to changed understandings and relations between the family and the state. 
Essentially, the change presented was that the family in nalmrr could no longer be taken for 
granted as the sanctuary for the child ofnaturr. 
Towards a postmodern critique 
By the 1980's the perceived fOure of the project of welfare enabled the rise of a neo- 
liberalism which was able to emphasise that it was the rational actions of individuals and 
the operation of a free market which guaranteed that society functions most effectively 
and efficiently and which was the only rational possibility for progress (Parton: 1997). The 
vision of a 'humane' social democratic welfare model, benignly meeting needs through the 
provision of universal services was undermined by the harsh realities of economic 
recession and the demands of globalised capital and the market. To an extent, it was a 
vision that collapsed beneath the auspices of a welfare project that had itself perpetuated 
the very divisions it purported to address - the growing gulf between rich and poor, Black 
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and white, the 'included' and the variously excluded (the offender, the child 'in care' the 
mentally ill). In this way it was in part the increasing disillusionment with radicalism and 
social democratic welfare which began to undermine the whole approach to welfare within 
modernity. All failed to realise the vision of emancipation and universal welfare. 
The neo-liberal ethic of the 1980's and 1990's came to dominate the welfare agenda by 
re-establishing the rationality of market forces and the precedence of individual autonomy, 
choice and responsibility in contrast to the unwieldy apparatus of collective welfare and 
communitarianism. In addition, the collapse of the socialist states of Eastern Europe and 
the ideological crisis of the Left aided the pre-eminence of neo-liberahsm as the whole idea 
of the socialist state fell largely into disrepute. The consequent dismanthng of the welfare 
state placed those on the Left, including many feminists, in the paradoxical position of 
defending the remnants of state welfare, despite the fact that it had been the focus for 
critique as a state apparatus which perpetuated both capitalist and patriarchal forms, so 
that for many, "even a monolithic, centralised welfare state might be preferable to no 
welfare state at all" (Leonard: 1997: 4). 
Further, liberal, social democratic, Marxist and feminist approaches have not only been 
challenged by the radical Right, but also as part of an overall challenge to Modernity 
presented by postmodern theorists. Fundamentally, this postmodern critique is about a 
ciids of knowledge within the Western philosophical tradition, one which serves to challenge 
assumptions made not only about the representations presented by knowledge, but about 
the idea of representation itself i. e., a challenge to the idea that, through knowledge, the 
'real world' can ever be represented. What both radical, social democratic, liberal and, to 
lesser extent, feminist frameworks assume, is that through 'progress' (for the radical 
through undermining and ultimately overthrowing the existing order, or for liberals, 
through economic growth, opportunity and wealth-accumulation) 'universal' welfare will, 
at some point in the future, be secured. It is this very idea of progress that postmodernism 
serves to challenge and post-structuralism seeks to undermine, both in terms of the 
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particular (i. e. bow law and policy is played out in practice), and the generalised (i. e. the 
inherent logic that motivates and drives the idea of 'progressý. 
From a postmodern perspective, welfare, in all its forms and whatever the motives at 
any given cultural and historical location, is regarded as a prodmet of modernio, the origins of 
which lie within the 'project of Enlightenment', formulated at the end of the eighteenth 
century. Here, a belief in ideas of progress, scientific knowledge, 'truth' and 'discovery' 
(crystallised in the French Revolution) came to dominate, provided the context for, and 
combined with a new capitalist agenda. 'Progress', in all its manifestations - economic, 
scientific, wealth-creating, humanitarian, emancipatory - provided an aspirational ethos 
which embraced capitalism and its oppositional ideology, socialism. To this extent, 
capitalism and socialism can be seen as 'rival forms of modernity' (Leonard: 1997). Or, put 
another way, they were a "family quarrel inside Modernity" (Bauman, cited in Leonard: 
1997). 
For the purposes of this study, Marxist, liberal, social democratic, feminist and neo- 
liberal critiques of welfare are all problematic in that they offer a 'Vision' of emancipation, 
albeit via different routes. Each route to emancipation or universal 'Well-being' itself 
requires domination (of either groups of people, ideas, or power structures) as, at the very 
least, a stage on the way. Those 'on the outside', the variously excluded, are required to 
determine the 'mainstream'. Further, whilst liberal and social democratic visions of welfare 
aim for a balance between apparently 'opposing' interests of human need and capitalism, 
this itself presupposes that the relative 'few' win decide what 'welfare' should signify for 
the many - despite what might be good intentions, there remained (remains) a prefiguring 
'blue-print' which contains thinly-veiled, but inevitable moral imperatives (about family 
form, gender relations, childhood etc. ) which will determine the shape and form that 
welfare takes. This is no more keenly felt in the arena of social work policies and 
intervention to support the family and/of protect the child. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that the neither state, not anyone else for that matter, 
unilaterally designates a definition of, say, child abuse, with which 'society' and the 'family' 
accords and to which social work professionals respond; such definitions are constantly 
being reworked by multitudinal. forces in an often unpredictable way. Indeed, they are not 
ever'fixed' and neither are responses to them; 'meaning' is constantly reconstituted in the 
'ebb and flow' of signification. The 'appearance of certainty' (about childhood, child 
abuse, family, and so on) is no more than a reflection of the particularised relations of 
power at a given point, indeed, the more 'certain' things appear, the more fragile they 
become, likely to fragment at any moment as meaning erodes. 
As far as this study is concerned, it is, therefore inadequate to see the state in the 
Marxist sense, as a coherent oppressive body emitting a uni-directional flow of power, or 
similarly, to see the family as some quietly acquiescent, reified construct that offers no 
resistance. That is not to negate the repressive exercise of power in society of one group 
over another but to suggest that as part of a 'social totality', power is also generative, 
creative and muld-directional. In this way, resistance is accommodated, allowed for, but 
ultimately circumscribed; the price to be paid for inclusion. These are all ideas which will 
receive further explanation in subsequent chapters. From an applied and 'professional 
practice' point of view all of this means concepts like childhood, child welfare and 
residential care need to be perceived muld-dimensionally (as having multiple signification 
and 'layers' of meaning) and with regard to the sometimes unintended consequences of 
policy directives and social action, right down to the very language used to construct, 
rather than reflect the 'reality' of social work practice. In this thesis, the post-structuralist 
framework, drawing primarily from the work of Foucault (1971,1972,1977,1981) and 
Derrida (1972,1973,1976,1987), will not, however, just be used as "an analytic 
scatterbomb waiting to be randomly secreted in argument by the cultural terrorist" Genks: 
1993: 138), but rigorously applied to selected texts, highlighting the intellectual deficit left 
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by remaining within the discourse of liberal professionalism; a deficit that may have real 
consequences in terms of the 9ived experience' of those on the 'receiving end' of social 
work interventions. Chapters Two and Three now begin to elaborate this conceptual 
framework 
CHAPTER 7WO 
FOUCAULT: DISCOURSE, POWER AND TIJE CONSTITUTED 
SUBJECT 
Introduction 
In this and the following chapter the study introduces and extrapolates some of the 
ideas of Foucault and Derrida respectively in order to draw together a conceptual 
framework applicable to a study of childhood in 'public care. 
It is worth stating here that neither of the two writers that this study primarily draws 
from attempts to theorisc the 'postmodern' per se. This is despite an irretrievable and, 
perhaps, inevitable association with the term. Their project is not to 'inhabit', define or 
describe the 'postmodern era' or persuade the reader of the 'postmodcrn condition'. 
Rather, they set out distinct, but complementary appmaches which unequivocally serve to 
undermine a monolithic rationality that is regarded as underpinning the Western 
philosophical tradition. In different ways, both are ultimately involved in a critique of the 
subject; not, however, in the sense of its 'disappearance', the 'end of an era' or a 
substantive 'break with the past', but in terms of how it is constituted, how it works as 
'meaning-in-origin' and as a transcendental signifief in the philosophical tradition. Further, 
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both writers arc concerned with the multiplicity of representation within an endlessly 
deferring field of signification. However, whereas Derrida's strand of post-structuralism is 
linguistic and textual in orientation, emphasising the interplay between reader and text and 
intertextuality, Foucault's emphasis is on the operation of power within the interplay of 
signification. Here, language and knowledge are seen as inseparable from power; 
Foucault's interest is in exposing the politics that are at work in 'representations' 
(discourses) and thereby in the constitution of the subject. The association of both writers 
with the postmodern is, therefore, more by default than design; less of a 'break' with 
tradition, more a re-examination of the very presuppositions that 'prop up' 'tradition'. And 
to this extent, as post-structuralists, they are, etymologically speaking, 'post-' more in the 
sense of 'from' than after in time or order. 
Foucault's investigations are cross-disciplinary; they range from psychopathology 
(Madness and Cidlisation- 1971) and medicine (Tbe Birfb of the Clinic. - An Arcbaeolo ,g of 
Me&cal 
Perception. - 1963), to criminology (Disoline and Punisb. The Bilfb of the Prison. 1977) and the 
final three volume H&og ofSexwafiýy. Despite the diversity of these fields of study, there is 
a continuity in Foucault's work. This is derived from his concern that conventional 
accounts of 'history' are always written from the perspective of the present; that is, as if 
history is a 'lead up' to the present where continuity always takes precedence over the 
discontinuity of practices. By writing across a variety of disciplines Foucault aims to 
establish a critique of strategic practices and structures of knowledge that have sustained 
the dominant discourses of Western culture. This is what Foucault prefers to call an 
'archaeology' of knowledge: 
He brushes the traditional scientific approach against the grain ... redraws the 
frontiers, exposing hitherto unrernarked overlaps and bringing together things 
usually far apart 
KeameT. 1994: 285 
In The Order of Tbings (1970) Foucault provides a critique of discourse at it crosses a 
series of 'epistemic jumps', charactcrised not by continuity but discontinuous ruptures. 
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The focus in the early work is on how discourse operates within the 'episteme' which 
represents the underpinning field of knowledge that sets the limits to understanding about 
'what can be said' across the whole range of seemingly unconnected disciplines. In this, 
Foucault validates the structuralist premise that concepts of 'meaning', 'subject and 
'reason' are constructions within underlying and unconscious systems of signs. 
As enthusiasm for structuralism begins to subside in the 1970's, discourse features less 
prominently in Foucault's work, his attention is turned more towards how knowledge 
operates as a social power upon the 'body' of the individual and the ways in which various 
institutions define the 'normal' and the 'deviant'. Dirqý, Une andPunish (1977) examines the 
confinement of the criminal and the emergence of the 'disciplinary society'. Foucault 
suggests it is not possible to separate the emergence of the prison as a form of 
punishment in the mid-nineteenth century from the rise of a number of other institutions 
(the school, the factory) which also emphasise the discipline of the body as a new 
articulation of power. 
A further movement towards the constitution of the self-forming subject can be 
discerned in Foucault's final three-volume Histog of Se. ýmaliýJ,. Here, Foucault examines the 
'confessional' rationale behind the rise of the sexual sciences and the ways in which 
individuals participate in subject-constitution through psychological and medical discourses 
thereby becoming active in the 'self-disciplining' order. These movements in Foucault's 
work are also characterised as a refinement of the 'archaeological' towards a more 
'genealogical' approach, found in Difqýkne and Punish and The Histog of Sexualiýy. Whereas 
his archaeology treats systems of knowledge as discursive formations operating 
independently from the intentions of subjects, his genealogy goes further than this to 
explain both the transition from one, contingent system of thought to another, and 
emphasises the connection between power and knowledge on active, subject-formation 
through self-knowledge. In this way, Foucault dispenses with the structuralist quest to 
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universalise a theory of discourse in favour of an examination of the discursive practices of 
the human sciences. To this extent, Foucault's later work might be seen as a critique of his 
earlier work. This study relies on elements drawn from the full body of Foucault's work to 
develop some of the conceptual tools for analysis. Towards that end the elements that this 
chapter now elucidates are epistemes, discourse, genealogy, power/knowledge and 
disciplinary practices. 
Epistemes, Discourse and Truth 
Thus far, the discussion has already inferred that for Foucault 'truth' and 'knowledge' 
are constituted through discourse; this idea is set against the Enlightenment conception of 
knowledge as that which jields truth and progress; and, to this extent, is provisional, 
culturally and historically specific, as opposed to definitive, universal and progressive. Its 
status is determined through the norms and rules internal to the prevailing episteme which 
sets the parameters and delimits 'what can be said' and how we think about, for example, 
childhood, depending upon certain 'conditions of possibility'. An episteme represents the 
framework of reference which works as the 'historical a prioe of the given epoch and 
which 'pre-exists' the human subject. For this study, discourse cannot refer to a given 
system or a self-enclosed 'body' of 'knowledge' whose parameters are definable and 
achieve some kind of closure. It may, however, refer to particular forms of knowledge that 
arise, for example as part of a particular 'discipline', but that should not be taken to 
gni§calion is open, fluid and indeterminate. presuppose a 'closure'; the field of si 
Notwithstanding the above, certain conditions (social, political, cultural, historical) will 
arise where particular sets of knowledge are given weight and validity in such a way as to 
. 
ppearance of 'limits' Cbody', 'form', 'shape) or parameters to understanding, give the a 
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'thinldng' and reasoning. It is these conditions that interest Foucault, as well as the specific 
propositions that count as 'true'where such conditions arise. ' 
In 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' (1978), Foucault suggests some of the general 
criteria or conditions that 'hold together' discourse in a way that is 'recognisable', even 
though we would struggle to define the limits (this is not surprising since signifiers 
endlessly defer onward). Not only do discourses overlap and intersect, they may also inberr 
within in one another but are still able to produce the appearance of being relatively well- 
bounded fields of 'knowledge'. They are also historically specific, having "thresholds and 
conditions of birth and disappearance" (Foucault: 1978: 62). It is not, then unity or 
'structure' that enclose discourse but 'criteria of formation' that allow, permit and validate 
what might sometimes even be inconsistent or contradictory concepts, objects, operations 
and 'theoretical options'. Further, discourse has what Foucault calls criteria of 
'transformation' which enable all of the concepts, objects and operations to meet 
conditions at a moment in history. Finally, a discourse will have criteria of correlation that 
situate it among other discourses. In meeting these criteria we ate able to construct not 
what is thematic or similar 'within' and between discourse (knowledge) but what is absent 
by virtue of meeting the said criteria or conditions in such a way as to infer an underlying, 
universalising ethos or 'truth', manifested as the progress of reason. (This idea can be 
correlated with Derrida's notion of &ffierance which will be described in Chapter Three. ) In 
this way it becomes possible for discourse "to describe, as the episteme of a period, not the 
sum of its knowledge, nor the general style of its research, but the divergence, the 
distances, the oppositions, the differences, the relations of its various scientific discourses: 
penion, it is an open and the episteme is not a sort qfgrand underlýWng theog, it is a space of dis 
doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationships" (Foucault: 1978: 55). 
11hus it is that wWch proposes, enables and progresses, as well as, and at the same time limiting, regulating and 
constraining 'knowledge', understanding, 'common-sense'l call it what you vA that elicits our scrutiny. 
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Foucault identifies three broad epistemic periods. The first, up to the end of the 
sixteenth century was structured around 'resemblance' formulated through Renaissance 
ideas of similitude between things. Here, it is through the pursuit of a correspondence 
between things in nature that meaning is derived: "the search for meaning is to bring to 
light a resemblance" (McNay: 1994: 56). The second episteme is described by Foucault as 
the classical system of knowledge structured around 'representation' and the search for 
differences and contrasts that can be measured and ordered to derive truth. The belief was 
that the pursuit of knowledge would ultimately achieve certainty about the natural and 
social world. The third and Modern episteme gives rise to the human subject and is 
marked by a questioning of the representational function of language and a preoccupation 
with the source or origin of representation itself. 
Foucault's idea of episteme can be seen, then as the 'rules of formation'; anonymous, 
time and culture-bound structures of thought that create the conditions of possibility for 
discourse to be constituted; a concept distinct and, more importantly, anterior to 
epistemological enquiry in the conventional sense, with which it should not be confused. 
Episteme is that which delimits knowledge within the whole field of experience and which 
allows discourse to be sustainable and 'true'; as such they are "out of reach for those 
whose thinking is bound by their laws" (Merquior: 37: 1985). Epistemes underlay historical 
'blocks' of knowledge; that is, they sustain the &scontinuio within a conventional view of 
history as continuiDi and they succeed each other without any overarching logic. Foucault's 
particular interest is in those bodies of knowledge whose 'truths' are most tenuous and 
contentious (i. e. the human sciences, economics, medicine) but where the 'conditions of 
possibility' mean that the assertions they make are often expressed in terms of 'human 
nature' and 'universality', as if they were, indeed, indisputable. It is here that Foucault's 
analysis has a particular relevance to this study of childhood as an 'object' about which 
there is, perhaps more than anywhere else, (and for particular reasons, as we shall discover) 
an overriding sense of universalising themes and 'truths'. Far from the evolutionary 
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refinement of 'fixed' concepts or objects, such bodies of knowledge constitute of tbemselves 
concepts and objects which are historically discontinuous, thus also implying an econoMy of 
power trlafions (see McHoul and Grace: 1995: 59). Foucault's strategy, therefore exposes "the 
political and strategic nature of those ensembles of knowledge previously thought to be 
either relatively independent of power (the 'human sciences); or (as in the case of 
criminology or sexuality), linked only in a vague or inadequate way to political institutions" 
WcHoul and Grace: 1995: 60). 
Discoursc and Gencalogy 
It is fruitful in a certain way to describe that-which-is by making it appear as 
something that might not be, or that might not be as it is. Valich is why this 
designation or description of the real never has a prescriptive value of the kind, 
'because this is, that will be. ' It is also why, in my opinion, recourse to history - 
one of the great facts in French philosophical thought for at least twenty years - is 
meaningful to the extent that history selves to show how that-which-is has not 
always been; i. e., that the things which seem most evident to us are always formed 
in the confluence of encounters and chances, during the course of a precarious 
and fragile history ... It means that they reside on a base of human practice and human history, and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, 
as long as we know how it was that they were made. 
Foucault: 1990: 37 
In constituting the subject, disciplines rely upon a 'totalising' view of history which is 
characterised by the practice of remembrance, reconstituting; that is, bringing forth 'from' 
the past that which is obscured in order to 'complete' the picture and awaken history as 
essentially narrative in form within the episteme. In Foucault's terms, this approach takes 
'evidence' as if it were a document which is scrutinised, analysed in order to reveal the 
'truth' about the past. From a fragmented and undifferentiated past, history is put 'back' 
together, as if it were really a 'whole' that had been splintered and not a set of 
discontinuous, differentiated traces. 'Remembrance' and a progressive awakening; features 
of a logocentric history; one which relies on the structuring of certain oppositions to 
construct meaning. Such oppositions which couple and give precedence to continuity over 
change construct the notion of the 'spirit' of an age and relate the past with the present; 
tradition versus change (tradition linking the discontinuity of change to some grand, 
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overall schema and an origin from which all change has ensued); simple forms of 
knowledge versus 'genius' Coriginal', continuous knowledge and the 'revolutionary' 
thinking which is often individualised (Darwin, Marx) in order to maintain the opposition 
with continuity); stability versus metamorphosis /convergence (momentous events 
constructed in relation to periods of stability). These oppositions impose upon a 
presupposition that what is contemporary or present is logically, meaningfully related to 
the past; discourses categorised as, for example, 'literature', 'social science', which are 
relatively recent are then applied to 'history'. 
Can one accept as such, the distinction between the major types of discourse, 
of that between such forms or genres as science, literature, philosophy, religion, 
history, fiction etc., and which tend to create certain great historical individualities? 
We are not even sure of ourselves when we use these distinctions in our own 
world of discourse, let alone when we are analysing groups of statements which, 
when first formulated, were distributed, divided in a quite different way. 
Foucault: 1972: 22 
In place of a 'general' or conventional history Foucault suggests that we pose questions 
about the particular, require that evidence be redefined; that is, to ask 'what is to count as 
evidence? ' or 'what is being asked of 'history'? ', 'how does it serve the present'? Thus 
differentiation and discontinuity become equal players. Against (what counts as) 'evidence, 
governed by a structural relationship to the 'episteme', its 'place' in the overall scheme of 
things, that from which we 'draw' (in both senses; 'gather' and 'depict) the past/present, 
Foucault suggests the metaphor 'document' should be rejected for the metaphor 
cmonument' - that which should be 'described'. 'History' in the conventional sense (that 
ascribes to the conventions of a pursuit of 'origins) must be held in abeyance, suspended 
since it anticipates and forecloses its own method of analysis and discourse to create 
'unity'. 
An exposure of the singularity, the idiosyncrasy of 'events' and discontinuity of history 
is the project of Foucault's Senealoor, which might be described simply as a study of the 
'gap', or difference between a separation of the past from the present. That is, how our 
(selves' are arrived at is not just a 'product' of history but a construction of 'history in the 
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present2.2 'History', or any field of 'knowledge' or discourse is not defined by what is said 
or 'meant' but by the difference between what could be said at a given point in time and 
what is actually said. It is in this sense that the study come to examine the history, or more 
accurately, genealogy, of childhood. This genealogy leaves the 'discontinuity' in history 
(history of the present) unresolved; it is no longer hooked into a grand, underlying theory; 
for Foucault, discontinuity is inconsequential in this respect; that which we should search 
for, but only on order to say it is there. This is a process which thereby 'delegitmises' the 
present, shakes to the foundations our knowledge of the present in relation to the past. 
Foucault chooses to examine aspects of the past which have been denied a history in place 
of teleological assumptions about progress, evolution, linearity. Genealogical researches 
can in this way open up new 'spaces' for debate, rather than offer equally definitive but 
alternative assertions to the orthodoxy. To this extent, Foucault's genealogical approach to 
history is complementary to Derrida's deconstructive approach to the text, described in 
the following chapter, and it is these two strands of post-structuralism that together form 
the conceptual framework that is applied to this study of childhood in public care. It is an 
approach which enables us to look at the 'hierarchy' of knowledge which defines the 
present and a sense of what 'is' in the present; that is, what 'counts as' knowledge in the 
present (in this study, specifically about childhood): 
(genealogy) record(s) the singularity of events outside of any monotonous 
finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel 
is without history - in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive 
to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but 
to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles 
Foucault, cited in Rabinov- 76: 1991 
So, it is the fragmentary quality of apparently inconsequential phenomena that Foucault 
is interested in; a kind of 'non-history' of insignificance in place of an evolutionist linearity 
of events. The idea of the evolution of scientific disciplines and other bodies of knowledge 
21 listory, then, is as uncertain as it is fixed, how things 'are' is not the end 'resuie or culmination of a sequence of 
events that has determined things as they appear to I)e; things may appear differently, are always already 'other than' 
they 'arc; history 'mediates' the present. 
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which come to constitute our common sense understandings of the world and take us ever 
closer to truth is again challenged. Here again 'knowledge' itself is no simple matter, even 
where particular bodies of knowledge seem eminently coherent "obscure forms of 
consciousness - practical, mythic and moral will always revolve around it" (Foucault: 
1971: 181). 3 
Power and Disciplinary Practices 
Our society is not one of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of 
images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, 
there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of 
communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of 
knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power, is not that the 
beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social 
order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated within it, according to a 
whole technique of forces and bodies. 
Foucault 1977: 17 
Foucault is interested in the transformativc relations between the body and social 
institutions in terms of the political relations between the two. Power is individualised 
through processes of objecti, 9cation which take place in several ways. First through the 
&d&ngpraaices. Here, social exclusion and modes of scientific classification combine to 
create differentiation amongst previously undifferentiated masses and are fused with a 
humanitarian ethic of reform and progress. Examples of this include the segregation of 
lepers in the middle ages, the confinement of the poor and destitute and insane in 
L'Hopital G6n6ral of Paris in 1656; the classification of disease in the early nineteenth 
century; the way in which psychiatry operates in hospitals and prisons and the 
medicalisation, stigmatisation and normalisation of sexual deviance in modem Europe 
(Foucault: 1981). Whereas in Feudal society power was seen as synonymous with 
sovereignty and was generalised, in the nineteenth century a new form of disciplinary 
power emerges which mediates relations between the state and the family/individual and 
along with methods of exclusion objectifies, classifies and identifies sections of the 
3 So, for example, with the apparent fact of a 'surface naturalis& or 'Pathology, % articulated through psychiatrT, its very 
'reasonablencss'indicadve of how exclusive the language of reason has become. 
Foucault. - Discourse, Power and the Constituted Subject 49 
population, behaviours and diseases, conditions etc. This is a power that "insidiously 
objectifies those on whom it is applied, to form a body of knowledge about these 
individuals, rather than deploy the ostentatious signs of sovereignty" (Foucault: 1977: 220). 4 
In order to facilitate the extension of power, methods of control, containment and 
scientific classification are perceived in terms of their relationship to the humanitarian and 
Enlightenment discourse of 'progress', reform and 'natural logic'. But for Foucault, 
notions of progressive humanitarianism and 'reform' of the individual are supplanted by 
the idea that the penal system does not only discourage reform; it actively promotes 
recidivism. "Humanism, good intentions, professional knowledge and reform rhetoric are 
neither in the idealist sense the producers of change not in the materialist sense the mere 
product of changes in the political economy" (Cohen: 1985: 25). The second mode of 
objectification alluded to above is related and overlaps the first but emphasises sdentfic 
classification. Whereas the dividing practices had the effect of constraint and exclusion in 
which individuals were largely victims of the process (and mostly prisoners and mental 
patients), scientific classification and modes of enquiry in the nineteenth century 
constituted the 'body' as the object for study (complemented by but not causally linked to 
the dividing practices); the body was appropriated into procedures of power and 
knowledge. 
The third mode of objectification is articulated in Foucault's later works - The Histog of 
Sexmali* and Disdpline and Pmnisb. Whereas the dividing practices and scientific classification 
were largely applied to populations on the margins of society and were processes applied 
to groups and individuals who were socially, economically and sometimes physically 
constrained for the purposes of sciendfic enquiry, containment, or exclusion, subjectification 
works differently; it is an active process of self-formation, mediated by an external 'expert' 
qbus the penal system survives even today amongst a range of other alternatives (probation, children's homes, secure 
units) because it has other subliminal meanings that are about the construction of delinquency itself where a 
pathological notion of the delinquent is less dangerous' than, for example, the politicised revolutionary. "For a 
strategy of social order this advantage far outweighs the very minor disadvantage of habitualising criminals to a life- 
long cycle of crime and punishment. " 0 larland: 1987: 165). 
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(for example, the psychoanalyst). Here, self understanding is arrived at through 
'knowledge' derived from the human and social sciences. 
Whereas a normative policy analysis takes for granted existing institutional structures 
and presumes that any inconsistencies, inadequacies or injustices can be eradicated by 
some adjustment to the operational functioning of the overall structure across time, place 
and culture, Foucault argues that power is simply reorganised and progress illusory. 
Foucault argues that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries power becomes increasingly 
exercised through the emergent human sciences and associated professional practices 
(medicine, psychiatry). The sciences, when applied to identified groups, represent a 
sophisticated use of power using techniques of surveffiance, examination and classification. 
While prisons continue to have their place, other community-based options emerge. In 
this way, the scope of regulation is extended and the distinction between 'Welfare' and 
'punishment' less clear. Family, school and community become absorbed into new systems 
of social regulation (Cohen: 1985). The social worker, the psychologist, the psychiatrist, 
the probation worker all operate in ways which network new forms of power and control 
(Penna and O'Brien: 1996). The discipline/discourses of the human sciences give over 
their 'knowledge' to the disciplinary apparatus of society, not as dictates, directions in an 
oppressive, coercive way, but as 'truths', 'knowledge' of how things ought to be within the 
prevailing episteme, of what human nature is, of what is madness, 'normal' sexuality, 
criminal, and moreover, what is 'child', 'family' and 'state. In this way, there is scope for 
non-conformity and resistance given the multiplicity of often competing discourses and 
the way in which knowledge-power works to create subject-identides which are 
accommodated within discourse which hold within themselves their own constituted 
'truth'. It is, therefore, possible to transform, but not transcend the scope of disciplinary 
power. A child can be needy, vulnerable, the victim of adult's maltreatment at the xame time 
as being the offender, the delinquent, the perpetrator; all are encapsulated within 
childhood and the 'truth' of a child's nature. 
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In this way, power is 'itself is not 'embodied' or uni-directional but is also a relational 
matter, "it inheres in difference and is a dynamic of control and lack of control between 
discourses and the subjects, constituted by discourses, who are their agents" (Weedon: 
1987: 113). In Dis4line and Punish (1977) Foucault describes how power has become both 
individualising and totalising and examines the moment when it was understood to be 
more efficient and profitable to place people under surveillance than to punish individuals. 
Foucault suggests that the end of the eighteenth century was a time when behaviours 
previously categorised as 'criminal' begin to acquire an alternative 'political' meaning and 
become represented as a protest against the existing social order. It is the modem penal 
system which manages to accommodate this potential for disruption. 
According to Foucault, prior to the eighteenth century physical punishment was the 
major response to crime. Power is exercised over individuals and the population and upon 
the body. In other words, 'crime' signified differently, was highly individualised and seen 
more as an attack upon the 'body' of the king (as a signifier), in contrast to contemporary 
conceptualisations which more often regard crime as an infringement of social norms. 
Accordingly, punishment was inflicted upon the body of the criminal through various 
forms of torture, dismemberment and, ultimately, execution. Such punishments, however, 
were not inflicted in an arbitrary way - torture was used in a sophisticated and highly 
systematic way; precise forms of mutilation were used for specific crimes. These methods 
were just as systematic as deciding what fine or prison sentence to impose today. 
As rule by sovereignty and right is eroded so too the 'body' is required for new 
purposes - meeting the needs of the industrialising economy in the factories. Thus, as the 
body begins to signify differently, so torture becomes anomalous and sovereign power 
denounced by reformers in its barbarity. Since mutilation as punishment is no longer 
meaningffil or, perhaps more accurately, no longer irkvant to the interests of industrial 
capitalism it acquires a different signification and as such might more easily be deemed 
immoral, brutal and inappropriate. The mutilated body is not of use in the factory; its 
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signifying value changes and the use of public spectacle and humiliation no longer viable or 
cost-effective from a practical point of view. Punishment treon gurrs within the scourseof 9, di 
criminality not as revenge but correction and new modes of punishment emerge, most 
notably prisons, designed to control and punish, retain an able workforce and maximise 
surveillance. The exercise of power is now transformed; it is no longer an external force 
upon the body, or over individuals but is manifest through internalised processes of 
discipline and regulation. Bentham's Panopticon is both example of and metaphor for, a 
disciplinary society which contains a prison building whose design, featuring a central 
observational tower, allows for the maximum surveillance of prisoners housed in the 
surrounding structures. Not knowing whether they were being observed or not, the idea 
was that the prisoners would behave as though they were observed at all times. The 
Panopticon was never built in its pure form, but serves as a powerful symbol of how 
Foucault sees the observing, scrutinising, regulatory imperatives operate in society. In the 
carcereal society "is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, 
hospitals, which all resemble prisons" (Foucault: 1977: 128). The prison comes to 
symbolise all forms of punishment; all social institutions become part of the Panoptican 
world and power-knowledge comes to justify punishment as treatment of the mind 
(Cohen: 1985). Perhaps it is also not surprising that since residential care for children 
evolved out of the same rationale of segregation, surveillance and reform that children's 
homes have in the past resembled prisons or that even more recently in residential care 
practices within the care 'system' often emphasise or prescribe 'behaviour modification' 
approaches or institutionalising and regulatory methods where the bias is toward the 
dcontrol imperative' and a tendency towards penalising non-conformity. Social work, 
children's homes, child protection procedures, all are institutions that are operated by 
disciplinary power; they are the discipline-in-practice. It is important to point out here, if it 
is not already clear, that when we are talldng about 'discipline' in is in both senses of the 
term that Foucault uses it, i. e., discipline as in knowledrgjeý intellectual, academic 'training' 
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within a discourse, as well as discipline as a more explicit form of control. Both meanings 
inhere simultaneously. The 'disciplinary society' is the society of disciplines, in the former 
definition of the term, one where the disciplines of science, psychiatry, criminology and 
related subjects come to constitute that which we define as the signs of 'society', 'family', 
'child', 'subject', 'dysfunction', 'deviance'. 
Discipline and 'Subjectification' 
Foucault's 'counter-history' regards the subject not as the creative force, origin or drive 
behind 'progress' in the sciences, but as an effect in and of itself of a process of subjection 
wherein particular techniques have historically facilitated the construction of 'subject' 
denying the possibility of thinking differently. As previously suggested, expressions of 
subjectivity, 'truth', consciousness, whether ideas, beliefs or theories are preceded by 
processes external to the subject that actually enable the concept of subject to emerge. In 
short, the social precedes the private, the 'disciplinary society' gives rise to the subject, 
rather than vice versa. Moreover, Foucault gives attention to the peripheral, the marginal 
discourses that figure little in a 'conventional' history of ideas. Not that such discourses 
have been 'hidden' as such, but that they have held little credence in the scheme of things; 
they are marked by their subjugation from the dominant discourse and help to show how 
a variety of processes work to exclude, differentiate and categorise groups. In this way, the 
subject, rather than being at the centre of things, origin or core, is instead 'arrived at' and 
given 'form' (identity, diagnosis) as a consequence of the processes described. 'Truth' 
about a person's proclivities, whether sexual, social, psychological, or indeed about their 
very 'sense' of self-identity, is brought about not so much by dominant discursive practices 
but as an effect of the way in which these discourses work, i. e., they constitute, dominate, 
create the manner and the means by which we think about and describe ourselves and the 
way in which others think about and describe us. Foucault argues that marginal, subjugated 
discourses have been not silenced, but unheard because of the processes and techniques of 
Foucault. - Discourse, Power and the Constituted Subject 54 
the disciplinary society. What is validated as 'truth' is that which is an effect of the medical, 
legal, psychiatric, religious practices of the nineteenth century. Here again, we are less 
concerned with where power lies, or with whom, than with the process of subjection; how 
subjects are constructed and what methods and techniques are used in order to classify, 
identify, regulate so that 'truths' about human nature, sexuality, childhood even, are able to 
establish themselves beyond question. However, the trick is not so much in refuting such 
'truths' but in describing the means by which they become established and institutionalised 
so as to become irrefutable. Such means are variable, both historically and culturally; 
indeed they are embedded in variability and change, contrary to logic, which would dictate 
continuity and certainty; where truth seems most certain it is at its most fragile. It is this 
understanding of contingent and constituted truths that will form the substance of the 
discussion of the construction of childhood in Chapter Four. 
Subjectification and Self-forming Identities: Foucault's History ofSexuaMy 
It is in The Histog of Sexwalio (1981) that Foucault refines the idea of 'subjectification' 
through an account of the constitution of knowledges within the discourse of sexuality 
that reduce sexual identities to biology, instinct and notions of repression. The process of 
'subjectification' constitutes the human subject not as a passive object to be moulded and 
shaped by external forces but as an active, participatory actor in the process of 'self- 
formation'. Here, we have suggested that self-understanding is formed by reference to 
external techniques and mediated through an external authority, for example, the 
psychoanalyst - the 'valued' knowledge of the expert in modern society providing us with a 
deeper knowledge of the 'inside' of ourselves. Thus, a society emerges which creates 
individuals as both actors and objects (Boyne: 1990); where power is not so much 'owned' 
or possessed by any one group to the exclusion of others as it is experiential and exercised 
by all in a multitude of diverse and pervasive forms. 
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It is here that Foucault's position moves from the subject as a tool of power within a 
normalised subjectivity towards the production of power from 'within' an internalised 
subject-identity. In the nineteenth century modem understandings of sexuality emerged 
where the body becomes the focus for scrutiny and surveillance within the emergent penal 
sciences, medicine and psychology. Against a progressive view which places Victorian 
inspired repression and collective silence about sex against twentieth century 
permissiveness and liberalism, Foucault argues the Victorian era was rather characterised 
by an obsessive interest in sex as a political and social problem. Indeed, the very idea of 
repression was constituted by a discourse of sexuality as an object for examination and 
classification within medical and psychiatric discourses, illustrated in the centrality sex takes 
as a theme in religious and, subsequently, clinical 'confession'. The 'discovery' of 'perverse' 
and 'deviant' behaviours is, in this way, symptomatic of this 'taking into discourse' of the 
object, 'sex', concomitant with its medicalisation and internalisation within the 'self- 
discovering' subject to the extent that that the very 'essence' of selfhood is seen as residing 
within the sexual instinct/identity. By identi6ýing and classifying 'deviance', 'normal' 
behaviour was established, most notably in the opposition created between the dominant 
heterosexual identity and the category of the homosexual. That said, as a productive force, 
internalised subject identities can, through a self-validating discourse, emerge and compete 
for equal rights and treatment whist remaining 'within' a particularised set of power 
relations within discourse. The constituted subject-position allows not only for the 
collective categorisation of potentially threatening marginalised groups (thus facilitating 
greater surveillance and scrutiny), but also enables an idenfityý a kind of negative 
reconstitution of the fragmented 'dissident-subject' within a discourse of supervised 
illegality, and one that will even speak on its own behalf 
So embedded is this constituting discourse that individuals enter into modes of self- 
regulation voluntarily, embarking on a voyage of self-discovery with the psychoanalyst 
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which further embroils the subject in disciplinary power - and all in the cause of liberating' 
the 'inner truth'. 
Clearly, for Foucault, the idea of a progressive emergence of an 'always already there' 
repressed sexual-identity is denied within this conceptualisation. Commonly-held 
assumptions about how for centuries our 'true' sexual 'selves' have been restrained and 
repressed by dominant bourgeois belief-systems only to be discovered and unlocked by 
the combined forces of psychoanalysis and the liberating consequences of 'human 
progress' are rejected. At the end of the day it is only from uilbin an understanding of 
sexuality as 'repressed' that we can conceptualise it as a kind of primal, driving instinct that 
can only be held back by external restraints. As wiU be seen in Derrida's post-structuralism, 
Foucault rejects the 'naturalness' of such so-called 'instincts' and looks to the cultural, 
more specifically the primag of the cultural over the apparrntly, natural in constructing our 
sexual identity. Freud's acclaimed 'discovery' of the sexual origin of neuroses is but one 
more episode in the production of a discourse of sex, and one in modern times which 
science, specifically psychoanalysis, dominates. It is the constructed notion of the 
repressed sex-drive, seen as a product of the capitalist bourgeois work ethic which 
appropriated all human energies towards industrial production and required a moral 
framework within which sexuality could be controlled, to which psychoanalysis comes to 
the rescue. In a society in which surveiUance and regulation were increasingly individualised 
and where the emergent human sciences had created a condition in which it was self- 
reflection, observation, training and treatment which regulated, defined and enabled the 
subject-position, it is not surprising that it is the physical body within which the sexual self 
is located. By constructing the sexual 'instinct', science was able to move in on sexuality as 
a new arena for control; first by 'discovering' it and reducing it to biology, then, later, and 
in apparent opposition by liberating it through the discourse of Freudian psychoanalysis, 
which, for Foucault, is just another discourse within which sexuality 'makes sense'. Sex in 
modem society is eminently cultural; located at the core of what we understand as our 
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'discovered' identity, something irrefutable about our 'true' selves. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries "sexual behaviour is no longer constrained under the notion of sin; 
instead it is constrained under the notion of the abnormal, the pathological" (Harland: 
1987: 160). It flows from the biological conception of the body as 'container of instincts' 
wherein pleasure is incidental to the 'true' function of sex as reproduction. Thus, although 
the discourse at its most liberal accommodates the deviant, even with open arms, it is only 
able to do so from within that self-same conceptualisation of what is deviance. 
In all of this what Foucault points to is the power of the body as signifier in resisting 
scientific imposition whilst at the same time being shaped and moulded, 'regulated', 
'managed' by such discourses. It is the very availability of the body for appropriation into a 
multiplicity of discourses, to signify freely, that is its power; in contrast to disciplinary 
practices, discourse is thus much more productive, resistant, self-validating and positive as 
well as self-regulatory. The Histog of Sexualio to this extent is as much about the 
production of subject-identities in general and the organisation of modem society as it is 
about sex or sexuality. In a society concerned with the life-processes, sex and sexual 
practices acquire a particular and a generalised significance. The 'disciplinary' society 
requires he both, ýody 'physical' to be regulated as well as the societal body - the 
population as a whole; in this way the government of 'biological' needs (or rather what 
they. rignifi) is the defining feature of modern society. This is not the flesh and bones of the 
body but the body as signifier; this is not power as impositional and uni-directional but 
power as muld-faceted, generative, expansionist, positive. Thus that which is experienced 
as most instinctual, primal and natural can as easily be conceptualised as cultural. The 
fundamental suppositions which are intended to prop up the nature/culture opposition 
collapse in upon themselves and subvert the very logic that sustains them. 
Implications for a study of Social Work 
The discourse(s) of social work are constituted and perpetuated through processes of 
negotiation, accommodation and differentials in the exercise and flow of power 
4 
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throughout society (for example, between 'family' and 'state', individuals, groups and 
institutions); it is only out of these processes that norms and standards can be determined 
on the basis of those who fail to meet or conform. Within this kind of conceptual 
understanding, social work is one of the means by which individuals are not simply 
controlled but drawn into processes of social and self regulation as active participants. In 
this way, social work undertakes a unique role in mediating between the 'excluded' or 
marginalised and the mainstream of society. Jacques Donzelot (1980), drawing on Nfichel 
Foucault's ideas, argues that in the late nineteenth century a new 'conceptual space' was 
opened up between the private and public spheres. In particular, the bourgeois family 
became a more private institution in an increasingly commercialised and industrial world 
where state power was beginning to shift from intensive to extensive modes of regulation. 
Since that time this 'social space' located between private and public has come gradually to 
be occupied by the 'expert' - the doctor, the lawyer, the social worker amongst others. 
Donzelot traces historically the emergence of various philanthropic institutions and their 
subsequent absorption into state functions mediated through the new professions, 
interventionist at the point of deviance. Similarly, Harris (1990) describes how, historically, 
French foundling hospitals raised the profile of cl-ýild protection and transformed the 
meaning and function of 'family' not only by accommodating the abandoned child but by 
also stimulating a demand for similar ventures by virtue of their very existence. In the 
twentieth century the 'experts', even if only by default, set new standards of behaviour for 
the individual and implicitly police family behaviour. 
In particular and in contrast to most other professions, social work also sets out to 
articulate the subjective status of objective categories, for example, advocating or 
representing the individual experience of people in the 'mental illness' category, the child 
or the 'learning disabled'. Giving 'voice' to the marginalised or unheard requires the social 
worker to draw on interpretative, subjective experience; it is in part in this way that the 
exercise of power may be generative, proactive and creative as well as repressive. Further, 
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this study sets out to show how social work, as a set of practices/ texts (discourses) serves 
to constitute what childhood and the family is, and in turn, the discourses of childhood 
which it variously articulates, are constituted through the muld-faceted operation of power 
in society. 
Signifiers (the 'body', 'text', 'child', 'fan-ýIy' etc. ) are infinitely variable and always open 
to challenge, change and redefinition. Meaning, then, is dependent on the discursive 
relations of 'context' (historical and cultural location). These 'discursive fields, as described 
by Foucault, are a way of maldng sense of the relationship between language, social 
institutions, subjectivity and power. The discursive field of 'child welfare' is one therefore 
that 'makes sense' of residential care for children, normalising exclusion, reconstituting 
difference in a way that is palatable, necessary. By 'opening up' the field of signification it 
is not intended that all that is 'describable' must now be described; Foucault in particular 
suggests that it is 'statements', the 'enunciative function', the articulation of signs 
(Foucault: 1991) that are effective in discourse formation, in part through their 
repeatability that should be selected. However, repetition here does not need to be formal 
or self-identical but must be regular and in correspondence with other signs; a statement is 
a form' of knowledge that is not necessarily a linguistic or grammatical 'unit', (though it 
may take this form), rather it is a signifier that contributes to the particular, it is not 
knowledge 'itself but one of the markers that point to the parameters of what 'is' 
'knowledge' (albeit often taken as knowledge). The 'repeatability' of statements is in 
referring to other corresponding signs, repetition as a function which requires a 
differentiation, and which may occupy a 'subject-position' (doctor, psychiatrist, social 
worker, patient, 'service-user', parent, child) within an associated field of signification. 
The associated field ... is made up of all the formulations to which the 
statement refers (implicitly or not) either by repeating them, modifying them or 
adapting them, or by opposing them, or by conunenting on them; there can be no 
statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others. 
Foucault: 1978: 98 
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By examining the methods and practices, the 'statements' of dominant discourses, 
those which are repeated and hold common currency in our thinking', we can see how 
groups are reconfigured, relocated and positioned in particular ways, not by virtue of some 
kind of conspiracy or other but through the construction of knowledge and 
understanding. This kind of repetition is one which occludes alternative forms of 
knowledge. In saying this, no discourse can reveal the 'truth' about whatever its claims 
might be; they can only work to classify, regulate, 'treat' and organise; in doing so shut out 
other possibilities in terms of 'thinking' about them. Power is constituted in and through 
the subject, not exercised upon the individual. 'Texts' do not bring forth authoritative 
interpretations in and of themselves; nor does the subject as reader of the text give 
themselves over to the authority of the text; both inhere in each other and arc productive, 
generative within the discursive field. The exercise of power in society is one of discursive 
relations, that between, rather than within the discursive field; not exercised by but 
through the constitution of subjects in discourse. It is in this way autonomous, it is in the 
playing out of discourse that power is exercised; it is not possible therefore to identify it, 
locate it, analyse as such since it is 'within'. We can, however, observe its operation within 
the relations of discourse. 
For example, Foucault (1972) suggests that where madness is concerned, all of the 
statements in the discourse of psychopathology, which may be different in form and 
dispersed in time, cohere if they refer to the same object, in this case madness. Madness 
was thus constituted by all the statements that made it up and differentiated it. The object 
may be broken down into sub-divisions, e. g. neuroses, melancholia, but in turn each of 
these discourses constituted the object; it was never 'there' but was 'discovered' as it was 
constituted in and through the discourse. This study will come to illustrate how childhood 
may also be seen as similarly constituted and reconstituted throughout history and within 
the present; moreover, following chapters will show how, as an 'object', children have a 
particular prominence for Modernity as a 'fulcrum' within a wider nexus of familial and 
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social relations in contemporary discourse. Again, despite appearances, 'unity' (that is, in 
this case, our very 'taken-for-grantedness' about childhood and children's needs), is 
constructed not on the certainty of the 'object', but on the space between other signifiers 
in the field. It is an active, generative play of signifiers, within the discourse (the space 
between signifiers) and between other discourses (the space between discourses) meted 
out in daily practice, law and policy which circumscribes and delimits the 'object'. 
Foucault suggests we may further examine the coexistence of heterogeneous and 
dispersed statements and seek that which governs their division, interdependency and 
determines what they exclude (what cannot be said about the 'objectý; we should 
acknowledge that discourse 'unity' is arrived at not in the coherence of concepts 
themselves but in their simultaneous or successive emergence (again, the 'space' between 
them); and analyse the interplay of appearance and dispersal. Finally, we should account 
for unitary forms and study their identity and persistence of 'themes'; against a 'totalising' 
history. Out of all of this Foucault aims to map the role and operation of different 
subjects-in-discourse; seek the conditions of 'birth and disappearance' of historically 
definitive discourses; looking at practices and the conditions that make these acceptable in 
a given time and place. 
Objects may be diverse, contradictory and multifarious but will have a correspondence 
to each other; it is the conditions of possibility that allow reference to be made to the 
object or objects. 'Statements' are related to neither grammar nor logic but must operate 
within a domain of coexistence with other statements; they allow a 'subject-position', a 
thematic 'identity' which is given the appearance of a 'history' and 'evolution' a 'progress' 
towards and awakening 'truth'. 
These are all matters that will be comprehensively explored further in this study; in 
particular how in both the 'textual' and 'historical' fields of signification a discourse of 
needs comes to constitute childhood. For now, it will suffice to suggest an analogy 
between this notion of childhood as having some kind of coherent, structured, natural, 
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(completeness' to 'itself, (which must be, no matter how fractured or interrupted it is) 
prefiguring adulthood and, within Modernity, 'history' itseý, or rather, the idea of a 
progressive, 'totalising' history; that which transports and imparts to us the 'present' within 
our very sense of self and time and place. 
Conclusion 
To reiterate: post-structuralism insists on cultural and historical specificity; meaning is 
never dcfinitivc and universal but is generated out of the discursive field of a particular 
historical and cultural location. Meaning arises and is read 'in context' so that behaviours 
acquire a symbolism specific to the context in which they arise. The discourse is a means 
of constituting the subject within a historical and cultural location. Within any discursive 
field, a number of discourses will offer alternative states of subjectivity and identities. 
However, some will be more legitimate than others and will validate the 'status quo'; 
others will challenge dominant interests. Those discourses which are most dominant will 
have powerful structures in society to support them whether within law, medicine, 
education. For Foucault, the local and particular are always inserting their differences; this 
requires that we avoid giving primacy to the subject; the subject in history and the subject 
as historian, theoretician, of ideas. 
Those less dominant discourses, subjectivities, identities are likely to be marginal but 
will be crucial in defining what is dominant, central and 'mainstream'. Within bodies of 
knowledge and their related institutions there are competing interests; different subject- 
positions allow for the accommodation of diverse and contradictory interests and 
resistance to the predominant discourse. 
For the purposes of the study, constructions of childhood, child maltreatment and 
child abuse are seen as operating within interdependent discursive fields; the idea of the 
child as innocent, pure, sexless, is what enables the infringement and contamination of this 
purity to be constructed as abuse. Such understandings are dependent upon a particular, 
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relatively recent interpretation of children's behaviour, articulated in theories of cud 
development and achieved on the basis of adults determination of what children's rights, 
needs and responsibilities are (Parton et al : 1997). To this extent the opposition 
adult/child is one we cannot take for granted or assume that it is a 'given. The ever- 
shifting relationship between the state, family and child across time tells a very different 
story about childhood to that which conventional wisdom today might hold as 'truth'. It is 
from our stated conceptualisation of discourse, power and a6 genealogy of knowledge that 
the discussion will examine 'child' as constituted within the various discourses which 
constitute 'childhood'; look at some of the 'fragments' that coalesce in contemporary 
understandings of the 'meaning of childhood'. ' 
The assertion has also been made that it is differentials of power as knowledge or 
'truth' which through discourse constitute the subject-identity. These processes make it 
then possible to conceptualise and address individuals and groups as a 'problem', whether 
sympathetically or punitively, depending on the social and political milieu of the time. 
Whether in the prison, the hospital, the school, the institution, or the family, social 
regulation is variously manifested. Thresholds for how individuals and groups are 
constructed as 'outside' the mainstream are determined out of these norms and standards, 
setting a trigger for when matters like 'concern', 'risk' and 'need' provoke the state 'help' 
or censure. However, despite appearances, it is the very precariousness of constructions of 
family and childhood, their 'instability' as signifiers that serve to perpetuate the discourse. 
Thus, whilst on the one hand the "modern, obsessively legislating, defining, structuring, 
segregating, classifying, recording and universalising state reflected the splendour of 
ibis ambivalence in the construction of childhood has become problematic when it comes to determining children as 
victims of child sexual abuse; it is argued that 'innocence' may be a source of arousal and fascination for adults who 
may then be inclined towards abusive behaviour (ICtzinger. 1990). As 'innocent victim!, showing all the traits of 
passivity, silence and unknowing may incur a particular response to the child as 'abused'. the 'knowing' child, who 
fails to fit the stereotype may go unheard. By determining that there are particular signs and symptoms of abuse 
which chafacterise the construction of 'victim!, children may be going unseen or unheard. Further, lGtzenger (1990) 
suggests that even where children are seen as 'victims'. forms of resistance presented by children as active, positive, 
resilient, powerful are rendered pathological by the processes which intervene to 'rescue' the child reformulated as 
'post-traumatic stress' syndrome or other psychological/emotional dysfunction. 
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universal and absolute standards of truth" (Bauman: xiv: 1992), this 'splendour', derived 
from a 'centred' presence in Modernity and the Enlightenment project holds within it the 
seeds of its own de(con)struction. 
In this study, this very celebration of certainty is itseý'the warding off of uncertainty and 
instability about childhood and family; that is, in realising the 'splendour' of absolute truth 
within Modernity, instability is paradoxically acknowledged as its very possibility. In other 
words, it is the sight and the possibility of the 'other' (non-child, non-family) that 
circumscribes family and childhood. Driven by the fear of chaos and fragmentation, the 
signifier is thereby regulated, proscribed and ensured. In Foucault's terms, this is reason 
enough to characterise the 'problematic' and excluded and those that transgress the norms 
variously as a threat to social order and stability, requiring better control, policing, 
regulation and ordering or, (and perhaps more often in the case of children), characterised 
as an 'object of concern'. In the first characterisation, the excluded can experience 
something close to a ritualistic catharsis of popular fears (see the vilification and 
subsequent moral panics and debates around the 'nature' of childhood following the death 
of Jamie Bulger in 1993) in the second, 'concern', even outrage at the hand fate has dealt is 
cause for campaigning, promotion of children's rights and civil liberties and episodic 
displays of emotionalism. Such fears and concerns are compounded and given added 
impetus in the context of a neo-liberal, market-orientated, consumer-driven economy (see 
Bauman: 1999). 6 It is the regulatory, circumscribing and excluding operation of discourse 
that is the concern of this study; no where is this more exposed or more keenly felt than 
within public care for children, where those who are not of tbejamily must signify for what 
the family and child of nalurr should be. 
6 Writing of excluded groups (including children), Bauman suggests that such fears are compounded further where, for 
example, the idea of the poor as an army of 'labour in waiting' is no longer sustainable and that the unemployed are 
, structurally redundane; i. e., there is no return; the idea that 'there but for the Grace of God' becomes all the more 
resonant; fear and pity combine effectively to ensure marginalisation and exclusion (see Bauman: 1999: 22). 
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These are matters for elucidation in later chapters. The next chapter sets out to refine 
the conceptual framework further by correlating what Foucault has to say about the 'body' 
as signifier with what Derrida has to say about the text. 
CTL4PTER THREE 
DERRIDA AND DECONSTRUCTION 
What, therefore, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymics, 
anthropornorphisms; ... truths are 
illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions ... coins which 
have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of 
account as coins but merely as metal. 
Nietzsche: 180: 1964. 
Introduction 
The work of French philosopher and post-structuralist Jacques Derrida appears more 
explicitly focused on language than that of Foucault. This linguistic strand to 
poststructuralism, specifically 'deconstructioe, was first presented in 1967 with the 
. 
peecb and Pbenomena, - Of Grammatology; and Writing and publication of three books -S 
Difference and represents both a movement from structuralism and a wider critique of 
conventional theories of meaning. Derrida's basic contention is that a text has multiple 
meanings beyond those of the author's intentions; meaning is indeterminate - as are the 
contents of the author's intentions; further, it is suggested that a text may indeed subvert 
or contradict the intended meanings of the author. This contention is further extended by 
Derrida to formulate what amounts to a critique of the Western philosophical tradition 
whole - which is based, as Derrida sees it, on an assumption of the determinacy of 
meaning or, put another way, a 'centred', self-presence to thought. 
Later sections of this chapter elicit the key themes from Derrida's work that are 
applicable to this study and which in combination provide the 'tools' for subsequent 
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deconstructive readings of selected social work texts. However, it is essential to begin by 
briefly describing the grounding Derrida's post-structuralism has in Saussure's work on 
language which has formed the basis for modern structuralism. The chapter then describes 
the movement Derrida's work represents from structuralism to post-structuralism, paying 
some attention on the way to the early work of Roland Barthes, before focusing on 
Derrida's deconstruction and beginning to discuss the implications for this study of 
childhood. 
Sausuffe's Structuralism 
The work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) on language Hes behind much of 
modern structuralism in paying explicit attention to the way in which linguistic features 
may be analysed in terms of structures and systems! As wen as introducing the concept of 
a system, structural linguistics takes as the basis of its analysis not terms or linguistic 
features themselves but the relations between them in order to discover general laws which 
operate the system. Language is seen as a system of signs; each made up of two 
components; the signifier and the signified. The signifier is the acoustic component; the 
sound image 'dog' for example, and the signified is the idea or concept. It is the structural 
relationship between signifier and signified which constitutes the sign. Its meaning is 
determined by its context and its relationship to other signs. For Saussure, the meaning- 
value is only acquired within the context of a differential relationship within the system of 
signs. 
gue - the structure, system, theory and rules - Further, language itself is divided into lan 
and parole, the use of langue in spoken language. With language the relationship between 
structure and the 'event' of speech is crucial and for the structural linguist it is language, 
not speech that warrants attention. Both speaker and listener must have internalised the 
principles of langue in order for language to signify. It is the differential relationship 
I For the social scientist this means looking at those structures which generate the phenomena that are being studied. 
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between what is and what is not signified that gives language its informational value. 
Consciousness itself can only be rationalised within the context of having intcrnaliscd 
language. Any attempt at evaluating the relationship between the acoustic component 
(signifier) and signified is somewhat futile since any such evaluation is already and always 
dependent upon having internalised the system. 
The system of language is therefore not fixed, but rather one of relations between 
various constituents each defined by difference. It is this difference that gives language its 
meaning-value - "the important thing in the word is not the sound alone but the phonic 
differences that make it possible to distinguish this word from all others" 
(Saussure: 1959: 118). This is the sense in which this study will extrapolate an understanding 
of concepts of 'social phenomena'; in relation to other concepts and at the point at which 
they differ. Language is a means of generating an abstract reality; signifying sounds or 
marks on a page only have value in relation to the system of which they are a part - as long 
as the structure of formal relations between signifying sounds or marks on a page remains 
intact and the speaker and listener understand the system. For example, a quietly spoken 
sentence may still be comprehensible over a lot of non-signifying noise since we may still 
differentiate the pattern of relations as meaningful. Equally, the sounds of the pattern 
themselves may vary considerably as in the case of different vowel sounds in local accents 
but as long as the pattern obeys the rules of the system it Will still be intelligible. 
Moreover, the signifieds are seen as obeying the same principle of differentiation. 
Signifieds are not mental images or concepts of 'things' as such, "the concepts are purely 
differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with 
other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being what the others are 
not" (Saussure: 1959: 117). 
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Barthes and Semiology: Myth and the Naturalised Sign 
Although the early work of Barthes is highly structuralist, his insight develops the idea 
that the sign is always a product of historical and cultural convention. Barthes's serniology 
has a relevance for this discussion in two main of ways. First, 'myth' is a useful concept 
which, whilst essentially structuralist, is some where 'on the way to' post-structuralism; it 
powerfully illustrates the idea of meaning as multi-faccted, 'loosens' meaning and 
signification in a way that begins to pave the way for Derrida's deconstruction. Second, 
and more pertinently, Barthes stresses both the 'emotive' quality of signification within his 
mythical system and the 'naturalising' effect signification can take when signs take a 
particular form. 
For Barthes, cultural phenomena are revealed to have muld-layered meanings, general 
meanings that stand for a shared idea that may have a socially unifying effect, just like 
meanings in langue. In Mytholooies (1957/1993) Barthes reveals these mythological 
meanings; myth is a mode of signification motivated by the concept represented and yet 
holding within the potential for multiple representation. Mythical systems thus enable 
other meanings to transcend the initial semiological or linguistic system. Barthes offers the 
example of a student of Latin grammar examining a sentence from Aesop: quia ego 
nominar leo (because my name is lion) (Barthes: 1957). The sentence has a first order 
meaning, 'I am a lion, my name is Leo', this is its immediate, literal, face value meaning, but 
in the context in which it exists (that of learning grammar) it has a second order meaning 
as a grammatical example of the rule of the agreement of the predicate. Both serniological 
systems co-exist although the second order meaning demotes the first order meaning to near 
insignificance; neither meaning requires stating, but the system works to convey the 
primary message. The same relation between signifier and signified exists just as in 
structural linguistics. But here the signifier does not simplistically express the signified, but 
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unites to generate the correlation, the second sign, constituted by the totafi! ý, of assodalion 
of signifier and signified. Another example: 
Take a bunch of roses: I use it to signiý my passion. Do we have here, then, 
only a signifier and a signified, the roses and my passion? Not even that: to put it 
accurately, there are here only 'passionified' roses. But on the plane of analysis, we 
do have three terms; for these roses weighted with passion perfectly and correctly 
allow themselves to be decomposed into roses and passion: the former and the 
latter existed before uniting and forming this third object, which is the sign. It is 
true to say that on the plane of experience I cannot dissociate the roses from the 
message they carry, as to say on the plane of analysis I cannot confuse the roses as 
signifier and the roses as sign: the signifier is empty, the sign is full, it is a 
meaning. 
Barthes: 1957: 113. 
gnificatio , constituted in part by the first What Barthes calls 'myth' is a second order si n 
order sign which then becomes the signifier in the mythological system. Again, the content 
of the first order, the linguistic component, is relegated from its primary status where 
myth takes hold of it and constructs its own meaning. It is the form, as opposed to the 
content of the signification which may hold the myth within, sometimes as a delusion, 
sometimes as an alibi, sometimes as a symbol but always as standing for something other 
than that which is immediately present. Barthes uses this approach to reveal the ideological 
implications behind cultural interpretations of everyday things from wine to soap-powder, 
wrestling to the face of Garbo; in mythological terms everything is an example not only of 
what it 'is' but also of something else and something more; the 'something more' often 
being that which has some shared, socially unifying effect. In this respect, Barthes is 
placing emphasis not only on the ideological implications of myth, but also the 'emotional 
weight' that signs carry. This is of particular relevance to this study since many of the 
signs within the field of social work arc highly emotive - 'child', 'needs', 'protection', 
cabuse' etc. We can draw from Barthes analysis the idea that signs carry with them a 
'knowledge' of the past, a memory, an emotion, but that this 'biography' is put in 
parenthesis' in order to receive the full meaning in the movement from a linguistic sign to 
a mythical signifier. In the case of the innocuous example of Latin grammar given above 
(because my name is lion), we can say that the first order signification, which is linguistic, 
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holds within it a 'biography' of the lion (it signifies a history, geography, an idea of the 
power of the lion etc. ); however, as a grammatical example, this biography recedes and is 
subordinate to this second order signification. In the following section we can explore 
some of the implications of myth for this study. 
Mythical Childhood 
For the purposes of this study, the 'dangerous' sign is the one that presents itself as 
cnatural' when it is essentially ideological; the sign functions to naturalise any ambiguity and 
chase off any possibility of alternative reading; simply perceiving the sign as reflective and 
expressive denies the constrmaiie and ctrative character of the sign. Meaning is constructed, 
and then made to appear natural. Myth is a means of 'naturahsing' historical and 
naturalising intentions; the social world is seen as a signifying field, a network of 
intersecting signs. 
in order to analyse social institutions, professions and their activities in this way requires 
a deciphering of the multiple meanings behind how they are played out in practices. The 
question is: what does the concept or idea mean or 'stand for' in terms of a socially 
unifying, collective experience? For Barthes, "myth hides nothing. its function is to distort, 
not to make disappear" (Barthes: 1957: 121). Whereas in language, Saussure's contention 
was that the sign is arbitrary (the sound-image 'dog' is not automatically compelled to an 
associative relationship with the concept 'dog; it does so through its differential 
relationship with other elements of the system), in myth there is a dynamic between 
meaning and form, a drive toward an interplay between the two components. 
Let us consider 'child protection' as a sign; we are at first caught up in its 'face value' 
meaning; keeping children safe from 'harm', securing 'welfare', the innocence of children, 
the abuse of power by adults, the very worthiness of the message 'protect children. The 
configuration of this particular sign is highly emotive but immediately captures and chases 
2 Where 'form' for Barthes is the signwithin a second order signification. 
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off any possibility of disputing the worthiness of 'protecting children; the 'biographies' of 
'child' and 'protection' are immediately put into parenthesis for child protection to take up 
its mythical signification. All of this happens before we can even begin to challenge some 
of the suppositions that 'prop up' child protection as a 'good thing. (For example, that 
children occupy a state of natural incapacity and innocence, that 'harm' surrounds them, 
that they are not able to consent in the same way as adults, that there is assumed 
'knowingness' about children's welfare) Clearly, the motivation for this denial is also derived 
from either a sense of our own childhood (and how it signifies for us today, in the present) 
and /or (if a parent) a sense of our 'own' children% childhood and how that, too signifies 
crucially for adults. In this way it seems an unquestionable, 'natural' imperative to ensure 
the welfare and safety of all children. But as well as conceptualising the need to protect 
children as unquestionable, 'child protection', as a myth, can also be alternatively 
deciphered/decoded as an 'alibi' for controlling the family, a way of ensuring and 
legitimating access to the private and autonomous arena of 'family'; a feeble disguise for 
ccontrol of the state'. However, if child protection is regarded as a ývnamic relationship 
between the 'protect' (as a first order signification) and 'control' (as a second order 
signification) imperatives, it becomes not something else, but something more altogether. 
The debate can continue to rage about family autonomy versus liberation of the child; 
myth allows for this, is driven and motivated by this very dynamic. If child protection were 
purely and simply about 'saving children, then it would be hardly such a contentious issue, 
no-one would argue about it in terms of class relations, state interference, the rights of 
parents or the infringement of civil liberties. It all too obviously means something else as 
well. And yet, revealing (as if we were naive) the controlling aspects of child protection is 
equally insufficient; if child protection were purely an alibi for state control of the family, a 
conspiracy against the worldng class, an imposition of bourgeois values on the masses, 
then it is an exceptionally ineffectual one, hardly worth bothering with. The point is, Myth 
is not in the business of deluding, conspiring or concealing hidden truths; it 
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accommodates alternative interpretations and works them together in a dynamic 
relationship. It does so at that crucial interface where differential meanings of state and 
family come together; where they dcfine themselves, not once and for always, but 
constantly changing, working and reworking themselves out in a relational dynamic. 
Conceptually, child protection is neither a first order signification about saving children, 
nor in a second order signification about state control, the two combine to generate the 
mythical meaning of child protection; a socially unifying concept which is able to bring 
together a variety of disparate causes and contradictory political identities beneath a 
common banner. 
In a similar way, 'childhood', as a sign, has itself acquired 'mythical' qualities within a 
discourse of liberal professionalism that social work inhabits. In later chapters the study 
will describe how social work knowledge is necesswily, eclectic, and thus occupies somewhat 
ambivalent territory; somewhere within a coalition between 'psychological' and 
csociological' theory. Here, discourses that constitute the natural child, enable childhood to 
transcend any potential contradiction. It is in this way that we could say that 'childhood' is 
a 'mythical significr'. Its significance in this respect will be discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Driven to either unveil or liquidate an historical concept, myth sidesteps the issue and 
naturalises it, projecting it out of paradox or contradiction. In this way, Barthes 
structuralist serniology develops ideas that Derrida subsequently pursues to the extreme 
and provides for this study a 'way in' to the critique of meaning that post-structuralism 
represents. In particular, this study will return to an examination of the 'naturalised sign' 
in social work discourse from the perspective of Derrida's deconstructive approach. First, 
we should begin by establishing the movement in Derrida's thinking from strcuturalism to 
post-structuralism. 
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Structuralism and Post-structuralism: Some continuities and discontinuities 
The discussion has thus far shown that for Saussure, systems are understood in the 
present, not in terms of an evolutionary process; for the post-structuralist, this divide 
between the bistotical and the conceptual is a priority that is pursued to the extreme and 
represents a significant shift away from not only traditional thought, but from modem 
structuralism, particularly in the work of Foucault and Derrida. 
It is Saussure's positing of a pre-given and fixed structuring of language prior to its 
actualisation in speech or writing that makes his linguistic analysis 'structuralist'; Derrida, 
however, rejects the notion that there is anything 'behind' or prefiguring language. In 
structuralism, a sense of the 'naturalness' of things was ultimately retained; for example in 
the attempt to universalise and generalise a theory of the human mind through the 
structuralist anthropology of Levi-Strauss (1966). 
In structural linguistic analysis the sign is arbitrary, its meaning is not predetermined or 
'God-given', but is established through its use in nlation to other linguistic signs but from 
within an enclosed system. Post-structuralism looks at the variability, the cultural- 
specificity, and the arbitrariness of meaning, particularly in language; this symbiosis 
between signifiers and signified is more fluid, less certain; one does not necessarily 
correspond to the other. Indeed, for Derrida, the relationship between sign and signifier is 
not just less certain; it is not certain at all. In this sense, language can refer only to itse! ffivm 
ujibin itseýl with no external points of reference that we can 'hang on' to at all. In 
structuralism, there is at least a sense in which we can say that meaning somehow hes 
'behind' the sign; the sign is a sign of and for the meaning intended and received; it retains 
an 'objectivity' about it. Even though the sign is arbitrary and it is only through common 
usage and its differential relationship to other signs that its meaning makes any sense, this 
implied 'externality' gives an objectivity to meaning. Although the distinction between the 
historical and the conceptual was well made by structuralism, for Derrida it loses credibility 
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in attempting to establish universal truths about the systems it espouses. The post- 
structuralist project is not to demolish one set of apparently universal truths in order to 
reveal something more 'true' within, beneath or behind Cit is here post-structuralism parts 
company with structuralism), but to reveal the instability, non-universality of all truth and 
logic and the infinite play of significations in the social field. Derrida argues that there is no 
coriginal', natural, unsupplemented state of things, pointing out that Saussure's theory of 
language as a system of signs ultimately reverts to a discourse which assumes a 'centre' or 
clogos' to thought by suggesting that speech is the 'truest' form of language and writing the 
most 'unnatural'. Whilst Saussure emphasises the pre-eminence and purity of speech over 
writing, Derrida shows that when he comes to explain the 'nature' of linguistic units he 
ironically returns to writing to illustrate the point. This is a tendency which Derrida sees a 
symptomatic of the whole of the Western philosophical tradition. However, despite this 
'fatal flaw', we should not diminish or underestimate the significance of Saussure's 
contribution: 
Saussure set the terms for a development which passed beyond the grasp of his 
explicit programme but which could hardly have been formulated otherwise. By 
repressing the problem which his own theory of language all but brought into 
view, Saussure transcended the express limitations of that theory. The very 
concept of 'writing' was enlarged through tMs encounter into something 
primordial and far removed from its traditional place in usage. 
Norris: 1991: 31 
What all of this means is that as far as language is concerned, we can no longer see 
beneath the surface or get behind the meaning since there is nowhere to go, no 'core of 
things', no celestial city, at which to arrive and stay forever after. Put another way, language 
does not only construct the social world that we inhabit; it constructs our very 'selves' 
within it. This is a crucial point to which we shall return; one which particular implications 
for this study in respect of the ways in which 'child' and childhood in public care are 
constituted through the language and, by extension, the discourses that constitute social 
work practices. In order to fully appreciate the movement from structuralism to post- 
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structuralism and the practice of deconstruction which emerges from that movement, it is 
necessary to explore further some of the key ideas and concepts in Derrida's thinking 
alluded to above. These ideas and concepts can be seen as comprising an overaH critique 
presented by Derrida of what he caUs the 'metaphysics of presence' -a critique which 
chaUenges not only the precepts of structuralism but also other conventional 
understandings and theories of meaning and signification which have characterised 
Western thought. 
The Problem of 'Presence' 
I'll have said it, IT have said it inside me, then in the same breath outside me, 
perhaps thaeswhat I feel, an outside and an inside and me in the middle, perhaps 
thaeswhat I am, the thing that divides the world in two, on the one side the 
outside, on the other the inside, that can be as thin as foil, I'm neither one side nor 
the other, I'm in the middle, I'm the partition, I've two surfaces and no thickness, 
perhaps thaeswhat I feel, myself vibrating, I'm the tympanum, on the one hand 
the mind, on the other the world, I don't belong to either. 
The Unnameable Beckett. 1958: 343 
i. Logocentdsm, Presence and the Indeterniinacy of Meaning 
It will be clear that the idea of meaning as 'graspable' in its entirety and fully present to 
us in our minds is being undermined by post-structuralism. The Tlusioný of fully present 
meaning is one which Derrida regards as deeply embedded in Western culture and 
philosophical thought in that it assumes an area of 'knowingness' in presence that is solid 
and irrefutable. This tradition towards a 'metaphysics of presence' relies upon the idea of 
a centre or 'logos' to thought - characterised by Derrida as 'logocentrism' - and is manifest 
as a commitment to the belief in the ultimate 'word' or truth which must, as a founding 
principle, exist 'outside' of all signifying systems. Western philosophy has assumed a core 
of meaning to everything; that things have an origin and essence; "the belief that the first 
and last thing is the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the seff-presence of full seff 
consdousness" (Sarup: 36: 1993). However, as Derrida points out, notions of 'truth, 
3 Derrida (1982) also makes use the metaphor 'tympanu& in describing presence, undermining the idea of the 'interior 
self and the exterior 'real world'. 
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ccertainty', 'identity' etc. are all centred tia the exclusion, suppression and marginalisation 
of multiplicity, ambiguity and difference - there can be no concept that is not subject to 
this 'play' of signification. Without the transcendental or independent signifier no one sign 
can refer unequivocally to a particular signifier; at the same time, there is no 'outside' to 
the realm of signification; therefore, Derrida concludes there can be no unqualified 
presence or originating meaning. For example, we can argue that in Western culture 
'family' signifies as an 'origin', something upon which a whole plethora or other 
signification rest and are centred (about the sanctity of childhood, the respective 
childrearing capacities of women and men, the 'thread' of 'nature' that family signifies). 
This is in spite of the actual diversity of family forms, the proliferation of lone parent 
families and fears of moral decline as a consequence of a fragmentation of traditional 
family configurations. Throughout, 'family', as a sý, gnfiier is not subject to, but transcends 
the play of signification that surrounds it. Alternatively, 'originating' meanings or signifiers 
can be characterised as the goal within a teleolq! gical way of thinking that drive ideas of 
progress, (as within Modernity the 'project of Enlightenment' or the strive for 'universal 
emancipation': see Chapter One) either way, both teleological and logocentric 'thinking 
paradigms' rely on the transcendental signifier and fail to account for the multi- 
pective dynamic of signification. dimensional and retros 
In this way, Derrida rejects the various strands of linguistic and non-linguistic theories 
of meaning that precede post-structuralism. First, and most obviously, 'literal' meaning is 
no longer guaranteed (as in for example, the standard linguistic dictionary definition). 
There is no tidy unity between a signifier and a signified (linguistic or otherwise); meaning 
is emptied from one before it reaches the other. By looking up one word in a dictionary 
we are referred to another, and so on. But not only is meaning escaping just at the point of 
arrival, there is also no real distinction signifiers and signified; one signifier bows out to the 
next before the signified can ever become fully present. 
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At the same time as undermining the structuralist linguistic notion of meaning, Derrida 
allows no escape from language in to the 'real world'. Meaning is not either 'external' to 
the 'self' in the sense that our experience of the world can be taken for granted and in 
which names for 'things' are simply 'labels' or where words 'stand for' things that 
correspond directly with the real world, for there is no access to this world except through 
meaning. Meaning cannot be fixed either by the intention of the speaker or author; it is 
neither 'somewhere in between' the former or the latter (the study returns to this in the 
following section). This means that theories which suggest that meaning is derived where 
the intention of the speaker or author coincides with Iteral' meaning, or where intention 
is seen as shaped by 'public', linguistic meaning but ultimately is independent of it, of 
where a combination of individual (psychological) and social/cultural linguistics coalesce 
to constitute meaning, are aU rejected. For Derrida, there is no unmediated experience in 
the world since there is no meaning outside of language and signification; all meaning is 
always and already in a process of constant change; it is therefore indeterminate, context- 
specific and produced through a process of repetition or iteration, a concept to which we 
shall shortly return. 
I Speecb and Wi*ing. - The Structudng of 'Presence' 
We can see that for Derrida, language is seen as constituting meaning, rejecting the 
notion that there are prior ideas which are merely expressed in language. In a traditional, 
metaphysical reading of a text, meaning is more than what the words on a page mean, it is 
understood as the meaning that the author intends for them. Language is thus dependent 
on the self-knowing, subjective author and by inference the purist form of expression 
communicable is speech. For Derrida, however, philosophy cannot rely on the assumption 
of a known, given, taken-for-granted certainty, or self-present consciousness from where 
all our investigations of the social world, past and present can derive a foundation of 
truth. This logocentrism is manifest in the way in which speech is seen as closer to truth 
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than writing. Derrida suggests that rather speech is dependent on writing and that 
language reveals this paradox form when it is at its most distant from its corigins': 
But consider an analogy- the case of a growing tree. Ordinarily we tend to 
imagine - even when we know better - that a tree rises and flourishes by virtue of 
some deep and inwardly hidden source of life. We tend to imagine some single 
essential centre which was there in the earliest stages of growth, and w1kh has 
remained constant under all later increments. But in factý of course, a tree lives on 
the outside, by the circulation which flows through its green bark and sapwood; 
and its centre is mere dead heartwood, endlessly supplanted and left behind. 
Harland: 1987: 129 
When applied to the meaning of texts this analogy rejects an authoritative meaning 
originating in the subjectivity of the author, and replaces it with a conception of meaning 
as an ongoing process, produced on the surface, by a text in particular environments. 
In Of Grammatology (1976), Derrida suggests that it is the assumption of presence that 
has meant writing has been seen as an appendage or even a corruption of speech, 
indicative of the broader tendency toward metaphysical thought-systems 
oogocentrism/phonocentrism) which depend on a core, or logos. Such thought-systems 
are dependent on what they exclude: presence/absence, 'Being'/nothingness, good/evil, 
speech/writing and the priority of the former term over the latter. 
These binary oppositions traditionally are seen as obeying a principle of contrast 
between two mutually exclusive terms, and are crucial to metaphysical thinking since it is 
the opposition of subject/object upon which objective description depends. Binary 
oppositions represent a way of seeing things; of ordering the world along ideological lines 
of what should and what should not be. Deconstruction aims not just to challenge these 
oppositional categories but to take apart the conceptual framework that makes them 
possible at all. It is a means to show how texts can undermine their apparent logic. Derrida 
suggests that there is no unsupplemented 'original' of anything to which to return in order 
to find out the truth about things. In each and every binary opposition the first state 
depends on the 'present absence' of the second. How ever far structuralism seemed to go 
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in challenging existing understandings about the 'nature' of things it ultimately reverted 
back upon itself, caved in, collapsed and made 'non-sense' of itself in pursuing invariables 
which as though they reflected something about the 'nature' of humankind. 
Against the priority of speech over writing (phonocentrism) in the Western tradition, 
Derrida argues that rather than be seen as derivative of speech, writing is in fact a 
precondition for all speech. It is because of the assumptions of metaphysical thought that 
a priority has traditionally been given to speech over writing, fundamentally that the 'voice' 
is seen as closer to the origins, closer to the presence in the present, certainly as close as 
one can get to self-conscious intention, thought and meaning. "Voice ... is a metaphor of 
truth and authenticity ... writing destroys this ideal of self-presence" (Norris: 1991: 28). The 
fact that this seems so logical and common-sensical is precisely the point; common-sense, 
the 'familiar', the taken-for-granted must here be subverted. Derrida argues that we must 
see writing as a precondition for language and therefore as prior to speech. 
How can this be? For a start, marks on a page do not always anyway represent the 
phonetics of language; in Egyptian hieroglyphic and Chinese ideogrammatic scripts the 
written sign signifies independently of an equivalent spoken sign. So there is no universal, 
automatic relationship between the written and the phonic. Of course, Derrida does not 
argue that in the development of a child, speech comes before writing and "rccognises that 
thefact of writing follows from thefact of speech, but he none the less asserts that the idea 
of speech depends on the idea of writing" (Harland: 1987: 129). 
This preference for speech as the authentic 'voice' and self-presence pervades all of 
Western theory and can be traced in the linguistic theory of Saussure, despite his 
exposition of language as a system of abstracted differences. If speech is assumed 
cpresence', then writing is the 'absence' of 'presence', in other words, writing is lberrforr that 
upon which speech depends for its very sense of presence. Again, Derrida is chaRenging 
the assumption that the most basic, rudimentary form of something is necessarily closer to 
the origin or the truth about a thing. Metaphysical thought is that which always depends 
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on a foundation, a certainty. Such certainties, as we have seen, are defined not by what 
they are, but by what they not; that is, in a relation of binary opposites. Writing works in a 
way that speech cannot because of its delusion of authenticity and truth. Writing is the 
infinite removal, replacement and dislocation of meaning and of meanin g of meaning that 
determines language and places 'truth' forever one step beyond our reach. In terms of 
discovering universal laws, generalities about the social world we are in the disconcerting 
position of being unable to say what we mean, or indeed to mean what we say: 
By a hardly perceptible necessity, it seems as though the concept of writing - 
no longer indicating a particular, derivative, auxiliary form of language in general 
(whether understood as communication, relation, expression, signification, 
constitution of meaning or thought, etc. ), no longer designating the exterior 
surface, the insubstantial double of a major signifier, the signifier of the signifier - 
is beginning to go beyond the extension of language .. There the signified always 
already functions as a signifier. The secondarity that it seemed possible to ascribe 
to writing alone affects all signifieds in general, affects them always already, the 
moment they enter the game. There is not a single signified that escapes, even if 
recaptured, the play of signifying references that constitutes language. 
Derrida: 1976: 6-7 
Derrida gives no special precedence to the mind and argues that in the case of writing 
there is no precedence of mind over meaning. Even in the very act of writing itself, 
meaning is 'discovered' by the writer-as-reader: "before me, the signifier on its own says 
more than I believe I meant to say, and in relation to it, my meaning-to-say is submissive 
rather than active" (Derrida: 78: 1978). In S . 
Peecb and Writing (1973), Derrida places priority 
on the relationship between the text and the reader; a relationship that is seen as active 
and generative wherein the text rather than 'complete', 'passive', or 'finished, no longer 
coheres directly with 'marks upon a page'. "The new movement implies a shift from the 
signifier to the signified: and so there is a perpetual detour on the way to a truth that has 
lost any status of finality" (Sarup: 1993: 3). Whereas structuralism regards 'truth' as lying 
'behind' a text or sign, post-structuralism emphasises the productivity of interaction 
between reader and text and is highly ambivalent about (though equally indebted to) 
Saussure's confidence in the unity of the stable sign. 'Truth' is therefore forever elusive; 
signification and meaning are, in this way, a permanent 'detour' to truth. 
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iii. Differance, Iteration, Presence 
Against the idea of an interior 'self presence' or language, the concept of meaning is 
that of a repeatable (iterable) ideality. It is the temporal quality to iteration that ensures 
that meaning is never static. Whilst it may be self-evident that repetition is necessary to 
signification (otherwise there would be nothing to refer or defer meaning to or from), with 
iteration this repetition is not self-identical simply because meaning is not fixed; 
temporality erodes meaning with each repetition; this is part of the very identity of the 
sign, a mark of its instability and absence; it is here that language becomes a much less 
consistent and determined phenomena than structuralists tended to consider. It is also 
here that because meaning is the result of a division, a 'non- presence', such repetition can 
also be transformadVe4. 
Derrida attempts to defer the logocentric theory of the sign where the sign marks an 
'absent presence'. In doing so, he uses the term &fferance, meaning to both differ and defer, 
or postpone. In French, the verb &fferer has both these meanings; phonetically there is no 
difference in the ending '-ence' and '-ance'; the difference is only apparent in writing. The 
silence of the 'a' in the neologism reminds us that writing is not necessarily phonetic, it 
only 'works' phonetically by the insertion of non-phonetic instructions (punctuation, 
spacing, etc. ). "Even within the graphic structure, the perfectly spelled word is always 
absent, constituted through an endless series of spelling mistakes" (Spivak: 1976: xIiii). 
Differance is a word 'suspended' between two meanings, reflecting the resistance of the 
signifier to a stable, reductionist meaning. Since in writing there is an endless deferment, 
postponement, present-absence, Derrida argues that it undermines even the possibility of 
4 For more on 'repetition' from a post-structur2lia, psychoanalytic perspective see Julia Kristeva (1981,1982). Kristeva 
draws on Freud and particularly Jacques Lacan's (1977) notion of the 'symbolic order% Kristeva argues that repetition 
is a means of constituting the 'subject' through an 'occlusion' of the 'other, but it can also be used 'positively' to 
subvert the symbolic order and 'transform! meaning. Similarly, Elisabeth Bronfen (1992) sees repetition as a narrative 
tool which can be both destructive Ccomplete, self-identical repetition) and constructive (repetition which is similar 
but non-identical, therefore emphasising difference and transformation). 
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an underlying 'structure' to language, or anything else for that matter; structure assumes 
foundation, something solid at the bottom upon which everything else is built. In the 
absence of this, signifiers endlessly differ and defer to and from each other, always and 
forever referring to the absence of the 'other'. "Differance produces what it forbids, makes 
possible the very thing that it makes impossible" (Derrida: 1976: 143). Differance is what 
makes the 'being present' possible; it is not just that presence is constituted by difference 
and deferment (&fferance) but the 'subject' that perceives 'presence' itself so that 'thought' 
(the 'thinking' of perception) is a dffierance of perception. DiYerance is used by Derrida as a 
metaphor for all signification since, as we have seen the 'sign' stands for meaning/referent, 
representing the 'thing' (or 'presence) in its absence. 
Whether written, verbal, political or social, signs defer our encounter with the 'thing' 
itself so that signification is the '&fferance of temporization' (Derrida: 1976). The referent 
itself is secondary and provisional; &fferance creates structure and produces 'concept' in the 
absence of 'presence'. In this way, &fferance produces difference as a concept. There is no 
promise of 'arrival' here; 'displaced' presence is not waiting, somewhere else, to be 
ultimately discovered once and for all; it is always already suspended; postponement/ 
deferment is both its character and its destiny. Differance ensures our relationship with a 
'structure' which enables our construction of the social world on the basis of oppositional 
constructs. ' It is polysemic but characterises the functioning of all language as 
differentiation and deferral; - without the ideas and concepts constituted by the iteration of 
signs we could not identify, for example, 'cat' as 'cat'; all meaning is derived from this 
differing/deferring play of signifiers. 
5 In Speech and Phenomena (1973) Derrida reads differance in Freud's analysis of the unconscious where the 'normar 
and the 'neurotic' are defined in relation only to each other. It is through understanding the action of an 'economy' 
(Spivak. 1976) of opposing instincts such as the pleasure principle and the death instinct, never by one or the other 
operating alone, that we can begin to understand the human psyche and the way in which the unconscious works: 
"Following a schema that continually guides Freud's thinking, the movement of the trace is described as an cffort of 
life to protect itself by deferring the dangerous investmentý by constituting a reserve. And all the conceptual 
oppositions that furrow Freudian thought relate each concept to the other like movements of a detour, within the 
economy of Differance. The one is only the other deferred, the one differing from the other. " Derrida: 1973: 150. 
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Differance makes the opposition presence/absence possible; the desire for presence out 
of absence, 'being' out of 'nothingness' is carried within the notion of &fferance, without 
which presence is inconceivable; indeed it is not possible to conceive of presence as 
conceivable without &fferance. If speech is 'natural', immediate, self-proximate, it is only so 
with the addition of the supplement of writing, that which ensures the sense of presence 
encapsulated within speech, as unnatural. As an addition, a substitute, a supplement, 
writing (or any supplement) does not add to a positive presence but fills up an emptiness 
with a representation of presence that ought not to need supplementing (as something 
natural, full, complete, essential): 
Immediacy is ... the myth of consciousness ... the concept of origin or nature is 
nothing but the myth of addition, of supplementarity annulled by being purely 
additive. It is the myth of the effacement of the trace, that is to say of an originary 
difference that is neither absence nor presence, neither negative nor positive. 
Originary difference is supplementarity as structure. Here structure means the 
irreducible complexity within which one can only shape or shift the play of 
presence or absence; that within which metaphysics can be produced but which 
metaphysics cannot think 
Derrida: 1976: 166-167 
The idea of the 'now-ness' of experience is in tl-ds way supplanted by the experience of 
what already has been; the 'trace' inscribed on consciousness. Thus, "writing supplements 
6 
perception before perception even appears to itself' (Derrida: 1978 224). Immediate 
experiences, a sight, a sound, an exchange are not direct experiences of the world but a 
contact with a trace of what has already been; our experience of the 'real world' is, to this 
extent, 'indirect'; experience is preceded by the trace of what has gone before, of endlessly 
deferring significrs. This is an unnerving circumstance in which to find ourselves; what we 
think of as 'now' is gone just before we arrive, we can never be in the nowness of our 
experience of the world, we always arrive late in the sense that perception is displaced and 
removed from the felt 'realness' of things in the world outside of us. What we perceive, we 
can only see in the past: "pure perception does not exist; we are written only as we write, 
6 As in Freud's theory of the psyche there is a clear affinity here with the unconscious mind and the idea of there being 
different meanings lying beneath the surface of our idea of self-presence. "Ibe unconscious mind underlies the 
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by the agency within us which always keeps watch over perception" (Dcrrida: 1978: 226). 
Differance-is an attempt to displace the binarism of logic, suggesting that any appearance 
of fixed meaning is merely an 'effect', a temporary deferring and differing of meaning. This 
process serves to undermine the appearance and effect of textual coherence and meaning. 
The sign 'itself' is, in this way, not a substitute for an 'absent presence', on the way to an 
corigin', rather any 'sense' of origin is derived from &fferance. However, in saying this, we 
should also be careful not to imply &fferance as the true and only origin (in place of 
presence) but, if we like, as that which creates the 'conditions of possibility' for 
signification to emerge. 
iv. 'Being' underE. -asure 
Derrida also points us to Heidegger's use of the term "sous rature" or 'under erasure' 
(Heidegger: 1959) as a way of exposing the presuppositions of words but without denying 
ourselves the precomprehension that the words provide us with. Put another way, the 
inaccuracy of words is exposed without denying their necessity. Writing 'under erasure' is a 
mark of consequence when we examine the familiar and come up with unfamiliar 
conclusions. The word is written, but crossed out. For Heidegger, the crossed out word 
,g since 
he felt that BNgý is always indefinable, transcendental in the sense that was RW 
defining the 'nature' of anything in itself assumes that things can `be'. Writing R in this 
way is intended to prevent us slipping back into the habit of imagining that BAieZ can stand 
alone, in and of itself It is seen as better than the creation of a new word, which might 
mean that understanding becomes obscured or forgotten. A new word might also mean 
that the 'understanding', the 'word-meaning' is lost altogether as we imagine that it no 
longer exists and become too familiar with the presuppositions of the new word-meaning 
to even notice them as presuppositions anymore. With usage comes familiarity, with 
familiarity comes presumption and 'taken-for-grantedness'. 
conscious mindand the unconscious mind exists in the form of writing. Ws is writing as 'arche-writing', a 
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To illustrate, it is useful to think of the 'dead' metaphor, literalised into everyday 
language. For example, the word dedde began as a metaphor, where in Latin dedderr meant 
to cut Ibivugb something, presumably to arrive at a solution. Solution is itself a dead 
metaphor from the Latin solterr, meaning to unfasten. The old meanings are subsumed and 
lost in the new word-meaning; no longer infused with metaphorical value, they are 
metaphorical only in the sense that they are 'dead' as metaphors. We can see how in this 
context it becomes problematic to even use the term 'dead' metaphor when all language is 
essentially metaphoric and all meaning is ultimately provisional; we can see a parallel here 
with the idea of the naturalised sign where usage and familiarity mean that any immediate 
sense of metaphoricity is lost. 
Derrida's use of 'under erasure' is expressed through his use of &fferance (sometimes 
what he calls the 'trace) and is really one of the 'tools' for deconstruction. Whilst we have 
seen that the sign-word, thought-object and 'thing' never become as one, it is the &ffeirnfial 
relationship and the absence (deferred presence) that we make sense of Although our 
cself-consciousness' is not thought of in relation to other signs, 'presence' can itself only be 
conceived of in terms of 'non-presence'. Thus, any immediate sense of self-presence, self- 
knowing, (i. e. consciousness) in the 'here and now' is dependent on non-presence, non- 
knowingness; the sign is dependent on the absence of the 'other'. The sign must always be 
understood therefore as 'under erasure; always and already inhabited by the trace of the 
'other'. 
v. Metaphar and Presence 
The analogy of opposites is the relation of light to shadow, peak to abyss, 
fullness to void.. Allegory, mother of all dogmas, is the replacement of the seal by 
the hallmark, of reality by shadow:, it is the falsehood of truth, and the truth of 
falsehood. 
Eliphas Levi: 1856: XII, 22: cited in U. Eco (1989) Foucault's PenWum. 
For Derrida, the secondarity of writing to speech is symptomatic of a similar fear of the 
fundamental script or hieroglyplýics written upon the matter of the brie' 1987: 142). 
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diffusion of knowledge through the explicitly metaphorical activity of writing. The 
authority of speech, rooted in the philosophy of Socrates, is explored further by Derrida 
in his examination of Plato's thought. Further to the opposition speech/writing, Derrida 
locates the opposition between 'good' and 'bad' writing (Derrida: 1977). One is seen as 
'truth' inscribed on the soul by the laws of reason, the other the literal, crude and intruding 
script. The truth 'written' within, assimilated in the Nfiddle Ages with the spiritual script in 
Christian terms is thus described metaphorically in terms of writing itself, the supposed 
supplement of the origin. Here the figurative and rhetorical is not only given precedence, 
but is seen as closer to truth, as more accessible, immediate. What is written inside the soul, 
the logos, the core of meaning can paradoxically only be described metaphorically; for 
Derrida the point being that this is its only, existence; that is, as a delusion, a fantasy, since it 
is but an inversion of non-being. In Derrida's view it is not "a matter of inverting the 
literal meaning and the figurative meaning but of determining the "literal" meaning of 
writing as metaphoricity itself" (Derrida: 1977: 15). In a broader discussion of the role of 
writing as metaphor (Derrida: 1976) also shows how literal writing is often contrasted, 
without any sense of irony, to writing as metaphor: 
Writing in the conunon sense is the dead letter, it is the carder of death. It 
exhausts life. On the other hand... writing in the metaphoric sense, natural, 
divine and living writing, is venerated; it is equal in dignity to the origin of value, 
to the voice of conscience as divine law, to the heart, to sentiment, and so forth. 
Derrida: 1976: 17 
We can see the paradox at work in the Bible: In the býV*nning war The Word, and the Wlord 
was uitb God, and the Word was God (St John ch. 1, v. 1). The 'Word' is venerated but 
secondag, mere artifice to the 'truth', the 'presence' of God; yet simultaneously that truth is 
itself represented as the Word, the transcendental signifier: The construction of presence 
relies on the idea that empirical, literal writing is subjugated, rejected as derivative from 
presence in the 'absence' of the author at the same time as it is validated, accepted as a 
metaphor for 'presence'. 
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In part, Derrida aims to debunk the myth of philosophical superiority where metaphor 
is seen as one step away from truth, a deferred meaning which can, by some ultimate and 
grandiose philosophical exercise be unmasked to reveal the 'origin'. It can sometimes seem 
that whenever philosophy posits an ideal order that is appropriated by a theoretical 
discourse, along comes Derrida and shows how the same is always already contaminated 
by the very delusions that philosophy is trying to escape. From Aristotle to Plato to Kant 
to Hegel, the workings of metaphor have been seen as explicable at some deeper, yet 
undiscovered level that might be accessed by reference to some other more rigorous, 
reliable 'truthffiF kind of language. Clearly, there is an affinity here in the suspension of 
metaphysical thought and the positing of a theory of the multiplicity of interpretations 
available. Here, there is no literal truth; we have discussed how describing a concept or 
thing can only be done in terms of its differential relationship. Metaphor is the means of 
establishing a meaning to something by virtue of its dissimilarity and difference to 
something else. 
In this way, any sense that we sometimes have of the truth of meaning, the 'real thing', 
lying in wait, ever elusive, just there behind language is a delusion; reality is thus an illusion 
afforded us by the power of the metaphorical and metonymical operation of language. 
Thus, no distinctions between literary writing and other Ends of writing can be drawn. 
Philosophical, scientific and critical forms of discourse are therefore just as metaphorical as 
for example, poetry and other forms of literary and creative discourse. There can be no 
demarcation between creative writing and criticism, theory and poetry, fact and fiction. 
Since language as metaphor has no foundation of solid meaning where metaphor can be 
unmasked and truth revealed, it can only perform the expression of dissimilitude in all 
things. It is where metaphor is at its most seductive, alluring, apparently truthful that it is 
theirfore at its most deceitful; the less explicit the figuration, the more hidden the deceit. It 
is to Derrida's practice of deconstruction which, within a logoccntric discourse, 
undermines the metaphorical and metonymic structure of the text to expose a multiplicity 
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of 'truths', that the study now turns. 
Supplementarit3r and Metaphor. Introducing Deconstruction 
Derrida's deconstructive readings expose the inverted meanings within texts, showing 
how the figurative and the rhetorical are revealed as crucial to the logic and functioning of 
philosophical thought from antiquity to modernity. For example, in Derrida's readings of 
Nietzsche (Derrida: 1972,1976,1978), the 'will to power' is the human condition, that 
which requires us to create a semblance of order out of 'nothingness', a collection of nerve 
stimuli, chaos. 'Truth' is name given to the figurations afforded to these nerve stimuli, a 
camouflage which masquerades as the primary signified and from which all other 
interpretations or metaphors flow. This 'interpretation' or process of figuration then, is 
not a deciphering, translating or transforming of meaning in the everyday sense of the 
word 'interpretation', but the insertion of meaning by figuration or 'sign-maldng. This 
extrapolation of the notion of metaphoricity to the very Emits of understanding and 
signification is not without paradox, however. By extending the process of figuration to 
the limits, the notion of metaphor itself becomes subverted since no longer is one 
signified substituted for another in order to create similarity, structure, and order out of 
dissimilitude and chaos; instead, the infinite substitution means that the sign is not 
metaphor but metonymy, where the sign stands for the 'whole'. 
Is not Nietzsche's procedure here precisely to extend to every element of 
discourse, under the name metaphor, what classical rhetoric no less strangely 
considered a quite specific figure speech, metonymy of the sign [that die sign as "a 
pare' stood for "the whole" meaning]? 
Derrida: 1972: 270-71 
In part, Derrida's point is that we should avoid taking the notion of metaphor itself for 
granted, so that metaphor is, in effect, the primary signified. Thus, although figuration, as 
manifested by metaphor, is viewed simply as the form, appearance, guise of the 'Will to 
power', the impulses of nerve stimuli, and is interpreted as 'truth', truth itself is but a 
substitution for metaphor, and vice-versa, for all significations beyond that of the primary 
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signified: 'metaphor". As Spivak's preface to Of Grammatolog suggests, Ncitzsche could 
thus have more appropriately placed 'metaphor' 'under erasure'. 
The question for Derrida is 'what is the extent to which some interpretations can be 
disregarded or invalidated on the basis that they allegcdly misconstrue authorial intention? ' 
Rather than react defensively to the threat to authorial intention, texts need to be 
understood as fall of meaning and potential significance; they have a depth and breadth of 
meaning that is held not only within the text but also without the text and within the 
textual and intertextual setting, the con-text of interpretation and meaning of meaning. 
It is a particular kind of reading that gives rise to alternative interpretations; "... we 
should think (as Derrida suggests) in terms of 'mimetic perversion', of a reading that can 
seize upon the text's various resources (of syntax, metaphor, structural economy) and 
bend them to its own purpose. " (Norris: 1987: 201). It is in this way that the 'meaning' of a 
text can signify its own inversion and is open to deconstruction. 
just as it is inadequate to see the figurative as concealing, deferring or representing a 
'solid' meaning yet to be revealed, so it is also not enough to see metaphor in and of itself 
as some kind of truth in its own right. Thus Derrida opens up the possibility of the 
ultimate undecidabilty of metaphor and therefore of meaning within texts. 
To this extent, metaphor, rather than a creative and expressive smpplemew is the very 
condition of language. 'Theoretical' understandings are thus conditioned by metaphor; it is 
the mechanism for the transformation and control of meanings. The possibility for 
metaphor is infinite; ultimately anything can mean anything else. Deconstructivc criticism 
looks at the metaphorical structure of text, breaks through it in order to show that a 
number of binary oppositions are in operation which ultimately can be dismantled to bring 
out the marginal that is always already 'written' therein. It is in pursuing the notion of 
7 Afore than this, to collapse the opposition completely we can also regard 'truth' and 'metaphoe paradoxically as 
synonyms and metonyms for each other in that they 'stand foe each other in the sense of alluding to each other (as 
the press for journalism or the Oval Office for the US. presidency) at the same time as signi4ing the 'same"thing' 
(non-thing)j. c.; the absence/presence of each other. Metaphor points to 'truth' by finding the similitude in 
dissimilarity but in our reading, 'tlutW is itself metaphorical. 
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being 'under erasure' and &fferance, that Dcrrida posits the idea of the logic of supplements 
against logocentrism where it is what is added on to something that comes to dcfinc the 
originating concept or idea. We have begun to see how structural oppositions can be seen 
in a relationship not of opposition, but of what we might call supplcmcntarity, part of 
something much more fluid, amorphous, indefinite, less certain. It is this state and 
experience of uncertainty which, whilst on the one hand creating anxiety as the structure 
collapses from within, can also be a 'freeing up' of knowledge and understanding, not of 
new certainties, new structures, but of altogether different, contingent, interminable 
possibilities. 
For the purposes of this discussion the significance of metaphor in determining our 
conceptual thinking about children, welfare and the state cannot be underestimated. On 
the one hand, use of metaphor has the ability to obscure, limit, constrain, conceptual 
understandings; on the other hand, a dcconstructivc method can help to unlock the 
undccidabihty of metaphor and of meaning. Deconstruction can reveal as fictions those 
metaphors that have on the surface lost their very status as metaphors, so interwoven have 
they become into our everyday use of language. In this way, new possibilities of 
understanding and of conceptualising the social world may be opened up. 
The Practice of Deconstruction 
We can regard deconstruction as bringing together many of the ideas presented by 
Derrida into apraefice or a way of reading/ thinldng about texts, concepts, suppositions 
and practices which can seem not only familiar and, to an extent, above or beyond a 
conventional critique, but also and more importantly, appear seff-etidentyl- to articulate a 
ccommon-sense', logical, rational and unquestionable state of things. Whilst Derrida uses 
his deconstructive way of reading to scrutinise the texts of Husscrl, Rousseau, Plato, Freud 
and others, the strategy can be applied to any text, or indeed to any 'textual' setting, any 
ccon-text'we might choose. In this way, despite a certain anxiety in losing the familiarity of 
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'knowing' our fixed points of reference, there can also be a kind of liberation; both in 
deconstructing the discourse of, for example 'social work' (via social work texts 
themselves) and in the con-text of social work practice (as merely another textual setting), 
we are able to explore the possibility of developing new ways of thinking about and 
working with what may have often seemed all too familiar. 
It will be clear that this will have a particular resonance within the field of enquiry for 
this study i. e., childhood, wherein there are, indeed, powerful discourses, bodies of 
thought, theories and practices which are all too often taken for granted - for example, 
ideas based upon notions of the 'natural' family and childhood as a 'natural' state. 11crc, 
discourse is structured upon the opposition nature/culture. As far as 'family' is concerned 
we could also say, as Barthes indicates, that 'culture' has become so familiar, so 'naturahscd' 
within the field of signification that 'family' figures, that it is all but indistinguishable from 
nature. Thus, the 'natural family', a construction naturalised through a series of other 
naturalised constructions about the relationship between men and women is rooted in the 
seemingly indisputable natural 'facts' of biology. Here a reductionism is able to operate 
which provides the base, the foundation of structure upon which the 'natural' family is 
bat. Yet the powerful grip of the logic at work here can be subverted and contradicted in 
order to reveal entirely social and cultural forces at hand. For example, where the moral, 
religious, biological and psychological discourses predominate about the naturalness of the 
male/female reproductive role, sex itself can paradoxically be seen as derivative. Not just 
sexual behaviour that is seen from 'within' the said discourses as deviant, subversive or 
dysfunctional, but all sex, even that with the 'pure' function of procreation. Put another 
way, if reproduction (from within the said discourses) is the only legitimate purpose for 
sexual activity then artificial insemination can be seen as the 'purest' form of reproduction, 
an eminently cultural activity, devoid of any element whatsoever of deviation or mediation, 
and yet one condemned by some as perverse and against the 'laws' of nature. By pursuing 
the apparent logic' of nature to the very edge of reason, the nature/culture opposition 
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that props up the discourse has collapsed and is revealed as artificial. 
The point has been made that language is ineradicably marked by the indeterminacy of 
meaning-, as a consequence, when it comes to any analysis or interpretation, no-one or no 
one body of knowledge (e. g. philosophy) can lay claim to authority. Therefore, 
interpretation is always and already open to the play of signification. This 'play' describes 
the movement, the possibility of multiple interpretation that fies in the text. 
Deconstruction problematises the principle of reason within a logocentric discourse 
which presupposes meaning as existing within the presence of the self-speaking subject. 
For Derrida, we cannot think of language as standing in relation of correspondence with 
the world; whilst deconstruction is not a denial of reality as such, it does require us to 
rethink the parameters to reality; that is, the relationship between 'representation' and 
'reality'. Deconstruction brings unexamined assumptions into question; it relies on a 
number of terms and ideas that resist definition as 'concepts' e. g. &fferance, but which 
nevertheless function like concepts. Differance in particular manifests the inherent instability 
of language and, by suggesting that all writing (as a metaphor) is marked by the operation 
of &fferance, indicates the instability of all signification. As an approach, deconstruction 
turns our attention to the 'margins' of discourse, marks the absence, the 'Other' in the 
very production of meaning and coherence in the text (discourse). Deconstruction aims to 
examine the founding principles of the text in order to expose the hierarchy of meaning 
that inheres within. The process one of incessant reflection and self-reflection which 
highlights the instability of apparent certain bodies of knowledge, indicates the 
suppression that is involved in the production of meaning by examining what is on the 
'other side' since it is this 'other than' which serves to define what 'is'. Deconstruction and 
fferance are highly significant in this study when we come to look at those groups of Di 
people or activities which are marginalised in society; it is often the case that the 
distinguishing characteristics of the marginal or excluded are the defining characteristics of 
the central object, activity or group. In this way, we understand what family 'is' on the 
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basis of what it is not. Those on the fringes of society, those who are deemed to warrant 
the intervention of the state come to exemplify the 'other', non-conformity; in the same 
way, certain behaviours, activities that are defined as 'child abuse" can tell us more about 
what childhood 'is'. As far as children in the highly charged and emotive arena of public 
care are concerned, the study will come to illustrate how, both in terms of 'signifying value' 
(of what childhood ought to be), and in practice, their experience is fundamentally and 
comprehensively characterised by difference and deferral. 
Derrida and Deconstruction Critiqued: The Collapse of the 'Centre' 
The texts that carry the name 'Derrida' can be frustratingly abstruse, obscure; words 
and terms are used temporarily, established by convoluted means only to be then 
discarded, replaced by others, without warning. Yet in a sense the very desire for clarity 
and certainty of explanation, concept, meaning, points to the 'central' thesis of pmiijionality 
in these, and of course, all texts. Derrida's use of &fferance, supplemcntarity, 'under erasure' 
is provisional, sometimes interchangeable (different words used to describe similar ideas); 
his reluctance to establish the 'is' of deconstruction is perhaps intended to make that very 
point. The reader is constantly working and reworking Ms/her understanding, meaning, 
reading of the text, unable to take it for granted any more than fleetingly, momentarily, as 
each signs defers and points away to the next. (As if there were any such thing as 'plain 
English' - certainly a concept worthy of deconstruction). The kind of reflexivity that has 
become one the characteristics of most movements that describe themselves as 
gpostmodern' and 'post-structuralist' (at least those within philosophy, literary criticism and 
increasingly, social theory) is largely due to the critical shift of focus from the individual 
'subject' to the 'text' eminently articulated and exemplified by Derrida' s deconstruction. 
In any case, Derrida is aware that it remains crucial not to fall into the trap of 
gconstructing' deconstruction (or any critique or interpretation) as sovereign, final, 
authoritative, a 'closure' to the text. This is always the danger and the paradox of the 
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deconstructive method; closing the circle in on itself, opening the circle towards an 
inevitable re-encircling and closure and again opening the circle - except that this is the 
point; it is both an entrapment and a liberation, a freedom of sorts. The activity, from 
within logocentrism can thus seem at best self-indulgent, at worst 'pointless' - but that the 
very desire for a 'point'; to defy the desire for a 'point' is what is being questioned in the 
sense of drawing us into a teleological way of thinking as if there were an 'ultimate 'truth' 
to be discovered. From a Barthesian perspective we might argue that this is the 'myth' of 
logic; that to defy it is to go against the 'naturalised' sign of logic. Subverting, opening and 
reopening, not towards an 'end' but as an intellectually, or even politically enabling act not 
so much 'in'but 'ofitself. In this sense dcconstruction embraces its own critique; Derrida 
is just namin g lbegame that we allplay; all literature, all texts, all signifiers, for that matter, are 
deconstruction 'in progress' with or without Derrida's meticulous elucidation. In this sense 
and notwithstanding Derrida's anti-theoretical stance, it is perhaps possible to see 
deconstruction not as a rejection or denial of theory, but as a highly sophisticated and 
meticulous critique: "if every theory allows for its own critique, the authority of critique is 
itself theoretical ... theory remains the critical condition of dcconstruction. Derrida does not 
displace theory, he refines it. " (Fairlamb: 1994: 103). 
One of the main problems with the idea that metaphor cannot be reduced to a single, 
tangible meaning is that there is nothing left upon which to 'hang' any definitive meanings 
or truths about the world. As discussed, there is not, in Saussaurian terms, an independent 
signified, indeed the relationship between signifier and signified is itself seen as one of 
opposition; relying ultimately on the idea of a fixed origin. Texts therefore, cannot refer to 
anything outside of themselves, that is, anything than other texts. This is what is meant by 
intertextuality; the constant, generative and infinite interplay of texts. Derrida's post- 
structuralism deconstructs not only the text, but the self; any sense of stability of truth or 
meaning is lost and the self fragmented. 'Criticism' and 'philosophy' become 
uncomfortably blurred with the "collapse of the centre and the consequent 
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decentralisation of value" Genks: 1993: 138) leaving us lacking the coherence of intellectual 
discipline and unable to hinge meaning onto anything. In response to this, it can be 
suggested that deconstruction offers a way of articulating the 'subject' within discourse - in 
the case of this study a way of talking about the child within childhood - but without 
inferring an underpinning determinism, 'nature' or psychological essentialism. 
Terry Eagleton's criticisms (1983) of deconstruction are not directed towards Derrida 
as such, but rather some of those who would espouse the deconstructive strategy amongst 
mostly Anglo-American academics and literary critics such as Paul de Man (1979), 
Geoffrey Hartman (1987) and J. Hillis Miller (1982) whose often closed, circular texts, it is 
argued, bear little or no relation to anything outside of themselves whatsoever and in this 
sense may be judged as of no 'value' other than that of being an exercise in sophisticated 
abstraction. As Eagleton says, "such deconstruction is a power-game, a mirror image of 
orthodox academic competition" (Eagleton: 1983: 147). The problem is with the 
undecidability of meaning and the extent to which it was Derrida's intention to leave 
everything and anything open to multiple interpretation; a sort of apolitical cul-de-sac that 
leaves us with nowhere to go and nothing to do -a sort of blind arrogance so immersed in 
its self importance that it fails to 'see the wood for trees'. This is not the intention here. 
Meaning may well be ultimately undecidable if we view language 
contemplatively, as a chain of signifiers on a page; it becomes 'decidable' and 
words like 'truth', 'reality, 'knowledge'. and 'certainty' have something of their 
force restored to them when we think of language rather as something we do, as 
indissociably interwoven with our practical forms of life. 
Eagleton: 1983: 147 
,g we 
do'; a theme that will appear in subsequent This is crucial; to see language as 'sometbin 
chapters and one regarded as fundamental to a post-structuralist approach to social work. 
In any case, in spite of the best efforts of some of the most ardent Anglo-American 
disciples of deconstruction it would not seem that for Derrida the practice was intended to 
be an apolitical impasse of self-reflexive interpretations; indeed, something closer to the 
reverse is true: 
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There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to 
shake metaphysics. We have no language - no syntax and no lexicon - which is 
foreign to this history-, we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition 
wl-Lh has not already had to slip into the form, the logic and the implicit 
postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. To take one example from many; 
the metaphysics of presence is shaken by the concept of 'sign'. But, ... as soon as 
one seeks to demonstrate in this way that there is no transcendental signifier and 
that the domain or play of signification henceforth has no limit, one must reject 
even the concept and word 'sign' itself - which is precisely what cannot be done. 
For the signification 'sign' has always been understood and determined, in its 
meaning, as sign-of, a signifier referring to a signified, a signifier different from its 
signified. 
Derrida: 1978: 280-1 
Derrida's intention was to subvert the logic by which discourse is maintained in a 
'history' of the unconscious thus revealing the alternative meanings and practices of 
thought-systems and thereby challenging some of absurdities, contradictions and 
exclusions that provide the 'truth', the unquestionable presuppositions of existing 
structures. To this extent, we may suggest that deconstruction can become an emphatically 
political exercise; that is to say that deconstruction is 'political' not in and of itself, but in 
the sense that we can 'read' the text with a 'political' intention; deconstruction does not 
inflict politics upon the text; it is always already open to appropriation in this way. We do 
not 'do' deconstruction 'to' it; the text (any text) deconstructs itself; we simply say 'there it 
is' and take responsibility for our part in constructing 'meaning' therein (an inherently 
'political' exercise). 
Conclusion 
The challenge in the following chapters is to the supposition that any knowledge of the 
social world can be based upon a perceived 'direct experience' of it; that the concepts in 
which we think, the laws of reason we use to make sense of it are all formed from baseless 
notions of self-authenticating 'truth' structured out of the hidden metaphors of language. 
This represents a serious challenge to the centrality of empirical research in social work. 
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What is "familiarly known7 is not properly known, just for the reason that it is 
"familiar". When engaged in the process of knowing, it is the commonest form of 
self-deception, and a deception of other people as well, to assume sornetl-ýing to be 
familiar, and give assent to it on that very account. Knowledge of that sort, with 
all its talk, never gets from the spot, but has no idea this is the case. Subject and 
Object, and so on, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, etc.,... (are) uncritically 
presupposed as familiar and something valid, and become fixed points from which 
to start and which to return. The process of knowing flits between these two 
secure points, and in consequence goes on merely along the surface. 
Hegel: 1966: 92. 
We might say that Derrida's post-structuralism is an attempt to go no longer 'merely 
along the surface' as Hegel puts it, but to try and penetrate a little 'deeper' and a little 
farther; moreover, to explore the possibility that there are no 'fixed points' from which to 
start and to which we return. In an applied sense, the aim of this study wiU be to look 
uncompromisingly at the possibilities of 'not-knowing' and the 'familiar, exposing the 
artificiality of the 'known' in order to open up new possibilities of thinking and 'knowing' 
about social work and of how we make sense of residential care for children. 
What this means is that we can no longer take for granted either our 'history of 
knowledge' or our 'knowledge of history'. Derrida's deconstruction of the structuralist 
project was intended to show how its use of the metaphor 'structure' comes to ultimately 
subvert the very method being presented. "Structure is ultimately a reflex image of the 
visual or spatial metaphors to which Western thought has so often resorted in its quest for 
understanding" (Norris: 1991: 80). 'Me problem is of how to 'think' conceptually without 
the use of metaphor; Derrida's view is that if we fail to deconstruct the metaphor we are 
trapped within the figuration and completely unable to see or think beyond it. It is in the 
transference from image gstructure' to concept 'structure' that meaning slips away, beneath 
the metaphor at the moment we would like to get hold of it. Of course, if we were able to 
not think logocentrically, we would already know that the meaning hiding behind the 
sign/metaphor/concept is nothing but a delusion anyway; the least (and the most) that we 
can hope to do, (before we slip into abject despair) is to subject the process of sliding from 
image to concept itself to rigorous scrutiny and unmask the uncertainties of the controlling 
logic at work in order to open up the 'text' (ourselves) to difference and transformation. 
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The themes drawn from Derrida relevant to this study then, are of subverting, 
provisionalising, unlocldng the 'undecidabilty of meaning' that lies in the text, dismantling 
the oppositions that structure and presuppose a 'presence' 'centre' or 'origin'; seeing 
language as 'something that we do'. In Part Two these are themes that will be repeated 
(thereby constructing a theme) many times throughout the following chapters; a 
remembrance of the 'detour' we are in and an attempt to locate and give 'presence' to 
meaning that may be occluded in the text but which is always already 'there' - the 'other 
than', the excluded. 
PART TWO 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A GENEALOGY OF CHILDHOOD 
The idea of childhood does not make of the child a little angel to be coddlcd 
or a little devil to be tamed, a mini-adult, rational and calculating or a victim of 
passion, impulse and instinct, but any or all of them e)dsting in dialectical relation 
to one another. Childhood is an accumulation of 'traces' which, if regarded 
separately, would indeed be contradictory but (.. ) which cannot be regarded 
separately without missing the point. 
Harris and Timms: 1993: 29 
Introduction 
This chapter examines childhood as an idea; that is, the very idea of childhood as being a 
distinct, coherent and universal phase of life towards full, rational adulthood. The chapter 
will describe the historical and cultural variability of childhood, suggesting that it is, indeed, 
a social construct that has a particular significance within modernity in structuring notions 
of 'family' and "adulthood' and intersecting discourses of gender relations within the 
family, children's 'needs' and children's 'rights'. In short, the chapter will assert that it is 
'biological immaturity' that is universal, not childhood and that as a social construct it 
should be regarded alongside other variables of gender, race, class in an analysis of welfare 
and public care, rather than regarded as a 'given'. It is only in this way that the discursive 
modes of exclusion in social and cultural practices within the family and in public care can 
be delineated and shown to maintain the 'natural child' as an icon of family life and the 
'Other' child (needy, delinquent, dysfunctional, disordered, or in the extreme, aberrant) on 
the margins. 
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The chapter begins by locating childhood as a signifier within the matrix of discursive 
relations that surround the family; this explored further by deconstructing the prevailing 
discourse of the child as being 'of nature'. The chapter will then caution against any 
straightforward reinterpretation of childhood within a discourse of social construction 
before examining some of the historical variability of childhood and the wider context of 
an emerging welfare response. 
Childhood as Signifier 
By the nineteenth century childhood took a distinct shape and form but it is in the 
twentieth century that the child has become the object of particular scrutiny and in which 
psychology-driven empirical research has served to self-validate and universalise the 
(natural child'. Thus, 'childhood' has become prominent as a signifier both 'of itself', in 
the sense of being seen as increasingly 'reliable' (for which read 'wen-regulated 
unreliabilityý, 'self-verifying, 'universal' and also in the way it interrelates and is part of a 
wider nexus of discourse and field of signification about 'family', 'adult', 'welfare'. To this 
extent, what childhood 'is' has become the yardstick for constructing, measuring, 
differentiating and regulating notions of the 'needs' of children, 'rights', 'best interests of, 
'paramountcy of the welfare', 'abused' child, the 'delinquent' child in professional discourse 
and facilitated the rise of such concepts as 'child-centred' practice. But more than this, 
childhood, conceptualised as an innately distinct and universal phase operates in 
structuring the 'presence' of 'family', 'adult' and 'parenthood'. It is the configuring of 
'childhood' within the disciplines of psychology, medicine, psychoanalysis, sociology and 
so on which has ensured this prominence, not forgetting that anyway it is within and 
between these disciplines and related discourses that we have 'discovered' (constructed) 
contemporary 'childhood'. This 'discovery' is commensurate with and necessary to the 
idea of Modernity and 'self-presence'; that 'childhood' operates almost as 'pure' signifier, a 
lynchpin, fixed point of reference that is structured upon the opposition nature/culture 
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and which as such generates, facilitates and permits an array of signification over the space 
it delimits. Even in the field of sociology childhood has been regarded as a presupposition, 
consigned until recently to the margins of sociological and anthropological study (see 
James and Prout: 1997) a 'given' around which other social, cultural and historical variables 
and 'constructions' may move and metamorphose. Whilst it is primarily in the twentieth 
century that disciplines such as psychology, psychoanalysis, medicine have entered this play 
of signification, in other times and places the same 'object' has been differently 
constituted; a different play has ensued, albeit one that always/already inheres in 
contemporary thinIdng about childhood. 
This is childhood (or, perhaps more accurately 'childhood? (Hendrick: 1997) as non- 
history, the coalescence of fragments, traces out of discontinuities towards an emerging 
'truth'. The forms of knowledge which constitute childhood are characterised by the 
appearance of linearity, continuity, progress; a conceptualisation of a 'past' from a 'here 
and now' that is itself a &fferance of past/present. These characteristics are not 
coincidentally also those of childhood 'itself' as we commonly understand it; linear, 
temporal, a 'stage of transition', a 'development', a continuous progress towards 
adulthood. The hold that this conceptualisation has on our thinking about childhood 
occludes resistance; how many people would disagree that we 'know' more about 
childhood than we did, say, fifty or a hundred years ago? Converging elements e. g. 
psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, take up the fragments of what can always/already 
be 'said' about childhood to form what we regard as 'common sense' in the 'present'. 
Childhood signifies in the field of play around family, state and welfare; it relies on, 
requires a totalising history of itself and all that 'surrounds it' to fill the space with meaning 
and resonance with the 'present-sociaP. So embedded and expansive has this thinldng 
about childhood become within the discursive field that resistance to the signifier, 
exploring the 'unknowing' finds little space to be heard. 
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The Family and the Child 
Children's lives are almost entirely organised and articulated by adults, and uniquely, to 
a greater or lesser degree, by all adults. This is part of what sets them apart both in s6cial 
and cultural terms, but also in respect of any proposed study of children. To this extent, 
no 'history' is more hidden than that of childhood. The biological facts of life, of both 
what is recognised as cognitive and developmental psychology have dominated 
understandings of children's total experience of childhood and inhibited, sometimes 
prohibited, an understanding that locates children as 'active' within their own socio- 
cultural context. Further, nowhere has the 'theory' and 'practice' of psychology and other 
related scientific and professional discourses been more successfully or extensively bridged; 
it inheres within the fabric of 'successful' family life and 'common-sense' notions of 'good 
parenting' (see Boyden: 1997, cited in James and Prout (1997)). Implicit in the idea that 
childhood sbould be a time of innocence and happy, carefree pleasures is the potential 
threat posed by adults as abusers and/or 'bad' or inadequate parents, thus requiring the 
regulation of childhood in the nursery, the school and, of course the private household 
and family (preferably with enclosed yard or garden). When barriers are breached, whether 
physical or psychological the law also requires the protection of children from further 
csignificant harm' or the likelihood of it (Children Act 1989). What all of this reflects is not 
only a fear of adults and the harm they may cause children, but a fear of children and 
young people as potential delinquents, street gang members, football hooligans (or worse), 
and by extension a fear for social and moral order. Put another way, these are also fearsfor 
cbildhood, that children will somehow, collectively 'escape' a regulated childhood which 
both centres and intersects with discourses of adulthood and family. And for those that 
stray, or deviate or disrupt there are supportive interventions in the form of parenting 
programmes or therapy and public care for those children that still fail to acquiesce, where 
cchildhood' (as defined) as a social experiment is unequivocally in the child's 'best 
interests', a 'good thing, inscribed in the mind of the trained child care worker and 
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reflected in the very structure of every standardised case file format and care plan (always 
available for inspection). 
It is then, not just children's 'biological immaturity' that has largely excluded them from 
a more active participation in any study of childhood but the fact that childhood is largely 
taken for granted - and for particular reasons - so that: 
whilst thinking about women and the family has been revolutionised by 
feminist critiques, thinking about childhood remains relatively static, like the still 
point at the centre of a storm... 
James and Prout: l 997: 22-23 
A study of this Idnd is, therefore, incomplete without this recognition of how powerful 
the discourse of family is itself in constructing childhood, the family household being what 
Leonard (1997) describes as childhoods' 'material and discursive location, the place where 
the constructed 'neediness' and 'dependency' of children is instrumental in securing power 
differentials of age and gender through accepted parenting practices, health care practices, 
the media and consumption. Herein, and despite the prevalence of multiple variations, 
notions of the idealized, Western nuclear family and idealized childhood remain largely 
intact with the concomitant elevation of the nurturing role of women and eminently 
judicious subordination of children, evidenced in debates about family and welfare policy 
and the extent to which these may weaken or strengthen 'family values'. 
The Child of Nature: Rousseau's En2fle 
The nature of childhood may be seen in Foucault's terms as a 'regime of truth', 
succeeding as it does in articulating the 'whole' of what it is possible to say about 
childhood. Related and intersecting discourses of 'family', 'adulthood', 'welfare', and so on, 
self-validate and univeralise the child's nature through the discursive practices of 
psychology and sociology, no more so than in the idea of child development. The 
'irrational' child, prefigures the 'rationaP adult, and childhood is a naturally determined 
stage between the former and the latter. In this way, childhood constitutes children as 
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cadults-in-waiting', enabling childhood to become universalised and the 'child' to be 
spoken for and on bebalf of within discourse; it allows children to become the object for 
concern, scrutiny and investigation, rather than self-determining, active 'subjects-in- 
discourse'. In short, their 'needs' can be taken for granted since they are universal; indeed 
it becomes possible to constitute the child as having 'needs', creates the con&fions of 
posjibiliýj,, in Foucauldian terms, for a 'needs discourse' to emerge. The structuring of 
, gical 
discourse, 'development' over the opposition child/adult not only constitutes apgcbo1q 
, gical 
discourse of childhood in which but also permeates a structuralist/functionalist sodolo 
esocialisation' induces children into the underlying cultural and social rules and norms. This 
opens the way for a whole plethora of conceptualisations about children who either 'fail' 
to socialise or are neglected by family or in some way failed by welfare institutions now 
deemed responsible for their socialisation. For example, Bow1by's (1953) theory that 
children 'attach' to one adult figure in the early days of development and that this a 
prerequisite for future mental health, must be seen in the context of a society which places 
emphasis on matemal care in the nuclear family. In the first place, other cultures 
demonstrate different, multiple attachments (see Weisner and Gallimore's (1977) 
description of the high profile of sibling caring in some African societies), suggesting it is 
not straightforward to translate Bowlby's attachment theory into a prerequisite for mental 
health. Further, even when such psychological theories are contextualised within the 
environmental, social and cultural circumstances of the child, the practices of social 
workers and educators still emphasise the need to adapt, adjust and socialise into 
constructed, normative and culturally-specific arrangements (see the discussion of policy 
and practice documentation discussed in Chapters Five and Six). In this way it is these 
practices fbemselves which play a part in the construction of concepts of 'maladjustment' 
and 'delinquency'. The point is, children's behaviour, social interactions, activities are all 
viewed within the signifying field, trad as symbolic and in toms of their development; that is, 
as a measure (developmental milestone) of an increasing and evolving rationality on the 
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way to full, rational adulthood. In this way, children themselves do not need to appear, 
they can be spoken for, represented universally. Even in sociological accounts of child- 
rearing, the evolutionary model prevails with models of 'socialisation', implying a 'nature' 
that requires appropriate, progressive socialisation, a nature that is distinct and different to 
that of the adult. 
In the context of the nineteenth century, where social evolutionary thinldng prevailed, 
the idea of the child of natuir was consistent with scientific, progressive and evolutionary 
models of society; such ideas dominated much of twentieth century thinldng. Rousseau's 
earlier work Emile was thus celebrated as seminal, not least perhaps as a suitable metaphor 
for social progress. It is to this child of 'nature' that the study now turns, drawing from 
Derrida's reading of Rousseau. 
It has long been a subject of enquiry whether there was ever a natural language 
common to all; no doubt there is, and it is the language of children before they 
begin to speak. This language is inarticulate, but it has tone, stress and 
meaning ... Let us study children and we shall soon learn it afresh from them. Nurses can teach us this language; they understand all their nurslings say to then-4 
they answer thern, and keep up long conveisations with them; and though they use 
words, these words are quite useless. It is not the sense of the word, but its 
accompanying intonation that is understood. Emile: p451 
When children begin to talk they cry less. This progress is quite natural; one 
language supplants another... When once Emile has said, "It hurts me, " it will 
take a very sharp pain to make him cry. Emile. p59 
In Derrida's reading of Rousseau's Emile (Derrida: 1976) we are pointed to the 'space' 
occupied by childhood where Rousseau describes the 'natural' voice of the child, 
untarnished by formal language. 11rough structuring the opposition nature/culture the 
pursuit of origins is manifested as this 'natural'voice of the child, pre-linguistic, yet beyond 
, 
pplemented, therefore natural language'. A space is located the primeval, animal 'cry'; an unsu 
between the 'animal' (non-man, 'other than) and'man' (the 'centre', 'essence, 'presenceý; 
a space that can only be defined in terms of its impossibility but which makes possible self- 
presence. In childhood then, "two contradictory predicates are united: it is a matter of 
1his and the following quotation ffom Bwils are from (1929) Edition Gamier. Paris, as cited by Derrida pp. 247- 
248: 1976. Other quotations ffom Emile are from 1905 edition: Sydney Appleton: Iondon 
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language uncontaminated by supplementarity" (Dertida: 1976: 247). Childhood is the 
primary manifestation of the natural voice and is in this sense a &fferance of 'presence 2.2 
'Nonsupplementarity' here is the language used by children prior to a formal acquisition of 
language as culture, where words are used but without any 'rational' application; an 
'inarticulate' language, but one that has 'meaning; "he [the child] has language but what is 
pladng itseff, of substituting one sign for another, one organ of lacking in it is the power of rr 
expression for another" (Derrida: 1976: 247). 
But the 'centre' is at once derivative; supplementarity (culture) arrives before any 
'absence' or qack' in the originality, the natural, has been established. A deficit, absence, is 
the precondition of the 'centre', the 'natural'. "Without the summons of the supplement, 
the child would not speak at all: if he did not suffer, if he lacked nothing, he would not 
call, he would not speak But if supplementarity had simply been produced, if it had really 
begun, the child would speak knowing how to speak. "The child sa befo kno nho pe ks rr aig owl 
ipeak" (Derrida: 1976: 247). Paradoxically, the child's 'lack, that which causes him/her to 
speak is that which distinguishes him from the articulate world, marks a deficit, at the same 
time as signifying the 'natural' and 'pure'. He has no language because he is unable to 
substitute, supplement one sign with/for another. But he demonstrably has language; pure, 
unadulterated yet simultaneously deficient, singular, inarticulate; signifying 'absence' at the 
same time as 'presence'. In short, simply 'signifying'. 
Where, we might ask, in all of the ebb and flow of Derrida's intricate reading of 
Rousseau, lies the pertinence to own discussion? What we begin to see emerging out this 
paradox and complexity is a 'concept' in its very 'conceptualisation'; out of an 
arrangement, combination of metaphors emerges a figuration of 'child' and 'childhood' 
that resonates powerfully with contemporary discourse, one which is 'placed upon', in 
Foucault's terms, a 'totafising' approach to 'history', one which is commensurate with and 
2 In Foucauldian terms, these are some of the aforementioned 'conditions of possibility' that enable the 'birth' of a 
particular discourse of childhood and permit a structuring of child/adult to take place. 
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amenable to conflicting 'statements', discourses, 'perspectives' on childhood; one which 
allows, facilitates and enables variable signification, transformation, so that 'fragments' 
cohere, adhere and 'centre' themselves. 
To pursue the point; the child's expression of discomfort may be through crying or 
indiscriminate body movements; crying is not yet substituted for by the use of speech and 
language which enables deferment and differentiation of meaning-, to constitute meaning 
by supplementing and substituting one sign from another, to "enter the order of the 
supplement ... the human order: he will no longer weep, he will know how to say "I hurt.... 
(Derrida: 1976: 248). All at once childhood is 'natural', 'pure', 'original', 'good' because 
he/she 'speaks' with the unsupplemented 'voice' of 'true presence', uncontaminated by 
'language' (culture); at the same time childhood is a qack, without the supplement of 
'man', the 'knowledge' of 'speech'; the child is inarticulate, 'unformed', disorganised, 
chaotic, 'dangerous', 'not good'. As Derrida puts it: "Whence the regulated instability of 
the judgements on childhood: for better and for worse, it is sometimes on the side of 
animality, sometimes on the side of humanity" (Derrida: 1976: 248). It is this 'regulated 
instability' that characterises and constitutes the 'concept' of childhood; that which is 
closest to the 'origin', the 'truth' of 'presence'; that which must signify accordingly for 
'presence', necessarily, a metaphor for presence; that which must also be regulated, 
structured; the ambivalent sign (like any) whose ambivalence must be structured for 
presence to be 'centred'. The very ambivalence of the sign is that which enables such a 
structuring in order to regulate the 'dangerous' sign, without which 'presence' slips away, 
defers, 'deconstructs'. Thus 'child' as innocent, pure, natural, uncontaminated - the 'centre' 
and 'child' as 'depraved', amoral, ungodly, perverse, delinquent - the 'threat' (to the 
ccentre'; the threat to de-centre without the instability of the sign regulated). Childhood as 
a metaphor for a 'totalising' history where history is remembering, giving precedence to 
continuity over discontinuity whereby constructing the 'present'. 
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The 'Natural' Child 'In Need' of the Supplement 
Inspired in part by the (almost literally) revolutionary impact of Emile, the 'natural' child 
in state of incapacity seems to have been one which took hold in Europe at the end of the 
eighteenth century. The notion fused elegantly with the notions of the innocence and 
purity of childhood so central to the Romantic revival at this time, situated as they were 
somewhere between the rationalism of the eighteenth century and the industrialism of the 
nineteenth. Tbus, as Laurie Magnus writes of Wordsworth "childhood was the time when 
instinct had spontaneously arrived at the same truths which reason should subsequently 
discover by the process of interpreted experience" (Magnus: 1897: 92). 
0 joyl That in our embers 
Is something that doth live, 
That nature yet remembers 
what was so fugitivel 
The thought of our past years in me doth breed 
Perpetual benediction: not indeed 
For that which is most worthy to be blest - 
Delight and liberty, the simple creed 
Of Childhood, whether busy or at rest, 
With new-fledged hope still fluttering in his breast: - 
Not for these I raise 
The song of thanks and praise, 
But for those obstinate questionings 
Of sense and outward tl-ýings, 
Fallings from us, vanishings; 
Blank misgivings of a Creature 
Moving about in worlds not realized 
11igh instincts before which our mortal Nature 
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised: 
But for those first affections, 
Those shadowy recollections, 
V/Uch, be they what they may, 
Are yet the fountain light of all our day... 
Wiffiam Wordsworth (1807) Ode., Intimations of lmmorfak! y From Recolketions of Earý Ckildbood 
It is in childhood that the 'obstinate questionings of sense and outward things'; 'high 
instincts' that are the 'uninterpreted truths, 'worlds not realised' which in adulthood we 
come to rediscover through reason but have lost the immediacy, the sense of 
wonderment, awe and intimacy with nature associated with childhood, so that we are left 
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as adults with 'shadowy recollections' which are, nevertheless, the 'fountain light of all our 
day'. 'Truth' is uninterpreted experience, the province of childhood; 'reason'; that which 
interprýets experience, paradoxically removes itself from a communion with nature by 
virtue of the very process of 'reasoning' (interpreting) experience: hence, from the same 
poem, "The things which I have seen, I now can see no more" 
This 'distinctive' childhood, partly derived from the 'Rousseauesque child' was one 
whose 'nature' had emphasised 'purity' and 'innocence'; however, in so doing an 
opposition was also structured; it held within the possibility of depravity, of nature itself as 
corrupting and dangerous. This literary expression of ideas that formed part of the social 
and political milieu anticipated, albeit 'unknowingly', concerns that emerged at the end of 
the eighteenth century about child labour from a 'child welfare' perspective. Until this 
time, it was still possible to construe child labour as 'useful' in instilling ethics of work and 
discipline within the wayward child which were compatible with Evangelical moral 
concerns about child depravity. 
Here, to educate the child is to reconstitute 'nature' by systematic substitution (Derrida: 
1976: 145). To inculcate, 'moralise', 'normalise'; within the nursery, the school, the 
institution, the family, the criminal justice system; the acquisition of 'knowledge' of that 
which is 'natural' where paradoxically the supplement is against what is ýy naturr 'good', 
'innocent' and 'pure' and is yet at the same time what 'rescues' the sign (the child) from 
chaos. Childhood is the manifestation of the deficiency in nature which calls for 
supplementation. As Derrida asks: How can childhood therefore be possible? The 
supplement is what makes possible the 'natural', organises the possibility of progress and 
Reason at the same time as progress is itself the possibility of a corruption of nature. 
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Reason is incapable of thinking this double infringement upon Nature: that 
there is lack in Nature and that because of that very fact something is added to it. 
Yet one should not say that Reason is powerless to think this; it is constituted by 
that lack of power. It is the principle of identity. It is the thought of the self- 
identity of the natural being. It cannot even determine the supplement as its other, 
as the irrational and the non-natural, for the supplement comes naturally to put 
itself in Nature's place. 1he supplement is the image and the representation of 
Nature. The image is neither in nor out of Nature. The supplement is therefore 
equally dangerous for Reason, the natural health of Reason. 
Derrida: 1976: 149. 
First the child is 'natural', but at the same time requiring supplementation; the 
regulation of ambivalence in the sign. In educating the child, the child uses signifiers in 
order to imitate the adult world; but only to imitate; if the child were possessive or 
generous not with his/her toys but with what they signify he/she would no longer be a 
child. The child is that which is 'elsewhere', has a non-relation to the signified. Thus "vice 
or perversity would consist of not attaching oneself to things that are naturally desirable 
but to their substitutive signifiers" (Derrida: 1976: 204). 
At the point at which the child no longer imitates, is in a relation of education, 
regulation, the sign is corrupt, the child crosses the line and is no longer a 'child', is either 
an 'adult' or somehow 'other than'. Imitation is designed to form habits; it is within the 
sphere of the natural to imitate in the 'absence' of 'real' experience. But within inheres 
duplicity; to get outside of 'oneself' when 'self' is quintessentially a characteristic and 
constituent of childhood; that which should not require or demand supplementation and 
yet which is supplemented by regulation. The child can only acquiesce in order to remain 
'a child'; he/she can only 'play', benignly, innocuously with substitutive signifiers. To 
threaten to go 'outside' of oneself as a child is to threaten 'childhood'; 'safe play' is the play 
of substitutive signifiers. Childhood must be constructed as a non-relation to the signified, 
a deferment, postponement. To do otherwise is undermine 'childhood as presence' or that 
which allows presence to be constituted in the 'adult' even though 'child' is the process of 
centring 'presence' in the 'adult'. Where transgression takes place, this must be 
characterised as, for example amorality, rather than immorality, an absence or lack, where 
imitation is 'natural' as an attribute but in 'society' perverse. The case of the two children 
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convicted of the killing of Jamie Bulger in 1992 is a case in point where the two children 
convicted were seen as having being influenced by 'video nasties' and characterised by 
much of the media as 'monsters', demonstrating unregulated, but 'natural' depravity, in 
having a natural disposition towards imitation. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the 
victim, Jamie Bulger came to signify all that is pure, innocent and vulnerable about 'child'. 
Here, the instability threatened to boil over; a possibility that could only be assuaged by 
the demonisation of the perpetrators of the crime; maldng them 'other than', aberrant. 
It is through the 'nature' of childhood and family, which rely upon each other, that 
anything 'other than' is necessarily derivative, secondary, less than' the 'fullness' of nature. 
Not only does the 'natural' family assume a particular set of gendered relations; it renders 
any substitute, supplement as secondary. Since 'childhood' and 'family' are natural, 
complete and whole, whatever comes to supplement, substitute or replace cannot emanate 
from 'nature'; in this way it is not only inferior to nature but also alien to it. And yet 
'knowledge' (culture) is at the same time the means by which, through Reason, we discover 
how to constitute nature in the most natural way possible. 'Family' is in all manner of ways 
propped up, regulated, supplemented, substituted, amended, adjusted; this can only point 
to a deficiency in nature which requires supplementing but which is, in nature, impossible. 
'Childhood', as the locus of 'parenting' manifests this deficiency in nature as the 'unstable 
signifier'; it must be regulated, 'hooked' into family but still 'bobbing about' it, like a 
tethered balloon, in order to prrserve its naturr. Language, 'child-rearing practices', education, 
welfare policies, public care - all supplement, substitute for what is lacking in nature. To 
our question 'how is childhood possible? ', we can answer that 'in nature, it is not'. 
Childhood as a Social Construction 
'Me discussion has begun to infer that far from being of nature, childhood is a social 
construct; however, it may be clear that for the post-structuralist there may be similar 
complications in 'discovering' childhood within a social constructionist discourse as there 
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are within a 'nature/needs' discourse. For example, Hendrick (1997) argues that whereas 
in 1800 there was 'ambiguity' about the meaning of childhood, this was 'resolved' by the 
early years of the twentieth century and that a "recognisably 'modern' notion of childhood 
was in place: it was legally, legislatively, socially, medically, psychologically, educationally 
and politically institutionalised" (Hendrick : 1997: 35). Hendrick suggests that childhood 
went through a series of constructions and reconstructions before this 'identity' was 
'determined' (Hendrick: 1997: 35). Whilst the approach to this analysis is social 
constructionist and there is much with which this study can concur, there is still a 
tendency towards a sense of 'discovery' here, if not of the 'biological nature' of childhood, 
as discovered by the psychologist, then of a 'social nature', discovered here by the 
sociologist/anthropologist. There is still a sense, though not explicit, of saying 'here we are 
at the end of the twentieth century, at last getting close to the 'reality', the 'truth' about 
childhood as a 'social construction'. Now, although the ambiguity of childhood in the 
sense of being a 'distinct' phase may well have been established and institutionalised in the 
way Hendrick goes on to describe, the 'meaning, 'signification' of 'childhood' could not, 
from our own perspective, continue to be anything other than ambiguous and ambivalent 
then, now, or at any other time. The inference that childhood has somehow 'settled down' 
'in the present' tends towards effecting a 'closure' on childhood as a 'social construction' 
that is now, once and for all 'definable'; although social construction analysis takes account 
of some of the discontinuities and allows for the notion that meaning arises in the context 
of discourses which change, there is insufficient account taken of the extent to which all 
past 'childhoods' inhere in the present; none are qeft behind'. The 'discovery' of childhood 
as a social construction is no more a 'discovery' (or a 'truth) than that of the 'natural' 
child. Establishing the 'ambiguity' of childhood may still tend towards a presupposition of 
a conceptualisation of childhood as a distinct phase; as if 'prior' to this there is little to be 
ambiguous about. It is only out of the 'present' that ambiguity and ambivalence about the 
gmeaning' of childhood in the past/present can arise. What is perhaps more certain and 
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gulation of this ambiguity, of the 'space' that 'childhood' has come to determinable is the re 
signify, what Derrida (1976) calls the 'regulated instability' of the sign, represented by 
Rousseau in the 'natural child' as a need for 'well-regulated liberty' (Rousseau: [1762] 
1905: 57). 
In the following section we aim to explore bistorically, (the past in the sense of being 'of 
and through discourse of the present) and textually some of the discontinuities that 
'hover', inhere and coalesce over the 'space' that is 'childhood' today; like a 'Magic Eye' 
picture which holds more than one image; there, but not there at the same time, 
depending on how it is viewed. ' In our pursuit, we are emphatically not aiming to 
'discover' the 'child' somewhere, somehow, but to think deconstructively and ask simply; 
'How is a child possible at all? ' 
The History of Childhood: a Metaphor for'Progress' 
In setting a premise for the possibility of various constructions of childhood, it is 
necessary to establish its historical and cultural variability, and indeed the child's variable 
siting 'within' the family. In this respect, we can speak cautiously of a gradual emergence 
over centuries of children from the locus of the family where children were the property 
of parents to an ambiguous and somewhat vulnerable status as 'citizens' with qualitatively 
different rights and responsibilities deriving from shiffing and highly charged notions of 
childhood. That, however, is not to say that this 'gradual emergence' should be read as 
signifying a progression, or greater awareness of childhood as a 'discoverable', universal 
phenomenon, but that there has been a coalescence of 'fragments' in the present, or 
rather in the constituting of the present that shapes contemporary discourse. As for the 
treatment of children in history, the fact that in the pre-industrial age there was no 
embodiment of children's rights or protection in law should not necessarily indicate a de 
facto absence of either. The somewhat extreme view that even well into the nineteenth 
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century indifference and systematic maltreatment were the predominant characteristics of 
family life (Shorter: 1975) or that "the further back in history one goes, the lower the level 
of child care and the more likely children are to be killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized 
and sexually abused" (de Mause: 1976: 124) is not one subscribed to here. ' 
Whilst for some sociologists the contemporary family (at least in its idealised, nuclear 
form) has a vital function which has been seen as biologically determined in the cohesion 
and integration of society (Parsons: 1956), in the past, the family in all its variety, has 
served a multitude of other purposes: 
it functioned as a defense organisation, a political unit, a school, a judicial 
systern, a church and a factory. Over the centuries these ffinctions have been 
surrendered one by one to the great external institudons of modem society, the 
state, the church and industry 
Gies: 1987: 7 
Drawing on Foucault's notions of the disciplinary society, Donzelot (1980) argues that 
in the pre-industrial age the family formed the basis of a wider network of obligatory and 
dependent relations in the context of 'community. This social organisation was expressed 
via the head of the family in a contractual relationship whereby in return for taxes paid, the 
supply of labour and social order, the father was granted discretionary power over family 
members in order to secure the '6tat' (Donzelot: 1980: 48) (status derived from trade or 
profession). Those excluded or displaced from this network of relations acted as 
"disturbers in the system of protections and obligations" (Donzelot: 1980: 49). Dependent 
on charity and/or placed in public confinement they were maintained as an excluded 
population kept preferably out of sight and mind. As in Britain, for the orphaned or 
abandoned child a community obligation seems to have been extended; those that were 
placed in medieval hospitals were often wet-nursed and returned to the community (see 
Heywood: 1978). Emphasising this contractual relationship between family head and state, 
3 so called -Nýagic Eye' pictures are computer generated images where a field of repeated images and colour are 
transformed into another 'always/already there' third image. 
4 Perhaps significantly, Linda Pollock (1983), reviewing literature of this 'evolutionary' genre pointed out that at the end 
of the period each writer studied, things suddenly take a turn for the better, finthef, that when other writers had 
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Donzelot points to the use of 'lettres de cachet', whereby those family members who 
failed to meet community obligation were detained by the state at the request of the 
father. This legal device is indicative of the threat to individual family interest and public 
order posed by those who rejected familial and community expectations (whether 
religious, feudal or moral), demonstrating that in order to ensure public order "the state 
relied on the family for direct support, trading indiscriminately on its fear of discredit and 
its private ambitions" (Donzelot: 1980: 50). Whilst the family was in this way both an 
'object and subject' of government and to that extent, a definable, cohesive unit, it was not 
dependent for that unity on a construction of childhood as necessarily distinct, natural or 
universal. The family was at once public and private, tied and integrated into a network in 
which it actively negotiated exchange, status and obligation. Whereas today 'childhood', in 
a variety of ways provides the 'way in' for state regulation (via the need to 'protect' the 
child, promote the welfare of the child, meet the 'needs' of the child etc. ) this was not how 
it signified in the pre-industrial age; it sit1l, y &d not need to. 
Phillipe Aries' seminal work LEnfant et la tiefamiliale sous lAnden Riýýme (1960/1962) 
argues for the historical variability of childhood; indeed that "in medieval society the idea 
of childhood did not exist" (Aries: 1962: 128). This contention has been widely criticised 
(see Pollock: 1983). However, Aries' point seems to be that the 'idea' of childhood 
signified differently then; not that it was non-existent (see also Harris and Timms: 1993). 
Using evidence from the thirteenth century onwards of paintings, diaries, the portrayal of 
children as 'small adults' and the absence of portraits of children, Aries describes how 
childhood (in the contemporary sense of the term) was created, mostly from the sixteenth 
century onwards and that prior to this the collective life of the community took 
precedence over any notions of the 'private' family. Here, there was little distinction 
between community, work and family. Indeed, community life 
studied a short time period and used primary sources for research the attitudes to children appear to contrast sharply 
with those of the above and children were generally seen as well cared for. (Pollock: cited in Gies: 1986: 12). 
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carried along in a single torrent all ages and classes. leaving nobody any time 
for solitude. In these crowded, collective cidstences there was no room for a 
private sector. `Ihe family fulfilled a function; it ensured the transmission of life, 
property and names, but did not penetrate very far into human sensibility 
Aries: 1962: 411 
That, however, is not to say that children were necessarily maltreated, or that in the 
absence of 'childhood' as we know it they did not receive affection, rather, the period of 
dependency was minimal and the child was absorbed into adult culture in terms of work, 
dress and social life as soon as he/she could Eve without the "constant solicitude of his 
mother.. " (Aries: 1962: 125). 
An awareness of childhood as a distinct phase is seen as emerging amongst the 
property-owning professional and bourgeois classes in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries where children first become seen as a source of amusement and affection and 
with a revival of interest in education from reformist and Calvinist conceptions of children 
as 'depraved' and in need of moral guidance. As the family became a more private 
institution it assumed a moral and educative guardianship, enhancing the development of a 
space between the child and adult worlds. The social machinery of feudal life became 
increasingly inadequate as the organics of community life were weakened and the family 
became less able to guarantee both the upkeep and consequent control of its members. 
Further, increasing numbers of poor needed support, some of whom banded together 
creating disorder. In Britain, vagrancy became seen as much more of a social problem: for 
example the Elizabethan Poor Law 1601 gave parish officials the right to apprentice the 
begging child compulsorily. Moreover, industrialisation and urbanisation began to create a 
much greater problem in terms of destitution and dislocation from the rurality which came 
to inspire a much greater social control response from the state; problems which were 
compounded by the transition towards a more structured division of labour within the 
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family away from traditional feudal formations. As community ties weakened, family ties, 
and a consciousness of the separateness of childhood within, were strengthened. ' 
By the time of the revolution in France the 'lettres de cachet' had acquired a symbolic 
incongruity with revolutionary aspirations, demonstrated in the number of complaints to 
the civil tribunals of the Revolution (CS. A. Douarde, Les tribunaux dtils a Paiis sous la 
Revolution, 2 vols. (1905-07): cited in Donzelot: 1980). In taking the Bastille (wherein many 
confined by lettres de cachet were held), the 'liberation' of the displaced, excluded and 
poor signified the end of a collusive relationship between the state and the fan-dly in which 
paternal authority had been endorsed. 
Contemporaneously, the increase in the number of poor houses and general hospitals 
provided a means by which familial indiscipline could be punished. For those whom the 
existing social order failed to accommodate these events amounted to an ultimatum to the 
metamorphosed 'state' about how, in a transformed accommodation of family and state 
relations, social need could be addressed. 
Gradually, this notion of the separateness of childhood facilitated processes of 
intervention, protection, education and regulation within the social space between the 
increasingly private family and the public spheres. As notions of citizenship within the 
emergent liberal state take hold, so the vulnerability of the child as citizen becomes seen as 
requiring public intervention, whether from churchmen in the seventeenth century or 
fexperts' in the twentieth century at the same time as the privacy and autonomy of the 
family is prized as the bastion of the liberal economy. 
S For some (see Thane: 1981) Aries' weakness lies in Ids failure to take sufficient account of socio-economic changes 
and their impact on family life. Thane sees an emergent capitalist economy as central to changes in family life and 
notions of childhood. Here, those with wealth and property sought to secure their inheritance by tightening control 
of their offspring. Frost and Stein (1989) present two other areas widely regarded as problematic in Aries' analysis. 
First, the emergence of various welfare institutions which eroded, at least to some extent, the traditional 
famay/community functions is somewhat neglected. In this sense, the emerging private family had a more specific 
role than Aries suggests. Second, that it was a shift away from 'organie, (Gelis: 1986) community living towards 
greater individualism which in fact served to emphasise the health and welfare of the individual child above that of 
the community. 
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Aries' thesis is problematic in its linearity and presentation of a chronology of events 
with smooth transitions (see also Harris and Timms: 1993); the evidence he provides tends 
to suggest the End of progressive history we are seeldng to avoid. 6That said, we are 
provided with sufficient evidence to verify a notion of the variability of childhood in 
history which would throw into question some of the 'once and for all' certainties that 
conventional understandings offer, particularly when it comes to considering psychological 
theories of child development, upon which, as we shall come to see, much of the 
discourse of child welfare and children's 'needs', 'rights' and 'responsibilities' is based. 
Welfare Responses to the Child in Need and the Delinquent 
In Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century the state initially took a broadly 
laissez-faire approach to the family. As and when problems arose, the perception was very 
much in terms of deprivation as moral failure. Ilere was little precedent for intervention 
and the 1843 Poor Law aimed to reassert principles of family responsibility. Voluntary 
charitable responses intervened amongst the 'deserving' whilst the disreputable were to 
have their loss of status as 'family' ensured in the oblivion of the workhouse. 
Poverty was no longer held within a dialectic of humiliation and glory but in a 
certain relation between order and disorder which surrounds it with guilt.. it will 
become in the world of state - controlled charity complacency in itself and an 
offence against the good workirW of the state. 
Foucault: 1971: 70 
The reform movements of the mid to late century, whilst drawing attention to the 
needs of the neglected child made little or no distinction between abuse and poverty and 
consequently did not address the behaviour of adults in this context. Children were often 
placed in penal-type institutions designed to ensure their moral well-being. As the child 
6 The significance that Aries attaches to the absence of medieval portraits of children has been criticised by Frances and 
Joseph Gies (1987) on the grounds that the first portraits of anyone, other than tombstone effigies do not appear 
until the fifteenth century, these being of kings and queens and the 'family portrait ' does not emerge until the 
seventeenth century. Further, Linda Pollock (1983) offers an alternative view of history which argues for a greater 
sense of continuity of relations between parents and children using 'private evidence' not intended for publication 
such as diaries and autobiographies as well as newspaper reports to show similarities in terms of affection shown and 
concepts of the separateness of childhood over the last four hundred years. In Pollock's view, historians, by 
concentrating too much on cases of child maltreatment, fail to recognise the continuities in family life. However, at 
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became 'of the family' in one respect (innocent, dependent, open to educative and moral 
inculcation) the 'other than' became the depraved or delinquent child. It was a type of 
"preventive penology" (Pfohl: 1977: 325) which was to characterise the various 
philanthropic movements. Donzelot identifies two main strands to its somewhat insidious 
operation. First, 'Moralisation' is seen as the means by which material assistance was given 
to the deserving poor insofar as it enabled the transmission of moral advice in order to 
encourage towards 'righteousness: 
advice is the act that evinces the most equality since it follows at the same time 
from the desire to influence in the one who gives it and from the perfect freedom 
of the one who receives it. Wherever the exercise of political rights is lacking, it is 
difficult to get the poor man to understand that the advantages of the rich give the 
latter no material power, but rather a legitimate moral influence. 
Charles Dupin: Ommierr. 1828, cited in Donzelot: 1980: 65 
Greater surveillance is thus enabled by this type of philanthropy in order to first 
distinguish the deserving from the non-deserving and second to establish the ability of the 
family in question to accommodate the needs of its members. That is, to establish the 
autonomy of the family in order not to undermine, but reinforce its responsibility as 
distinct from the traditional allegiances whereby charitable endeavours affirmed a loss of 
autonomy. The underpinning theme is clear: by such means the family is represented as 
both the location and guardian of autonomy, "based on the following alternative: control 
its needs or be controlled by them" (Donzelot: 1980: 70) 
Second, 'Normalisation' constituted a strategy by which norms could be spread 
throughout society, usually by legislation and particularly legislation concerned ostensibly 
with protecting children and also through schooling and various ventures which promoted 
health and welfare. Again in part it represents a response to the worst excesses of 
industrialisation and urbanisation but was also borne out of fears for the preservance of 
social order. Whereas moralisation redirected a challenge to a new political order by 
reconstituting the notion of family responsibility and autonomy, normalisation 
least in the case of Aries' work we know already that the absence of childhood did not preclude affection for 
children, nor did it necessitate maltreatment. 
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transformed a challenge to economic imperatives into a problem of family authority. Here, 
delinquency and pauperism become seen not primarily as effects of economic and 
capitalist demands, but as a failure of family to instil appropriate ethical values. Schooling is 
the mechanism by which appropriate values could be inculcated and various measures to 
protect children in the workplace, to educate and promote welfare certainly alleviated the 
often dire conditions in which children found themselves. Simultaneously, however, they 
served to constrain the unpredictability, mobility and disquiet which characterised this 
period, often associated with the weakening of traditional community relations. 
Both of the above techniques thus invite individuals to subscribe to a liberal morality 
and ethic; by adhering to particular, mostly bourgeois notions of respectable behaviour 
families are able to keep at bay pervasive intrusion or, if they subscribe and still warrant 
attention they become more likely to receive 'supportive' rather than coercive 
interventions. In Britain, the emergence of child-saving movements such as the Charity 
Organisation Society (1869) need to be seen against this backdrop. The C. O. S. argued for 
an 'assessment' to precede any charitable intervention in order to distinguish the deserving 
from the 'residuum' and reintegrate 'rescued' children into the respectable and productive 
working class. Philanthropy was able to exploit the internal oppressions of the family by 
colluding with its weaker members - "Just as in diplomacy the enemy of ones enemy may 
be ipso facto a friend, in these domestic, emotional and physical spaces, the enemy of ones 
oppressor may be in a position to help" (Gordon: 1985: 22). 
Once embraced by the state, such processes take on a surveillance role aiming to 
anticipate deviance. Failure to acquiesce to scrutiny may be regarded as suspicious in itself, 
indicative of moral inadequacy and possible subversion. 
The seemingly intractable problem that needed, nonetheless, to be resolved was of 
confining abandoned children without encouraging parents to abandon their children to 
charitable organisations and then sometimes 'reclaim' them at a later stage only to return 
them to a life of vagrancy. Further, how to ensure an educative function and inculcation of 
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norms where parental authority opposed intervention by voluntary means. Here there 
emerged an embodiment in law of those situations in which compulsory intervention 
should take place. The problem became one of 'children as victims' versus 'children as 
vagrants and disrupters'; of how to address the potential for 'delinquency' without either 
subjecting children to unnecessary punishment or condoning their activities or allowing 
working class families to abdicate responsibility (either by seeing the child as 'better off' or 
the family as 'well rid). 
Donzelot (1980) argues for a concept of 'tutelage' which combines the idea of children 
in danger with the idea of 'dangerous children' (delinquents), thus encompassing the dual 
signification of childhood as both 'innocence' and 'depravity'. Whilst it is primarily a 
preventive intervention it includes a coercive element where the processes of 
normalisation and moralisation have failed. In Britain, at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century there was little differentiation made between the 'criminal' child or adult with 
children regularly - though not quite as frequently as some observers suggest - sentenced 
to death or transportation. This gradually began to change towards the middle of the 
century and the 1840's saw a series of legislative measures which were to improve the 
working conditions of children. The Reformatory School Act 1854 and Youthful 
Offenders Act 1857 in particular established a clearer differentiation between children and 
adults, while also acknowledging the bourgeois concept of the 'dependent' child. 
By the mid-nineteenth century legislation had embodied in law the idea of the 
delinquent child as 'other than' and reinforced childhood as a distinct phase in which 
children were no longer free agents but requiring control, first within the family, but failing 
that, within the emerging notion of public 'care', to prevent future delinquency. Here, 
ccare', signifying 'control' as much as anything else, could not be presumed to reside 
exclusively within the family, despite its promotion as the 'natural' sphere; thus from its 
inception, public 'care' or 'accommodation' carried within and signified a regulatory 
imperative that continues to inhere therein. 
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Tutelage constituted a form of external supervision to address the above dilemma in 
three phases: first, the child was 'judged' and became the responsibility of the penal 
administrators; second, the child was sent to a protective society; third the child was 
returned to the family as and when deemed appropriate on condition that in the absence 
of adequate familial supervision they could be returned to penal care (Donzelot: 1980). 
So, in return for the provision of adequate care and control the family avoided 
becoming itself an object of surveillance and intervention. As well as the instilling of 
behavioural and attitudinal norms and control imperatives, the tutelary process offers 
'betterment' and a new future at the same as reducing family autonomy. 'Mat very 
provision, however, carries with it a new ultimatum: that where such opportunity is 
offered (to avoid incarceration), to reject it is construed as a moral offence in itself. 
Therein lies the power of the tutelary process and of supervision; that of a choice 
"between subjection to norms and an orientation to delinquency that is difficult to 
reverse" (Donzelot: 1980: 80). 
Delinquency, a concept that became part of the discourse of child welfare in the 
nineteenth century, marked a crucial conjuncture between the 'criminal' and the 'deprived' 
where the child is to be both punished and reformed. This de- politicisation of crime is a 
functional necessity which locates the delinquent "precisely within the law, produced and 
maintained there. We Eve in the universal reign of the normative, a reign inaugurated by 
the spread of the carceral continuum which both objectifies and subjectifies 
individuals" (Boyne: 1990: 118). ' 
Ile construction of delinquency, its very possibility, came to open the door wider to 
universalising notions of childhood; indeed it is what makes it possible; by setting 
parameters to the 'space' signified by 'childhood' the instability of the sign (the child) was 
7 It is within that volatile 'space' wherein the parameters of family autonomy are defined and external forces loom that 
the transposition of medicine, psychiatry, juvenile law takes place and where philanthropy is incorporated into the 
juridical process that the activity of prevention combines with repression and assistance under the generic cloak of 
'welfare'. 
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further regulated. It was a small step from herein to legitin-ýise the formalisation of 
schooling as compulsory in the Education Acts of the 1879's and 1880's; children could be 
justifiably returned from the labour market to the 'natural order' of things; labour, 
constructed as the 'adult sphere' now became a corrupting influence; fears of potential 
delinquency were to be avoided; childhood ignorance and irrationality was to be addressed; 
the 'dependent' child's 'needs' were to be met. 
For Donzelot, the change we are describing is one from government of the family to 
, gb the 
family whereby the meaning, purpose, rationale and very essence government lbrom 
of 'family' is articulated in accordance with social imperatives. Tutelage serves to link 
bourgeois ethics with those of the working class family so that the legitimate act of 
protecting poor children facilitates an intervention which deflects resistance by offering 
the opportunity for 'betterment' and 'well-being' in place of political right. 
Towards the 'Modern' Child: A Fusion of Disciplines 
By the end of the nineteenth century schooling provided a captive population for the 
scientific scrutiny of children (see Hendrick: 1997), an exercise which came to facilitate a 
growth in knowledge of childhood conditions and their development. In addition, the 
relevance of children to the national interest was increasingly realised; that is, of children as 
holding the promise of the healthy, efficient and educated nation. 
Hendrick (1997) argues that the 'psychological child' emerged through various strands 
of child psychology in the first half of the twentieth century, most notably and visibly in 
the development of Child Guidance Clinics of the 1920's and 1930's. Here, the idea of 
'treating' the 'maladjusted' child was propagated within a discourse increasingly aligned 
with medicine. In a conjunction destined to shape the social welfare programmes practised 
by social workers, health workers and psychiatrists, 'Welfare' itself was becoming 
reconfigured to include the mental dimension. Childhood was appropriated into the inner 
psyche of human consciousness as a fragile interior that prefigured the 'intact, present, 
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rational adult. As such, it became susceptible to 'damage'; it was legitimately and necessarily 
the focus of professional scrutiny and attention as its 'true' nature was 'discovered' to be 
psychologically, socially and physically a distinct period of vulnerability that warranted 
emanagement', 'treatment' and, where necessary, correction or adjustment. Childhood had 
now conceptually come to extend into the unconscious; it had an unconscious 'nature' of 
its own, one that was contextualised and constituted within the sphere of relations in the 
cnatural' family. It could not be taken for granted that 'parenting' would ensure the 
development of the psychologically normal adult so expertise, advice, guidance, counselling 
and therapy were thus permitted entry into the private sphere of the autonomous family. 
Further, the new technologies of the 'psy' professions permitted the imperatives not only 
of personal mental hygiene but of its political concomitants, security, stability and 
regulation, to reach not only the home and hearth, but into the inner world of the child's 
mind. 
The modem child; an artifice of middle class domesticity, defined by virtue of 
psychological, educational, criminal and medical jurisdiction; a closure successfully effected 
on 'childhood' as distinct and discrete. However, where primarily it had been the 'body' as 
signifier that had, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, exercised the 
attentions of science, philanthropists, moralists, churchmen and the state (albeit with a 
significant element of concern about 'mental healthD, in the mid twentieth century it was 
the child's mind, imagination, dreams and fantasies that became the preoccupation of 
psychological and psychiatric endeavour. The linkages that psychology made between the 
child and the family, more particularly, family relations was to further secure the 'natural' 
child within an economic, sociological and psychological discourse from which, arguably, it 
has yet to emerge. In childhood needs and nature became synonymous; 'needs' are at once 
what callsfor the supplement and are the primary manifestation of nature in childhood; as 
the supplement, their 'way in' to childhood is in and through nature by being ofnature; the 
A Genealogy of Childhood 127 
paradox had the appearance of resolving itself; there was no longer any question; 
childhood was naturalised. 
'Mythical' Childhood 
It is somewhere within the coalition, commingling, between psychological and 
sociological theory that social work is immersed. This is despite the fact that this fusion 
falls upon the fundamental presuppositions of psychology; that there is a coherent, unified 
subject anterior to the social which is shaping, 'constructingý it. Here, one set of beliefs 
come to prop up another that might otherwise at first appear to be in contradiction. just 
as psychological theory might become problematic for liberal professionalism, social 
constructionism rescues it, qualifies it, supplements it, softens it and in doing so 
strengthens and naturalises it. Equally, just at the point where a broadly sociological 
perspective might become problematic in denying the individual, psycho- 
dynamic/developmental dimension to 'child' and 'family', psychological theory intervenes 
to rescue it, supplement it by drawing a line between the 'natural' and the 'cultural' so that 
the sociological is also paradoxically 'naturalised'. By allowing and accounting for the 
dsociological', discourse renders it obsolete in terms of transforming 'child' from the 
sphere of the 'natural' where it remains, untouched, 'freely' signi6ling but always/already in 
terms that can be 'read' within the parameters of the discourse. Ilesc are some of the 
tensions, contradictions and dilemma that social work theory, policies and practices 
articulate (albeit unconsciously) and it is to these difficulties, inherent in social work texts 
and practices that subsequent chapters turn. 
Determining 'childhood' as a social construction becomes one of the functions of 'what 
can be said' about childhood; it is at once a challenge to other conflicting or contradictory 
estatements' within the discourse but not one which transgresses or transcends the 
discourse. 'Knowing' that childhood is a social construction, adhering to a set of beliefs 
that constitute 'constructionism' as the 'truth' about childhood is no more 'trans formative' 
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or 'transcendental' than 'knowing' that childhood is biologically and psychologically- 
determined developmental phase on the way to full maturity. We could say that 
cchildhood' is a 'mythical signifier' (Barthes: 1993) in this sense. Both 'truths' occupy the 
same territory; it is 'childhood' that is 'naturahsed' as a sign, not the manner in wbieb we then 
plualise or Ibeorise about it; it is already too late, 'gone'... This mythical quality go on to conce 
to childhood is transformative: "myth is depoliticized speech" (Barthes: 1993: 143), that 
which transforms history into nature. Here, Barthes is referring to the speech act whose 
function is simplification. In this way, far from avoiding, concealing or disguising a 
potentially problematic subject, myth works to talk about it, repeat it, anywhere and 
everywhere, reducing it to a factual 'essence' to the point at which it is simplified beyond 
contradiction; it becomes self-evidently 'true'. 
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; 
simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal 
justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but of a 
statement of fact. 
Barthes: 1993: 143 
Myth serves the dominant discourse(s) that produces the myth by naturalising the 
cmessage' it carries; that childhood 'is'. There is then, after all, a 'transcendence' of sorts; 
that of the conventional distinctions between the various disciplines and discourses that 
surround and fill up childhood. Childhood is, to this extent, a transcendental signifier; 
where disunity may have threatened, childhood comes to the rescue. The child 'in need', is 
a 'child indeed'; her needs are the shroud and the essence of her childhood; her needs 
come before her in her state of natural incapacity, they speak not only for her but for all 
children. They speak before she begins to speak, when she speaks, only her needs are 
heard; they prefigure her speaking. She is a universal icon, a symbol. Her childhood is a 
place (a space) where the world is centred, easy and ordered. It is the place where adults 
'find' the child within themselves, the child who, being 'of nature' is able to lead them to 
the 'truth' about who they are, a way out of the chaos of existence to the centred Being. 
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Conclusion 
Subjects operating within discourse are operating 'freely' but in the very act of 
constituting as 'subjects' do so within the Emits of various 'regimes of truth' (Foucault: 
1977). This self-validating 'truth' works to occlude other forms of thinking; for the subject- 
position 'child' there is a further consolidation because of its relation to 'mother', 'father' 
and 'family' and 'adulthood'. Children thus become both the subject and object of both 
personal and scientific identification and scrutiny; it is not possible to 'think' outside of the 
discourse of childhood without deconstructing all that surrounds it and, moreover which 
relies upon it in order to structure itself, - that is to say 'family', 'adulthood' and 'presence' 
itself. The danger may be that in studying childhood post-structuralism. is misread as social 
constructionism because of the similarities; as if deconstruction were simply social 
construction inrrverse, what should not be forgotten is that social constructionism is just as 
susceptible to a teleological, logocentric, structuralist interpretation as anything else; it 
prefigures the subject. As James and Prout themselves say: 
... ways of thinking about childhood fuse with institutionalized practices to 
produce self-conscious subjects (teachers, parents and children) who think (and 
feel) about themselves through the terms of those ways of thinking. 'Me truth' 
about themselves and their situation is thus self-validating. Breaking into this with 
another 'truth' (produced by another way of thinking about childhood) may prove 
difficult ... the resilience of socialization as a dominant concept rests partly on the 
way in which notions of childhood are embedded wid-iin a tightly structured 
matrix of significations binding childhood with, and positioning it in relation to, 
the family. 
James and Prout: 1997: 23 
Moreover, the 'matrix of relations' (which is, of course, itself self-identical, self- 
validating, self-constituting) is extended further still beyond the family and in relation with 
the full, self-present 'adult'; 'presence' 'itself; that which 'sociological thinldng, 
cpsychological thinking' and other disciplines are strmawrdupon. 
However, for this study the application of a Foucauldian theory of discourse to 
childhood is not to say (as James and Prout seem to suggest) that the 'fact' of biological 
and physical immaturity and the 'body' itself are all no more than a 'social construction'; 
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rather we need to understand the 'body' simply, completely, utterly, as a significr; it is no 
more or no less a signifier than the text, and no more or less 'full', or creal' or 'true' for 
being so. It 'is', simply, signi4ring. 8 All of this is this is nowhere more keenly felt than in 
the shifting sands of 'social work'; that which is charged with delimiting the matrix, setting 
the parameters, 'materialising' theory into practice. And it is to practice that the study now 
turns. 
8 'Ihe 'biological facts' of childhood are no less contingent than, for example the 'face that children learn to speak 
before writing; 'writing, however, precedes speech as previously discussed. In the same way, the facts of biology are 
always/already within the signifying field and taken up into discourse. Afore on this in relation to children's needs in 
corning chapters. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
'BEING'IN CARE: DECONSTRUCTING RESIDENTIAL CARE 
What is meant by 'reality'? It would seem to be something very erratic, very 
undependable - now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of newspaper in 
the street, now a daffodil in the sun. It lights up a group in a room and stamps 
some casual saying. It overwhelms one walking home beneath the stars and makes 
the silent world more real than the world of speech - and then there it is again in 
an omnibus in the uproar of Piccadilly. Sometimes, too, it seems to dwell in 
shapes too far away for us to discern what their nature is. 
Virginia Woolf: 1977: 118 A Room of One's Own 
Introduction 
This chapter embarks upon a textual, deconstructive reading of residential care. The 
main focus of the chapter is the Guidance and RquIations: Volume 4: Residential Carr, a 
document produced by the Department of Health to assist those carrying out duties on 
behalf of the local authority in implementing the Children Act 1989 (hereinafter the Act). 
However, the chapter begins with a wider consideration of some of the terminology and 
metaphors used in the Act in relation to residential care, in particular the terms 'in care' 
and looked after'. The study brings into play many of the concepts discussed in previous 
chapters; iteration, differance, supplementarity, illustrating how, for example, the iteration 
of signifiers such as 'care', 'home', 'family', 'system' and others creates a dynamic play of 
meaning within the text and through the 'intertextual dynamic' of discourses (of family, 
childhood, child development). In this way, the study will aim to show how the text works 
to bring together as a coherent 'whole' conflicting imperatives. On the one hand, the 
primacy of family autonomy within a liberal democracy and a 'naturalised' childhood that 
lies within that family, and on the other, state intervention (at its most interventionist with 
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regard to the family) in the form of residential care as a not only necessary but, in the 
words of the Guidance, a 'positive and desirable option'. The reading will aim to show that 
the effect of all the above is to secure the subject (the child 'in care) within a particular 
framework of understandings and presuppositions, which, through a dynamic play 
between 'sameness' and 'difference' imparts to the reader a division between the 
'mainstream' and the 'margins'. In the other words, that it is through the processes, 
practices, policies that constitute a childhood in 'public care' that the 'natural' child in the 
cnatural' family is itself constituted - and, more importantly, that this is necessaril y so within 
contemporary discourses of welfare, family and child. 
A Note on Deconstructive Readings 
Before turning to the material in question, it is worth reiterating that the study 
represents a rra&ng, rather than a critique, a version of the text that is always already there, 
not hidden, but not read (or read and taken for granted) either by the intended audience 
of practitioners, managers and policy-makers. Towards this end, the aim is an undoing of 
the oppositions that lie within; those upon which 'knowledge' is constructed. Not as a 'way 
out' of the 'enclosure' of course, for such would arguably be impossible, but to point to 
the couplings, and in particular to the difference and deferment between such couplings as 
'interpretations' - for, in our reading, this is what they are, for by no means are they fixed 
entities which establish certainties about the social world. Deconstruction, in the sense 
used here, is best described as a style of reading, one which sets out on the premise that 
only interpretations exist and to subsequently corrode the fixture which holds together 
particular interpretations as if they were 'truths' or 'origins'? It is, as Norris has amusingly 
said, a "positive technique for making trouble; an affront to every normal and comfortable 
This 'play, towards instability and uncertainty is one Derrida not only uses but also sees as a motif in the work of 
Nietzsche (Derrida. 1976). Nietzsche uses the term 'active forgetfulness' (Nietzsche: 1964) to describe the process by 
which the philosopher acknowledges the enclosure within which he/she operates but does not take for granted the 
fixtures that that hold 'knowledge' in place. "... far from remaining simply ... within metaphysics, (Nietzsche) 
contributed a great deal to the liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to the logos 
and the related concept of truth or the primary signified, in whatever sense that is understood. Perrida. - 1976: 19) 
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habit of thought" (Norris: x: 1991). 
Not, then, a critique in the sense of taking what is written as it stands and analytically 
evaluating it at face value. Not arguing against it as such since the meaning deconstructed is 
already held within the text. It is not that things could have been done differently, or that 
the material studied presents inadequate information, poor analysis, weak syntax or, in the 
case of the Guidance, that it fails to offer 'guidance and regulation'. It does, and does so 
effectively. Deconstruction is not against the text but may show the text to be against 
itself. 
To locate the promising marginal text, to disclose the undccidable moment, to 
pry it loose with the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident 
1-ýierarchy, only to displace it; to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always 
already inscribed. Deconstruction in a nutshell 
Spivak: 1976: Lxxvii 
Children 'Looked After"In Care' 
The discussion begins by examining perhaps the two most powerful signifiers in 
residential care - 'in care' and looked after'. The term 'in care' is full of meaning; so much 
so that understandings of the phrase extend well beyond the parameters of professional 
discourse and into common usage. It embodies, incorporates and consolidates something 
about the 'whole experience' and meaning of public care; both about those who are 'in 
care', as well as the nature of that experience - without even having to specify the former 
or the latter. 'In care' and 'care' will form the focus of both this discussion and a 
subsequent examination within the field of signification within the Guidance. 'Looked 
After', however, is, at least as yet, different. It was prescribed in the Act as a term which 
describes both children subject to care orders and those accommodated under voluntary 
arrangements with parents that extend beyond a period of 24hrs. It is, to this extent, 
synonymous with 'in care' but no doubt intended to disassociate with some of the more 
negative connotations that 'in care' carries, holding within the possibility to dismantle the 
idea of being 'in' or 'out' of care. After all, being 'in care' had come to signify a particular 
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type of institutional life, regime and experience wMch emphasised all that is negative about 
not living within the 'natural' family 
Being 'In Care' 
Within the term 'in care', the sign 'care' acquires entirely different possibilities of 
meaning than its positioning within other signs used in relation to 'care' commonly have. 
For example, the words love' and 'care' are closely related, often used in the same contcxt, 
each an intrinsic component of the other. The term 'in love' conjures up images of a 
warm, caring, nurturing relationship; however, by placing 'in' and 'care' together, a 
converse set of possible meanings and images are apparent: images and meanings of 
rejection, institutionalisation, of not being loved or cared for in the 'conventional' sense. 
Care, in the 'in care' context might be seen as reflecting something that is not just about 
the lived experience of 'care' but also about the relationship between the state and 
children, more precisely about what childhood itself ought not to be (and therefore what it 
should be); there is indeed a discomfiture in usage of a term in this context that is 
elsewhere so intrinsic to notions of 'normal' family life, transformed into something 
oppositional in meaning to the sign 'care' in any other context. 
It is not just that coinddentalyl being in care has evolved or turned into a negative and 
stigmatising experience by itself; the sign works to generate particular notions and ideas 
about childhood, family and the state. It arises within discourse. It is therefore, generative, 
creative, powerful in defining and determining what fan-lily life ought to be about and 
therefore 'necessary', in the sense of being active and serving a purpose. But not fixed. It 
is, therefore, self-defeating to deconstruct the 'in care' term without challenging 
(deconstructing) other widely held assumptions and fixed notions of what it means to be a 
'family' or a 'child )2 . From within 
discourse, legislation, Guidance and procedures can go 
2 It is, in fact not possible to deconstfuct the sign 'in care' (at least in the Derridean sense of deconstruction) without 
deconstructing interlinked terms associated with childhood and family since, as is now perhaps clear, one sign leads 
to another, ad infinitum. The sign 'in care' does not, cannot, operate in isolation since in and of itself it is empty of 
meaning; its 'sense'is only in relation to other signs and what it is 'noe. 
4 
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some way to ensuring a better standard of care and provision for 'looked after' children 
but without a wider analysis of the dynamic between the state, the family and the child, the 
child 'in care' remains secured within a discourse that is part of the social construction of 
delinquency, childhood and family, however benevolent and liberal in expression an 
intervention might be. This is why it becomes relevant to look at bow signs, social 
phenomena, discourses work, rather than just asking why. For example, a political history 
of class and gender relations, industrialisation, urbanisation, the economic and social 
subjugation of those who do not hold property or land historically might inform a view, a 
perspective on why residential care for children is regarded as second best, and why 
children in care are often regarded as 'problematic, 'threatening' or dangerous (unless 
passive victims). However, none of the above will tell us how residential care works to 
ensure a particular ordering of the world and children's place within it. That is, in broader 
terms, how the excluded and the marginalised are crucial in defining the central and the 
cmainstrcam'. 
What are, then, the meanings, understandings and connotations that 'in care' carries? 
For the social work professional it reflects the legal framework within which they operate 
and describes the legal status of a particular group of children; it may also signify 
something about these children in relation to their families, their contact with statutory 
services and the degree of intervention it denotes in relation to 'other' children. It may also 
even denote a child's physical location to professionals, either within a residential home, a 
foster placement or, within the family since some children subject to statutory care orders 
do remain within the family. For professionals, 'in care' may also denote something 
beyond legal status about what it means in 'actuality'; that is, in terms of the disparity 
between theory and practice, intention and effect, need and resources, demand and supply. 
No doubt some ambivalence would be expressed about the value of being 'in care' in 
terms of 'rescuing' the child from an 'abusive 'environment' in order to place them within 
environments which may sometimes be construed as equally 'abusive, institutional, 
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debilitating and generally negative in terms of a child's overall 'welfare' and 'social and 
emotional development'. Further, for children and young people who are, or who have 
been 'looked after' 'in care' would likely elicit a similarly ambivalent response, perhaps 
most particularly with regard to the stigma attached to being 'in care' for many young 
people which may have reinforced and compounded feelings of rejection, not belonging, 
not being valued. Hence the emergence of rights-based groups such as the 'Who Cares? 
Trust' which provides information and newsletters for children 'in care'. In its chosen 
name the group adopts, subverts and reclaims the sign with irony and indignation. And 
yet, in doing so the converse meaning of the sign is reaffirmed. 
The Power of Metaphor. 'In Care' 
The notion of being 'in' or 'out' of care also infers that 'care' takes place when you are 
, in'; that is, 'in care', in some form of state administered environment and that when you 
are 'out', you are well and truly out; not just out of the environment but out of the realm 
of any kind of obligation towards your welfare. If you are 'out' of care, the care is finished 
with, done, over with, or at least that is the inference. Whether your experience of being 
'in care' has been good, bad or indifferent is largely irrelevant; continuing support, will still 
be framed in terms of an addendum, an extra, usually founded on the individual goodwill 
of your previous carers and probably based on the fact that you have been seen as co- 
operative, grateful, needy and conforming to a particular caricature of the clOd 'in care'. 3 
Now, none of this is an argument for saying that by changing the language and 
metaphors of social work structural inequalities and oppressions will somehow evaporate, 
but that doing so may be part of a creative and progressive way of beginning to open up 
thinIdng and practice in relation to public care and children's experience of it. Perhaps a 
little more contingency, provisionality exercised in language will itself mean that 'thinldng' 
3 Being 'in care' within foster care is of course, not necessarily any better or worse than a more institutional setting in 
of C it is, terms of in individuals' lived experience; it will, however be most likely seen as a slightly 'bettee form car (I 
after A within some semblance of a family), a 'privileged' form of care in wl-ýich the onus is even more on the 
individual to conform and acknowledge their privilege over institutionalised peers. 
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and 'practice' is less 'compartmentalised', the 'lines between' some children and all other 
children are less clearly drawn, that the operation of a system of public care is seen not as a 
sign of family failure, but a legitimate means of supporting children uilbin a familial and 
community network of support. After all, the Act explicitly requires the provision of 
supportive services under Part III to 'children in need and their families' and many local 
authorities now provide family centres, short-break care, day care in this capacity. The 
problem lies when children and families reach a perceived threshold for a more 
interventionist approach and/or legal proceedings; that is, when a 'line' is drawn and 
children enter the care system, for what may well be sound reasons. Being 'in care' is both 
metonymic and metaphoric within discourse; it 'stands for' all that 'public care' (buildings, 
social workers, legal frameworks, procedures, separation from the family ctc. ) entails at the 
same time as it is re-presenting something familiar (familial), known, 'close to home' (care). 
At once, the 'familiar' is marked by an 'absence' (what 'in care' is 'not) as meaning retreats 
from the space. Metaphorically, the metaphor extends, overflows and withdraws at the 
'moment of its fullest extension' (Derrida: 1987). Having 'privileged' status within the 
discourse of 'public care', metaphor sits unchallenged, taken for granted; but through its 
very usage it is eroded; despite a "presupposition of continuity" (Derrida: 1987: 109) it is 
subject to a regular semantic loss and erosion. So, whereas 'care' may inhere within 
'family', here it is, 'standing in for', and, at the same time explicit, prescribed and as close 
to its 'self-presence', metaphorically, as it can get. And as such it immediately absents itself, 
by trying to 'become' itself, it replaces and defers to itself, leaving only the mark of its 
absence, a 'space' that is open to the supplement; regulation as 'care'. Within a 
metaphysical discourse (of, say, childhood) a 'concept' of Being (of ýBeing' (being) 'in 
care', constructed out of metaphor) can only be exceeded by and through a withdrawal of 
metaphor (the singular and the 'concept' of metaphor 'as a whole). At this withdrawal, 
discourse is simultaneously uninhabitable (there is nothing to say 'in relation to', to 
contrast the familiar with the unfamiliar) without the return of metaphor at its retreat. This 
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withdrawal cannot have a literal sense (Derrida: 1987) since it is not 'something'. Ile 
question of Being (and 'being) 'in care' is one of proximity, familiarity, what is cclosc to 
home' in relation to the unfamiliar, the unknown. Towards the unknown, metaphor 
withdraws in expanding its Emits. 'In care' retreats as meaning erodes itself, metaphor 
returns (as 'in care' or transformed, as looked afterD to occupy the space. Derrida suggest 
metaphor as an 'economy' (Derrida: 1987), a 'shorthand' to somewhere known. To 
understand the role of 'public care', to be clearer, less ambiguous, more 'literal' we rely on 
familiar metaphors that, being within a metaphysical discourse correspond to a withdrawal 
of 'presence' in their signification and in which presence is constantly re-prcsenting itself 
awayfivm but only ever in relation to the familiar (or familial in childhood). Again, this is 
true for childhood 'everywhere', but where it is most prescribed and regulated is also and 
inevitably where the 'presence', the 'being' of being 'in care' is at its most absent, empty 
and derivative. 'Being, being absent can only 'appear' as a withdrawal, as something 
counterpoised and supplemented for the 'essence'. 
The use of the term 'Looked After' may be seen in this way as a response to negative 
connotations of 'in care' that were not only inconsistent with liberalism (over-zealous 
intervention in the family) but threatened to expose an instability (that 'in care' had 
become too &fferrnt from 'care', too punitive, stigmatising, intrusive to be seen as 
legitimate). 'Looked After' offered a more inclusive way of thinking about the task in hand; 
first in avoiding notions of being 'in' or 'out' of care so that 'care' is freed up from the idea 
of institutionalised care that takes place in a particular building for a particular duration and 
then ends; second, in that an individual can feel and have a sense of being looked after' in 
a variety of different settings and receive such a sense from a wider based community of 
professionals and people and without the 'in' or 'out' of 'care' stigma. In this way 'Looked 
After' represents a dispersal of regulation and a metaphorical 'return'. Arising a it does 
, within discourse' to supplement and prefix 'in care', meaning immediately begins to slip 
away and erode the metaphorical 'value'. Like 'in care, it begins to acquire different 
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connotations to those in general usage; it becomes associated with the same negative 
notions that 'in care' acquired, as a cynical euphemism for a particular type of state 
intervention as well as an innocuous depiction of part of the state's statutory role in 
relation to children 'in need', depending on the perspective of the reader; both 
perspectives are, however, embraced within the discourse. Here, changing the metaphor 
(from 'in care' to 'looked after) reflects apmýgrrssive understan&ng of children's experience in 
public care. However, this is an understanding articulated on the basis of a constructed 
childhood thmugb &scourse, thus effecting a closure and reaffirmation of the discourse. This 
means that the need to prevent damaging experiences for children 'in care' and raise their 
quality of life, address the institutionalisation of children, increase the opportunities for 
supporting families and reducing the numbers of children statutorily looked after, are all 
achieved through a better understanding of childirn's needs in childhood and how to meet 
these needs, by primarily increasing the capacity to regulate childhood in terms of systems, 
policy and practice. It is not then, how we understand children and childhood that is 
thrown into question, but our ability to understand them better, as they alirrady air, in 
nature. How this is meted out in current practice forms part of the analysis in this and the 
following chapter. For now, the study turns to the Guidance. 
Guidance and Regubdons Volume 4: Residential Care: A Deconstructive 
Reading 
The above text forms part of a series of volumes produced by the Department of 
Health providing guidance for local authorities in implementing the Act. The document is 
produced under section 7 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 which requires 
local authorities "in the exercise of their social services functions to act under the general 
guidance of the Secretary of State" (Guidance and Regulafionr p. iii: 1991). In these terms the 
, gulations 
does what it sets out to do. Its intention, as prescribed by the Act is Guidance and Re 
to ensure the care and welfare of children in residential care and the efficient running of 
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children's homes within the parameters of the Act and the principles of good practice 
embodied therein. What follows is not a critique of a 'bad' piece of 'social work literature' 
that needs to be improved upon. Indeed, it would be difficult to improve upon it within 
the current discourse of child welfare. It fits, neatly, comfortably, reassuringly into the 
everyday framework of understandings, values and principles of social work practice. It is 
exemplary in its precision, political correctness, 'contemporiness' and attention to detail. 
There is, at face value, little to disagree with, indeed, within an array of often conflicting 
and competing social work perspectives and literature which view social work variously as 
benign, controlling, policing, liberating, empowering there is much which lends itself more 
easily to sociological critique than this apparently benign document. And yet, for the post- 
structuralist, something lingers here that disconcerts somehow, its very perfection seems 
paradoxically to be the flaw. If it were all so straightforward - follow the Guidance by the 
letter, deploy staff and resources accordingly, why is residential care what it is and always 
has been; last resort, second best, an institutional apparatus that still carries within it, 
almost imperceptibly, like a whiff in the air, a residual vestige of the Victorian Workhouse? 
It is here that a post-structuralist finds fertile territory; from a Derridean perspective 
such a text is over-ripe for a deconstructive 'methodology' to be applied. 'Me very self- 
, gulations 
is cause itself for further assured tone, taken-for-grantedness of the Guidance and Re 
meditation and deciphering of the text. The 'common sense' it espouses, its authority as 
the emanation of a Department of State, its resonance with liberal, 'mainstream' values 
and its accommodation of a variety of perspectives on childhood that in any other context 
would appear contradictory are all cause for the post-structuralist to question and ponder 
the multiple worldngs of the text. just as Foucault's questions about the prison 
transcended micro-level concerns about retribution and deterrence, taking as a starting 
point their spectacular failure in such respects and asldng why, given this failure, they 
continued to seem so necessary, desirable even; so may we ask not wb? y we need residential 
care for children (to provide alternative accommodation following 'family breakdowný, 
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but bow does residential care work (to maintain a difference, an 'otherness' of childhood 
that defines, constructs and maintains variable notions of family, child and their 
, gmlates e 
iy relationship with the state). The Guidance and Re , gulations tr Ib 
& eirnee, make it 
plausible, palatable, sensible, necessary. They not only consolidate and clarify the divide 
but 'smooth it out', make the sharp edges soft so that its message is not only amenable but 
laudable. They make sense of the difference, pacifies the conscience and articulates the 
order of things. Beneath, behind and within which hes waiting the absent, the deferred, the 
unspoken, the disenfranchised voice of 'otherness'. 
The Text 
The Preface: Authorship and Mythical Signification 
Since considerable attention is given to the first paragraph of the Preface of this 
document, it is reproduced here for ease of reference: 
... (Mis) is the fourth volume in a series designed to bring to managers and 
practitioners an understanding of the principles of the Children Act and associated 
regulations, to identify areas of change and to assist discussion of the implications 
for policies, procedures and practice. It is not intended that any one handbook 
should be read by people in local authority social service departments, and others 
carrying on children's homes, as a discrete entity. The Children Act was conceived 
as a cohesive legal framework for the care and protection of children. Each 
volume of Guidance should therefore be read on conjunction with the others in 
the series and cross-references are entered where appropriate. 
Gtddance and Regulations: Vol. 4 pdý 
As is usually the case with official publications of this kind, there is no author named, 
other than the Department of State concerned, in this case the Department of Health. 
This anonymity adds to the authority of the text. One does not imagine some nameless 
civil servant feverishly tapping away at the keyboard to meet a deadline; or a committee of 
multi-professional worthies sitting monthly for a year in Richmond House to produce 
contradictory positions to be smoothed over in the final document by the classical prose 
of their pin-striped secretary; rather, it is as if the 'government' or 'state' produced it 
abstractly by sheer, almost Nietzschean force, or willpower, as if it just grew out of 
nowhere, on demand. It stands alone, detached, aloof, superior, authoritative. How would 
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it be if the civil servants and advisory experts who produce such documents were named, 
with some brief biographical details and list of previous publications? Probably it would 
seem irrelevant, unnecessary, even silly. It would certainly detract from the authority of the 
text if we knew the personal details and political persuasions of the author. " This is not a 
text that is open to debate; it is closed, final, definitive, until the next piece of legislation 
displaces it. That is its intention; to appear final and definitive as if it is saying, 'this is 
where we are now and here is where we are staying; God knows it took us long enough to 
get here'. Its authority is achieved via these seemingly benign details regarding its source, 
its anonymity, the use of language, its form and structure. The point is not that these 
details reflect or represent its authority, they constitute it. We are reminded here of an 
early Barthesian reading of signs in deciphering a 'mythical' signification here (Barthes: 
1957). The Guidance is a sign of first order signification and a signifier of the second order 
in a mythological system. In its qiteral', first order meaning it is guidance for the 
implementation of the Act, constituted by the language, the words on the page. This is the 
craw' material that myth takes hold of in its entirety, not in its literal, particular meaning 
but in its global signification. When it takes hold "everything happens as if myth shifted 
the formal system of the first significations sideways" (Barthes: 1957: 115), it builds a 
cmetalanguage' (Barthes: 1957) in which the first sign, the linguistic schema is of account 
only inasmuch as it lends itself to the second order mythical meaning or metalanguage. 
The authority of the text is the greater, mythical, second order signification which is co- 
extensive with the language itself. ' Myth is motivated, dynamic; that is its power. For the 
mythical signification 'state authority' to get hold of the Guidance (what it says) and 
subsume it within its myth it must have an identification and relationship with it; in this 
case the 'alibi' is the 'need for guidance for the effective running of children's homes that 
4 For an extended and excellent discussion on authorship and particularly on 'titles' of texts I%rithin' a Derridean 
approach see Julian Wolfteys (1998) Deconstruction - Derrida, Transitions Basingstoke: NfacmiUan. 
5 By the authority of the text we mean not only in the sense of its source (the state) or in what it actually says in a literal 
sense, but also what is left unsaid, present by its absence about defining the state in relation to children in residential 
care and our relationship with both the former and the latter. 
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ensures the care and protection of children'. A noble cause. Now, the Guidance cab be rcad 
in three ways. The first sees the Guidance in its simplest, literal sense and take it for what it 
appears to be. Here, the Guidance is the form that the need to regulate residential care 
takes, in a sense a symbol for that need. Second, the Guidance can be read sceptically; the 
reader can take a view about the political motivations and imperatives behind the Act and 
expressed in the Guidance. We can agree or disagree with them, we can take cynical view 
about the Guidance, offer a critique which unmasks suspected 'hidden agendas' or a 
'subtext' within the document. Finally we can read myth as a dynamic whole; the Guidance 
is neither a benign interpretation of legislation nor an alibi for state control; it is the 'very 
presence' of state authority. Neither our first or second reading detracts from the power 
of myth, quite the reverse, they are its very life-blood. Myth encompasses an signification, 
cnaturalizes' it, gives it an unquestionable status. Received naively, the Guidance is a 
straightforward prescription for the implementation of the Act; received cynically, it is a 
tool of the state, poorly concealed: 
... either the intention of the myth is too obscure to be efficacious, or it is too 
clear to be believed ... myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an 
infleidon.... Threatened. with disappearance if it yields to either of the first two 
types of focusing, it gets out of this tight spot thanks to a cornprorrýise - it is this 
comprotrýise ... driven to having either to unveil or liquidate the concept, it will 
naturalize it" 
Barthes: 1957: 129 
From a Derridean perspective there is not such a neat correlation between signifier and 
signified, or indeed, a convenient serniological system upon which to establish the 
dconcept' 'myth'. However, this early Barthes resonates powerfully with post-structuralism 
and deconstruction in its recognition of the ambiguity of signification, particularly in 
language. Mythical deciphering is perhaps deconstruction in progress, one of the 
'necessary detours' on the way to post-structuralism. 
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Family Autonomy vs State Intervention: "understanding", "coliesion", "care and 
protection" 
The Preface states the intention of the document as being "to bring to managers and 
practitioners an understanding of the principles of the Children Act and associated 
regulations, to identify areas of change and to discuss the implications for policies, 
procedures and practice" (p. iii). Not just guidance and regulations then, after an, but 
bringing 'an understanding' too; a particular understanding of the principles of the 
Children Act, perhaps the understanding intended by the Act, rather than any unintended 
understanding? Already it is as if the Act could be misinterpreted, as if the 
caccommodation' forged between competing interests, lobbyists and political imperatives 
in producing the Act might crumble away without the Guidance and Re , gulatio to 
hold it ns 
together and bring to us the 'understanding' needed. As if wisunderstan&n ,g were 
presupposed or inherent in the Actl Which begs the question: do the Act and its 
associated Guidance work in ways which are not made explicit or which may not be 
intended or even 'known'? In other words, bow does the guidance (or residential care) 
work in maintaining the marginalisation of particular groups of children (and families), 
especially when everything it 'says' is seemingly intended to ensure the normalisation of 
children? 
Further on in the Preface the reader is reminded that the Act "was conceived as a 
cohesive legal framework for the care and protection of children". Cobesive, cam and 
pmtection draw the attention here. 'Cohesive' seems a sensible enough idea; we shall then 
look for coherence in the body of the text; or perhaps marks of incoherence, where the 
edges fray, where whatever it is that is being 'cohered' attempts to break free, burst out 
and demolish the coherence. Maybe this expressed need for coherence has some 
correlation with the need to 'bring an understanding'. Two indications already that all may 
not be as it appears. Noteworthy too that 'cohesive' is not, in fact, in relation to the care 
and protection themselves but to the legal frameworkfor the care and protection. Is it that 
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the care and protection was previously non- or in-coherent or just that the legal 
framework was? It may be deduced that since there is an apparent need for coherence to 
the legal framework, the care and protection would themselves be non- or in-coherent 
without it. If they were coherent, in what sense? 'Held together', "logical and consistent" 
(OED), or both? If, in either sense, care and protection were coherent, would a 'cohesive' 
legal framework be needed anyway? 
Perhaps it is that having wrenched 'protection' out of 'care' and thrown it into the 
public arena it now has to be legitimately stuck clumsily back on again, reconstituted as on 
the one hand, a discrete activity which the state has a part in determining, and on the 
other, retaining an almost embarrassed association with 'care', a meandering offspring, 
escaped from the rest of the brood that is 'care'. 'Coherence' then, may express the need 
to explain the absence of protection from care where 'care' (of children) in the liberal state 
should be the cornerstone of the 'family', and 'protection' should inhere therein. In this 
way, the Guidance is operating at two levels; first in relation to the running of children's 
homes and second, in the process of doing so, being required to justify itself in relation to 
what 'ought' to be; i. e.; that despite the paramountcy of 'family autonomy', the state is still 
required to undertake certain activities that sbould fall within the sphere of 'parental 
responsibility". This dilemma is at the core of the Children Act (Harding: 1991, Parry: 
1992, Parton: 1991). Hence the need for 'coherence'; not only in terms of what should 
happen in residential care, but in defining, constituting what family fife should be. 
Since this is Preface - that part of a book which presages what is to follow (forpraefalus 
means, precisely, 'speaking before), we no doubt anticipate that the body of the text win 
make explicit reference to this care and protection of children. We shall see. Further, given 
that this volume pertains to residential care the reader might also expect to see more 
references to 'care' than 'Protection' since other volumes relate more specifically to 
6 Our references to 'family autonomy' throughout are, of course, qualified and refer to a Perceptual, rather than a legal 
of 'actual' sense of the term 
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protection. Each volume in the series begins with the same Preface, amended according to 
the area it covers. It is not intended that each volume is read as a "discrete entity", since, 
as we have already noticed, the Act aims to bring coherence to the legal framework for the 
care and protection of children. It is especially noteworthy that 'care' and 'Protection' are 
posited as mutually distinct activities; it is not then assumed 'care' encompasses 
'protection', or that 'protection' is a component of 'care'. (One of the dictionary 
definitions of 'care' is 'protection, charge' (OED)). Protection, then, is clearly an issue and 
presumably, in an alternative universe we might just as easily have observed a different 
coupling, like 'care and dietary needs' or 'care and understanding. Tbese, however are 
presumably immersed within the generic term 'care' in this particular context. Protection is 
clearly not. Nor is the reader (at this stage at least) informed as to what we are protecting 
children from. (Perhaps this is a little unreasonable since this only the Preface after all). 
However, given that 'care' cannot be taken for granted in that it has been defined (if only 
in part) by what it may exclude (protection), can it be safely assumed that the remainder of 
its demonstrably provisional meaning indmdes 'dietary needs' and 'understanding? If the 
Gmidance is going to start by i&01ý, iqg the provisionality of meaning, is the reader supposed 
to infer the provisionality of all meaning in the text? It is, after all, just as possible to 'care' 
for children without meeting their dietary needs (see the families ravaged by famine in the 
majority world) or understanding them (see parents of any 13-year old) as it is to care for 
them without 'protection'. 
Who is the Guidance for? 
Now, accepting the fact that the Gmidance is intended for a particular, informed and 
receptive audience of child care professionals working in the field of the 'care and 
protection' of children it has assumed a certain level of knowledge and understanding here 
about terms and definitions. That is, that there exists a working knowledge and 
understanding about language within a professional discourse that allow a series of 
presuppositions to be made that obviate the need for such pedantry. That leaves then, a 
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remaining question. When and where werr the terms defined to enable such linguistic and 
semantic shorthand? Where is the origin, the defining moment in which all child care 
professionals arrived at a consensual, shared understanding of the terms of reference of 
the 'social work' discourse, the linguistic schema and 'non-arbitrariness of signification' 
therein? Looking to the Act itself in Part XII (NEscellaneous and General: Section 105: 
Interpretation) in a glossary of terms used in the Act, protection, although appearing on 
numerous occasions throughout the Act is not defined other than in relation to other 
terms e. g. emergency protection orders. Plenty of room for interpretation here then, as to 
the meaning and form of 'protection'. 'Harm', often appearing in the Act in relation to 
protection is defined in Part IV, section 31 (9) as 
ill treatment or the impairment of health or development; 
(where)"developmene, means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or 
behaviourit development; "health" means physical or mental health; and "ill- 
treatmene, includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not 
physical. 
Apparently it is not to the law that we can look for certain knowledge. The point is that 
despite the presuppositions made within the Guidance, and indeed in its application in 
practice, the meaning and signification of the Act, of guidance, of policy is not quite as 
clear as it appears to be, even for those who inhabit the discourse. 
'Me Guidance gives the impression and appearance of 'knowing' what it is talking about 
and to whom it is talking. The targeted audience is assumed to be informed differently and 
more particularly than a general audience. VVhich it is, but not in a way that necessarily 
makes it 'any the wiser'. The difficulty is that, despite necessary appearances, the 
understandings and interpretations are no more fixed, determined and certain for those 
who inhabit social work's professional discourse than for those who do not. 'Protection, 
'harm', 'risk' are all matters in day to day practice which are worked out, reasoned and 
speculated upon (see Parton et al: 1997), rather then determined definitively and in a much 
more arbitrary way than the prescriptive and authoritative tone of the law and the Guidance 
would lead us to believe. It is not qaw' anyway that provides such certainties, since it "is 
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not the fount from which social actions spring but is in itself a social product, and by no 
means the most influentiaP' (Harris and Timms: 1993: 31). 
The Guidance is but one source from which actions spring, nor is it necessarily any more 
definitive than any other for being 'official'. We have already begun to unmask the 
provisionality of meaning within the document and can perhaps begin to see how it works 
in a way which siýnzyes authority but is much more ambivalent when it comes to precisely 
what this means in practice. As soon as the Guidance begins to describe the fom its 
authority takes in practice things become much more uncertain as each sign begins 
deferring to the next as soon as we try to pin down and hold on to the meaning. What we 
'know' is that it is this interpretation of interpretations that we should adhere to; that is its 
authority. And beyond this, that it is This interpretation that we may then go on to interpret 
(albeit differently) in practice. 
Of course, the Guidance 'speaks' to child care professionals in a particular way that 
(makes sense' and in this way it is what it says it is - Guidance. The landscape is familiar, it 
connects with what we feel we know and resonates within the milieu of social work 
practice and academia. But for it to do so requires an acknowledgement of a whole series 
of presuppositions about the nature of childhood and family, meanings of 'care', 
cprotection', 'residential care', 'children', the law and the Guidance itself, about which the 
reader has no means of verifying or 'knowing. It refers to a known terrain; to deny this 
reference would be to 'dislocate understanding' in a way which leaves the reader "adrift on 
an unknown sea" (Trefusis: 1988: 39)'. In a context where the unknown, rather than an 
exploratory, expansive terrain, full of different 'subjectivities' is seen instead as dangerous, 
(by inferring the fallibility of the family, the state and of the discourse in which the 
imperative is to provide the appearance of certainties), this is a fearful place to be. The 
possibility of difference emerging supreme, victorious is too much to contemplate. And 
7 Tlis literary reference is from Violet Trefusis' novel Ecko in which the author miimies the role of a meaningful 
linear plot and narrative in order to explore the possibilities of a different subject position outside of a univocal, 
unified text. 
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yet, the absence of difference is ever present. Noticed by its absence. Even though we may 
be steeped in the language and metaphors of 'social work', we are just as unable (and often 
unwilling) to get behind it and secure any sense of certainty than any one else is. This 
might suggest the futility of even trying to do so, but that would be to miss the point. The 
state, professionals, policy-makers, legislators, managers and the wider, incessant re- 
negotiation betwixt and between, define the territory, mark out the parameters which, 
because of the need for some kind of certainty, fixture, location, arc taken for granted 
since the alternative is untenable; constant, infinite self-reflexivity. ' But here it can be 
exposed, made known, marked out, say it is there and thus create an expanse of creative 
possibility, of change, of difference. 
Demarcating Residential Care 
Before looking at these references, it is worth establishing the Contents page as distinct 
from the Preface. This is vital, for reasons that are not made explicit but which will 
become clear. The reader is made aware that in the Preface that it is common to all of the 
volumes of Guidance relating to the Act, aside from one or two distinguishing amendments 
which indicate which volumes in the series are most relevant to read in conjunction with 
the one being read. In this case (Volume 4), it is Volume 3: 'Family Placements', which 
pertains mostly to foster care, that is cross-referenced as the most appropriate: "for the 
convenience of users who have responsibility for, or are responsible for, or share in the 
responsibility for, or otherwise work in, children's homes, most of the content of Volume 
3 (Family Placements) is replicated in this volume slightly amended where appropriate, 
given that this volume is about residential care" (Preface: iii). For this study, this 'aside' is 
significant on a number of levels. Given that apart from where there are 'slight 
amendments', the Guidance for family placements has much in common with that which is 
8 Here, a greater light is shed on the aforementioned need for coherence. VAilst the Preface states the need for a 
, cohesive legal framework, inferring the incoherence of what has gone before, we might begin to see that the Act or 
guidance is perhaps less likely to provide in practice any more coherence than previously since we know that law 
itself is no more likely to 'ensure certainties' about social relations than any other social action. 
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provided for residential care, the assumption might be that residential and family 
placements have a lot in common. But in what respect? They are not similar enough for 
one volume to apply to both, nor are they different enough to warrant any more than 
creplication, slightly amended'. Whilst there may well be some apparently obvious and 
specific requirements of, for example, foster carers in relation to looking after children 
who are 'accommodated' under section 20 of the Act, these would presumably not be 
substantial enough, in and of themselves, to warrant a separate volume since the 
amendments are only 'slight' and not substantial. 
Conversely, there are apparently very substantial reasons for there being specific 
requirements and regulations of residential homes for children, not least because of some 
of the malpractice and abuses of power that have emerged from inquiries into children's 
homes (see Kahan B., and Levy A., (1991), also The Ulting Report (Utting : 1991) and The 
Earner Report (Department of Health: 1993)). Is it that the Guidance is signifying here the 
sin-ýdlarity of treatment and care of children in both residential and family placements, or 
the similarity of the children themselves, or, by providing a separate volume, signifying the 
differences between the children and/or the 'care' in either settine. Institutional care is 
particular care, peculiar and unique in its difference to the normative arrangements for the 
care, welfare and upbringing of children. 'Family' is not; it is the normative arrangement. 
Things are taken for granted about 'family care' that are not taken for granted about 
residential care. 9 'Family placement' however, is somewhere else, somewhere in-between 
and perhaps more indeterminate than the institution or the family. That said, to place 
'family placements' within an arena of ambiguity between 'institution' and 'family' would be 
an inadequate conceptualisation from the point of view of this thesis since it implies the 
certainty of 'family' and 'institution' as social phenomena. 
9 Although what is and is not 'taken for granted' about 'family' and what it signifies changes over time and place, (almost 
to the extent that little, if anything can in fact be 'taken for granted) as we have already indicated. 
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Further, whereas regulation of the 'family' might be seen as achieved via a variety of 
individual and social activities and arrangements to the extent of accomplishing 'self- 
regulation' (see Donzelot: 1980, Parton: 1991), the institution, not conceived of within the 
natural state of things, is regulated through more explicit means, e. g. Guidance and 
Regulations. " 'Family Placements', as a composite arrangement, requires guidance to the 
extent that it marks out the difference between what can be taken for granted about the 
family and what cannot be assumed about the institution. Thus it is able to replicate 
substantially the Guidance for residential care, whilst appending slight amendments that 
pertain to family placements. Without a rigorous, comparative reading of both texts, it is 
not possible to ascertain any of the above and it is not anyway the focus of this discussion. 
Suffice to say that perhaps the very status and relationship of Volume 3 (Family 
Placements) to Volume 4 articulate some of this ambivalence. Perhaps it is worth 
reiterating that in any of the above, the argument is not against the 'need' for regulation 
and guidance of both residential and family placements, but that the form and 
manifestation of this need for guidance is signifying something about the status of family 
in relation to the institution that lies within the texts and the intertextual. relationship. 
Contents Section (pages v-xýý 'Care' as the institution 
Turning to the Contents page, the document is divided into 9 sections: 1: Children's 
Homes; 2: Arrangements for Placement of Children; 3: Review of Children's Cases; 4: 
Contact; 5: Representations Procedure; 6: Independent Visitors; 7: After Care - Advice 
and Assistance; 8: Secure Accommodation; 9: Refuges For Children at Risk. Ile final 
section is followed by an Annex of regulations. Each section is subdivided under headings. 
The sub-headings are numerous and cover a range of activities pertaining to residential 
care. In this section as a whole, what is striking is that in a document designed to offer 
10 It should be clear that 'family regulation' is achieved in a variety of ways which include the more explicit and direct 
means like the law and guidance documents but in the sense of what is said indirectly or what is not said but held 
already within. 
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guidance in the implementation of an Act concerned with the care and protection of 
children, references to care arc so few and far between. 
Having pointed out that the Preface is largely common to all volumes (though 
marginally yet significantly different at the same time), the Contents page, not surprisingly, 
is not. Here, straight away, 'care' manifests and signifies differently in the turning of a page. 
In the Contents page and in the remainder of the document, care acquires a much more 
specific meaning that arises purely out of it being placed in a particular context. Whereas in 
the generic Preface 'care and protection' seemed to denote some generalised notions 
about the activities, roles, understandings and realignments of 'state' in relation to 'family', 
here different connotations emerge and take precedence. Previous significations defer, slip 
stealthily, surreptitiously away, as if the 'word' itself arbitrarily arrived here in order to 
create some kind of artificial continuum, not of meaning, but of language (of word as 
meaning, as if it were meaning, non-arbitrary, neady connecting signifier to signified in a 
systernised way). This difference (of signification) is not announced in any way, explained 
or reasoned. But somehow it is understood. Within this discourse, the iteration of care is 
transformative, taking not only the meaning of 'care', but all that surrounds to another 
place altogether. 
Here, within the table of Contents, care denotes the institutional, residential 
arrangements for the 'looking after' of children. It is not that this is made explicit, or that 
ccare' appears in numerous sub-headings, on the contrary, it appears but 10 times 
(significant, perhaps, in itselo in the whole of the Contents section which is broken down 
into numbered paragraphs with sub-headings covering one or more paragraphs. In all, 
there are 242 paragraph headings in the whole document. Not even then, as one might 
expect, does care appear in any particular context where images of warmth, nurturing, 
understanding, supporting, 'meeting of needs' is suggested, inferred or implied. It is taken 
for granted that we have now entered a different place. The same, but different. And it is 
in the very 'sameness' of the language that this difference is articulated. This is a 
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subterranean level of meaning; everything is the same along the surface but what is 
beneath the crust is 'differently understood'. 
The headings which include direct references to 'care' are as follows: - 
o (paragraph(s)) 1.12: Short Term Care 
e 1.49-1.53: Organisation of Care in Homes 
2.23-2.29 : Health Care 
9 4.45-4.46: Contact with Children in Care 
* 4.21-4.22 : Residential Care (this paragraph relates to contact) 
o 4.26-4.30: The Restriction of Contact with Children in Care: 
o 7.48: Principles Underlying Preparation for Leaving Care 
7.19-7.27: Local Authority Written Policies on Leaving Care 
9 7.57-7.63: After Leaving Care 
9 8.18-8.21 : The Restriction of Liberty of Children Accommodated in Residential 
Care Homes, Nursing Homes, or Mental Nursing Homes 
Of the above, it will be noted that three settings for 'care' are in the context of leaving 
it behind or preparing to do so, three are in relation to contact with children in 'care', or 
the restriction of it and of the remainder, one refers to the organisation of care, one to the 
restriction of liberty of children 'in care', one to short-term care and one to health care. 
With the possible exception of health care, it is clear that we are now within a context 
where 'care' denotes the institution, control and the arrangements for the former and the 
latter. Ironic that in this of all texts it is not in the 'doing of' 'caring' that 'care' is 
prominent or presented in positive context (at least in the Contents page), indeed 'care' is 
signifying differently here, and not in a way in which one might usually recognise if we 
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were not within 'Guidance' i. e., associated with the innocence and vulnerability of the child 
or in a way that resonates with 'family values' and 'care' within the family as a haven of 
nurturing, warmth and security. 'Care' is most prominent in the sense of leaving it behind 
or controlling the contact of children 'in' it. Moreover, references to 'children' arc in 
relation to contact and the restriction of contact and liberty; 'care' figures here only in 
defining their status as in local authority accommodation, as shorthand for that status, a 
mark of that difference. Now, importantly, it is again not that the Guidance omits 
references to those activities that might more normally be affiliated with the 'care' of 
children where 'care' signifies all of those qualities exemplified by the ideal, naturalised 
representation of 'family life', indeed there is within both the Contents page and the main 
body of the text, extensive prescription for this. For example, in section 2: 'Arrangements 
for Placement of Children' there are several paragraphs devoted to the welfare of the 
child, his/her education, consent to treatment, his/her race, culture religion and linguistic 
background. But by this stage traversed from the discourse of 'family' to another territory; 
the landscape is mapped out, meaning is delineated, reconstituted and difference marked 
out. " 
The fact that the Guidance goes to great lengths to detail meticulously all of those 
activities that should be associated with 'good practice' in c1dld care does not simply mean 
that 'care' is there in all but name. Even though it is Cliterally' speaking), it is not, all at 
once, at the same time. It is not that but for the sake of a few semantic idiosyncrasies there 
is no difference in signification of 'care' here as opposed to elsewhere; these seemingly 
innocuous details about where and how 'care' is positioned in the text, peripheral, 
Our use of spatial and other metaphors here and throughout is both deliberate and problematic; it is also in contrast 
to the guidance itself which strains itself to sound literal' and precise in meaning. Its metaphors are those are those 
that would be otherwise regarded as 'dead, but we would regard as very much alive. For our own purposes, we aim 
to surmount the problem by embracing and exemplifying it; since all language is metaphor we make creative use of it. 
How else to articulate the arbitrariness and provisionality of meaning? Crowther (1996), in discussing the idea of 
, self-presence' has noticed a similar difficulty to the one we face here: "Self-consciousness is not self-presence. It is 
rather distributed somewhere in and between the field of lan&iage and other sign-systems, with which we engage 
with the world. My use of the spatial metaphors 'somewhere, 'between, and 'field' here is symptomatic of both our 
inability to articulate the self in purely abstract philosophical terms and, also, how unamen2ble the self is to our 
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marginal, almost imperceptible, are where language is fraying at the edges and the text 
begins to subvert in meaning. If 'care' and caring signify those activities linked to child 
rearing, here those same activities air described at length, but care itself has been shifted to 
the sidelines; it is as if its meaning has been emptied out, reconstituted. 'Care' is not the 
sub-heading beneath which everything that it entails is defined and described, it is divorced 
from all of that, emerging instead on the margins, and left to denote only the institution. 
'Care' has been disembowelled, laid out, its internal workings displayed; the carcass 'care' 
has been discarded, demeaned, devalued, no longer carrying anything of value it is now 
consigned to the margins. 
And yet, because of the attention to detail in the Gu4bnce, its thoroughness, its regard 
for the rninutiae and particulars of 'residential care', the marginalisation of 'care' itself 
seems an irrelevance; to problematise it seems like a tedious exercise in preachy 
didacticism. But it is there, 'care' does only appear ten times out of two hundred and forty 
two sub-headings and its appearance is marked by a deferred signification of meaning and 
difference. Without a deconstructive reading of the text this is not even seen, let alone 
questioned. What this means is that if language is constituting 'reality' as opposed to 
reflecting it, then as far as residential care is concerned a different reality is constructed for 
us and by us and that we are active as readers of the text. It is when we are not expressly 
dealing with 'care', when the 'parentheses are closed' on the subject that the field is then 
open for deconstruction. "Men one rcalises that what was chased off limits, the 
wandering outcast of linguistics, has indeed never ceased to haunt language as its primary 
and most intimate possibility" (Derrida: 1976: 44). 
Derrida's reference is to Saussure's study of linguistics (1959) where it is asserted that it 
is at the point at which the parentheses are closed on 'writing' that the 'field' is open. In 
Derrida's reading of Saussure, it is writing that is the 'wandering outcast'; we can use this as 
common-sense way of thinking about it - as some underlying substance in which our different moments of 
consciousness inhere' (Crowther. 1996: 27) 
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a metaphor in this study for the relationship between 'care' and its textual setting (social 
work discourse) within this document. Where 'care' is on the margins, the Guidance begins 
to articulate the particulars of its signification. By marking out the difference, 'care' as the 
signifier is chased off to the margins, the 'wandering outcast', and yet paradoxically it is 
what is relied upon, i. e., the 'signified' of 'care' that is then elsewhere articulated. Whilst 
ccare' sits on the fence, the Guidance uses its content and substance to describe and explain 
the activity of 'residential'. 
Chapter One: 'Children's Homes! 'Care' as supplement to the institution 
The introduction to Chapter One states that: 
Residential care is a positive and desirable way of providing way of providing 
stability and care for some children wl-ýich they themselves often prefer to other 
kinds of placement. Homes should set out to treat each child as an individual 
person and to promote and safeguard his welfare in every way. In part this will be 
achieved by planning and review of each child's case as required by the Guidance 
and Regulations covering Arrangement of Placements and Review included in 
later chapters. But homes themselves must exercise the concern that a good parent 
would by providing a safe environment which promotes the child's development 
and protects him from exposure to harm in his contacts with other people or 
experiences in the community. 
page 1, para: 1.1 
and further on in the introduction: 
Placements are frequently of short duration and some are made at critical times 
when other arrangements are changing or have broken down. Changes elsewhere 
in the care system such as the efforts to reduce the use of custody for young 
offenders, may also have an effect on the use of children's homes. Children's 
homes are provided for a range of purposes: some are a long-term base for a child 
growing up; others provide accommodation for a period while specific tasks are 
achieved. Some of the children have suffered the most distressing life experiences 
and working with then calls for skills of the highest order. 
page 1, para.: 1.3 
In the construction of the first sentence in paragraph 1.1, residential care and 'care' 
are not necessarily synonymous; the 'care' in the term 'residential care" is not then the 
same as 'care' in the sense of 'stability and care'. Otherwise, presumably residential care 
would be called 'residential stability and care. In creating a differentiation through 
sentence construction, the first sentence allows the inference that residential care needs 
to be flagged up as a positive and desirable way of providing care and stability. 
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Moreover, 'residential', as in where one resides, denotes the place itself, the institution; 
it features prominently as a fixture in the 'way of providing care and stability' that the 
Guidance describes. The 'care' itself then, does not inhere within 'residential care' in the 
way that it does within the sign 'family', for example, but is added on, supplemented, 
albeit at great length and in much detail. It is the 'residential' that is pron-dnent, primary; 
thepkee having precedence over the activities that ensue within, even though the bulk 
of the text is given over to a rigorous explanation of the supplementary activity of 
'care'. Whereas 'family' might be seen as denoting everything that the Guidance tens us 
that residential care standsfor, we do not generally associate 'family' in the same way with 
a place, building or other fixture. 
Nfight this be a moment where the text is opening up to other significations? Is this 
where there is the state leaves a mark of difference pointing to segregation as the 
priority, the relocation and at the extreme, incarceration of the 'other', the potential 
delinquent, the 'problem' child? Is it Mere, despite the saturation of the text with 
positive, affirmative, liberal and paternalistic remonstrations about the needs and 
welfare of the child? This precedence of place, of physical location which requires, by 
its very nature, at least some from of segregation over the supplementarity of caring , 
may be read as a metaphor for the marking out of 'otherness' and of difference within 
the discourse of child welfare. However, this potential for ambivalence is promptly 
assuaged in the same sentence by the affirmation of the 'positive and desirable' 
opportunities residential care provides for 'care and stability'. This needed to be said, 
lest the mask slip. Significant too, perhaps that it is 'to other kinds of placement that some 
children prefer residential'. Other kinds ofplacement ? This is an odd turn of phrase in a 
context where the provision of care and stability are presented as something that can be 
provided in variety of ways, as though this was an open territory where the priority was 
the care and stability and its quality, rather than theform it takes. 
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Clearly then, in this context, when being guided in the ways of providing positive 
care and stability it is in a particularw2y, one which relies on form and location as much 
as anything else. Residential care, we infer, can be a positive preference for children 
only amongst a range of other partiwLzr choices, not as a positive opportunity for care 
and stabilitypff jr, or as good as mg other child rearing/caring context, for example and 
most obviously, the fimily. We arc, of course, assuming that 'other kinds of placement' 
is not intended to imply the family-, or at least not the 'autonomous' family, since as we 
have already noted, Imnily placements' do exist where the state has assumed an 
interventionist role for reasons of non-conforn-ýty. Otherwise, we are most unlikely to 
think of our 'own' children as 'placed' with us. Parents do not normally discuss with 
their children whether they are s2tisfied with the 'placement' (not in these terms 
2nYW2y) and whether or not they would like to consider the range of alternatives (at 
least not unless the state is already assuming some responsibility for the goings on Of 2 
p2rticular family). Tamily' is not one of the placements on offer in amongst the 'other 
kinds'. Wi2t. also of these 'some' children for whom residential care is a "Way of 
providing stability and care"? To be sure, it is not all children for whom residential care 
oray pro-6dc stability and care on the basis of their preference (the preference of each 
and every chi4, but rame children for wbom it ij therr and who may then, and only then, 
express a prcfcrcncc for it. I"his sentence 'sounds' child-centred and 'rights' oricnt2ted 
if the tc2dcr is seduced by the language. I lowever, it is not (or not only, and then only 
just) saying that 'children arc citizens and h2vc the right to at least express 2 preference 
for one of a r2ngc of cqtully valid care 'settings'; far from it; it is beforr (not after) we 
even rc2ch the "choice/prcfcrcncc' element of the sentence that 'some' children are 
21rcady set spirt and only then that the preference may be expressed. Who are these 
children? %'h, 2t sets them spart? Is it their statutory c2rc status or their section 20 
Caccommodstion' under the Act) status? Wliat, if so, arc the sub-di-6sions within these 
Categories and on what are they bi"? Thcsc me un2nswcrcd questions but again, what 
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is clear is that difference is being marked out. Whilst articulating the possibility of 
'choice' for some children, the Guidance is also allowing the reader to deduce that such 
choices are only obtainable once a line has been drawn between the normal and the 
marginal. Here, the notion of children-as-citizens with active rights and choices is 
flagged up in a way that it is not for all children with reference to the form that their 
care and upbringing takes (although it may be in other contexts). 
Despite the point previously made that the Guidance is speaking to an informed 
audience for whom it may well be clear that we are talking in the context of children 
who are either 'accommodated' or in statutory 'care', the point still stands; that 
notwithstanding the positive packaging of residential care in the Guidance, it is only 
tpositive and desirable' i) beyond the primacy of family and fi) inasmuch as the 
'residency' has precedence over the caring, no matter how strenuously the latter is 
promoted. That is, the Guidance expressly and explicitly promotes, endorses and 
prescribes a positive approach to residential care abilst at the same fime ensuring its 
secondariness, its subordination, its difference and &fferance (postponement), 
emphasizing the institution, for which we can read the control, regulation, organisation, 
inspection and arrangements (this is the language of the Guidance) for the care above the 
care itseýfand thus subverting the central tenet of the thesis it proposes. 
This idea of residential care as a 'positive choice' is one of the catch phrases of 
contemporary social work that is and has for some years been expounded widely (see 
Wagner: 1988). It is indeed one of the eminent ironies of the discourse since it is 
invariably preceded by statements which assert the primacy of the family as the 'best' 
place for children. 
'Home' as somewhere 'Other than' 
Returning to the selected text, the second sentence begins: 'Homes should set out to 
treat each child as an individual person... ' Again, our reading begins by resting awhile on a 
seemingly innocuous, even benign sign, in this case, 'homes'. First, 'homes' is situated here 
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in a particular textual and intertextual setting, it does not emerge in a vacuum and has no 
finite meaning; there is instability along the surface in the very structure of the text, and 
the meanings held within are subject to subsidence. It is upon this shaky ground that 
'homes' is situated. 
Gmidance requires that 'Homes sbouldset out... '; already this evocation is not of 'home' as 
the place to which one rrtmms for perhaps, sanctuary or escape or as an 'inner sense' of 
'well being', 'where the heart is', but as something externalized, instrumental, in this case, 
the institution. 
'Home' is conventionally defined as' the place where one lives; the fixed residence of a 
family or household' (OED), or 'members of the family collectively, one's family 
background (OED), or 'an institution for person's needing care, rest or refuge' (OED). 
Here, where 'home'is defined as the residence of the family, it is to the physical site of the 
family's residence that home refers or to the family itself; the residence of the sign 'family' 
in which are presumably subsumed the qualities and characteristics made explicit in the 
third definition 'institution for person's nee&ng carr, rrst or rrfm ge' Imagery in literature 
reflects this notion of home as sanctuary and as engendering a sense of belonging and 
refuge: 
The folly of people's not staying comfortably at home when they canl ... five dull hours in another man's house, with nothing to say or to hear that was not said 
or heard yesterday, and may not be said and heard again tomorrow ... four horses 
and four servants taken out for nothing but to convey five idle, shivering creatures 
into colder rooms and worse company than they night have had at home. 
Jane Austen (1816): Emma ch. 1 3 
Home is the place where, when you have to go there, 
They have to take you in. 
I should have called it 
Something you somehow haven't to deserve. 
Robert Frost (1914): The Dealb of the Hired Man 
'Being' in Care: Deconsaucting Residential Care 161 
Even where there is ambivalence expressed about 'home', it is in terms of a positive 
and affirmative notion of what it ought to be: 
Lingering he raised his latch at eve, 
Ibough tired in heart and limb: 
He loved no other place, and yet 
Home was no home to him 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1798): Tbe Mee Graves pt. 4, sL I 
Family life and 'home' can be good, bad or indifferent, as can residential care. However, 
positive valuations of 'home' are rendered provisional in the context of the Guidance. Thus, 
"It is a most miserable thing to feel ashamed of home" (Charles Dickens, Girat Expectations 
Ch 14 1861) where home is not all the things we expect; 'home' is idealised, imbued with 
positive significations, whatever the 'reality'. The point is that the sign 'home' is only 
regarded as provisional when its status is qualified, e. g. 'home' as the 'institution' in the 
dictionary definition can no longer be relied upon to assume 'care, rest and refuge'. 
For the most part then, home is almost synonymous with family where 'family' is 
almost synonymous with 'care, rest or refuge'. What is implicit in the first two definitions 
is made explicit in third. Noteworthy, then that in the Guidance (as part of the discourse of 
child welfare) it is the Home itself, not the persons who reside (or work) therein ('family' 
or otherwise), that should 'set out to treat each child as an individual person and promote 
and safeguard his welfare in every way'. Whereas 'residential care' signifies primarily the 
institution and segregation, 'home' is not primarily denoting the 'site' (whether literal' or 
metaphorical) within which care is provided but is itself seen as actively treating each child 
as an individual and promoting and safeguarding the child's welfare. 'Home' in the 
'everyday' sense of the term as the place to which one belongs through familial or other 
affiliation is thus transformed. Of course, we are aware that at the level of the 'informed' 
reader, this may seem too manifestly obvious (even pedantic, facile) to be worth stating 
since within the Guidance we are clearly in the business of setting up and providing 'care' by 
the local authority where 'home' in any sense of being associated with family life has been 
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undermined. The point is the same one made throughout; that the 'informed' audience is 
one which is simply informed 'differently'; that is, despite appearances, not bestowed with 
any greater degree of certainty about what actually 'is' than anyone else. To this extent, an y 
'reader' becomes equally a player in the game, a participant in the discourse since the 
boundaries are artificial, uncertain and open rather than 'real', fixed and closed. In this 
way, all that the sign 'home' does (by causing us fleetingly, if at an, to reflect that obtiously, it 
is signifying differently here) is to point to the difference (the mark of 'otherness) and 
deferment (&fferance - the 'postponement' of the 'non-absence' of 'homeD, effectively, very 
effectively, placing it under erasure (Heidegger: 1959), almost (but not quite) imperceptibly. 
Put another way, we take for granted that 'home' is signifying differently, see this as 
unproblematic and as such, it is, in the same moment given over to a 'higher authority', in 
this case the state. Again, there is no conspiracy here, the reader is active in reconstituting 
meaning and cannot do otherwise since we inhabit the discourse that we are describing-, 
but we can point it out, say it is there, give it a name. 
'Home' as an Instrument 
The fact that the Guidance, having transgressed, has to immediately compensate for the 
loss of meaning by pointing out what would, in any other context, be taken as read (that 
'home' is the metaphorical or physical place in which one's welfare is promoted and 
safeguarded) means that something else and something more is being signified here. In 
describing what the 'home' should 'set out' to do, 'home' is being attributed with specific 
functions. Since these functions are variable, (which they must be or the Guidance would 
take it for granted and not need to state them), they are secondary, supplementary to 
'home' in describing not what 'home"is' but what it 'does'. In other words, by needing to 
prescribe the function of homes, we learn what homes are not, not what they are in the 
context of local authority care. What they 'are' is indeterminate anyway, since meaning 
cannot be fixed. In the context of the Guidance we are unable to take for granted that 
which seems patently obvious. In place of 'home' as 'sanctuary, haven, a site of intimacy, 
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warmth, security, imbuing a 'sense of belonging', here, home is both institution and 
instrument; the private and autonomous substituted by the public and regulated. 
Where 'home' points to 'family'; care, refuge etc. are embraced within the meaning; 
where 'home' is in part synonymous with 'institution' and in part an 'agent' itself delivering 
the 'promotion of welfare', other connotations absent themselves. Even though welfare, 
care and individual treatment are immediately spelled out as activities that the home 
undertakes, this is already too late; the sign 'home', (like 'care' previously) has been 
emptied of meaning and rendered barren and momentarily bereft, only to be then 
reconstituted as 'instrument of the state which delivers care and the promotion of welfare 
deemed necessary'. This happens through both the grammatical use and construction of 
the sentence, as well as in the signification 'home' acquires. 'Home', is the institution in 
action, not simply the place within which care and the promotion of welfare are provided 
by persons. Despite making explicit the need for children to be treated as individuals, the 
manner in which this is to be achieved is through the process of following guidance and 
procedures - that is to say impersonally, via the systems of the institution and devoid of 
reference to the persons providing the safeguarding and promotion of welfare. And it is 
achieved, at least 'in part' by the 'planning and review of each child's case as required by 
the Guidance and Regulations covering 'Arrangement of Placements and Review'. 
'Exposure to Hartn': Identifying potential disruption 
The second half of the same paragraph goes on to qualify the role and function of the 
home: 
But homes themselves must exercise the concern that a good parent would by 
providing a safe environment which promotes the child's development and 
protects him (sic) from exposure to harm in his contacts with other people or 
e3Tcriences in the community. 
Again, this seems straightforward enough. Here, as well as following the Guidance, 
homes are given a degree of autonomy in the exercising of concern (that of a 'good 
parent') and in providing a safe environment for development and protection from harm. 
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Whereas it is the 'home' (de-personalised and instrumental) that must show the concern, 
when it comes to the 'harm', it is other 'people' (not society in general or elements within) 
as well as experiences from which the child must be protected. Within the volume as a 
whole, references to the individual subject are scant. It is as if there are no individual 
cactors' in the provision of care; throughout the text, references to those who work within 
residential care are to 'staff' as a homogenous group (see para. 1.28: Establishment 
Numbers' as an example). In the context of potential harm, though, it is 'people' who 
emerge incongruously from the text, out of place somehow; in the 'wrong' context. The 
'wrongness' and incongruity of this particular word-sign serves to emphasise the necessity 
of containment and regulation of those within the institution. Its presence within the text 
is as a metaphor for the relationship between the state and the individual. In a text that 
seems to pride itself on the use of 'official', 'departmental', 'government-spcak; de- 
personalised, institutionalised, bureaucratic, this seems a telling lapse, a chink in the 
armour. When the care and protection come from the state, exposure to harm comes 
from contact with other 'people'. Moreover, exposure to other people as a positive 
component of the child's development is not mentioned. All that is safe, positive, certain 
comes from the institution; the spectre of harm materialises in the contact with the 
outside world, 'people' or 'experiences in the community'. It is not even a particular group 
of 'other people' that is identified, just 'other people' in general. Is this all people, or just 
some? Since harm comes of contact, maybe the 'people' referred to are those with whom 
the child is deemed likely to have contact with, otherwise why make the reference at an? 
Those with whom the child has perhaps had former association with; family, friends, 
members of the same community or group to which the child previously belonged. 
Perhaps it is those who also present a threat not so much to the child as to the institution 
or even the state. Those who might incite the child to rebel or rekindle the embers of 
delinquency or deviance. Although common sense (however uncommon) tells us that that 
at one level the child will need protection from harm to ensure his/her welfare, it is in the 
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inter-textuality, or if preferred, the 'second order signification' (Barthes: 1957) of the 
Guidance that something else and something more is signifying. At 'face value, the 
protection from harm is both appropriate and laudable, it is also what is not 'said'; that 
which is present by its absence which inheres in the meaning. 12 
For this study, this is not some peripheral, marginal, semantic weakness or idiosyncrasy 
in the text. Whilst the Guidance is what it says it is, a framework for the running and 
regulation of residential care for children, it is also a 'playing out' of residential care itself, 
an active, live participant in an incessant interpretation and re-interpretation of what 
residential care 'stands for'. It is 'open', 'fluid', amorphous, as 'empty' as it is 'full'; rather 
than shifting or in some way 'progressing' the status of residential care it inhabits and is 
accommodated ýy the discourse of child welfare. Even in its very use of the metaphor 
'framework', it infers structure, fixture and certainty where there is none; something more 
dynamic and nebulous is at work. Inasmuch as change may be effected, in the sense of 
achieving 'better' regulation or even measurable improvements in the quality of care 
provided, this is incidental to the GA(idance which is but one player in the field of 
signification, albeit a prominent one. 
%Positive and Desirable Option'? 'Placements', Care System, 'Specific Tasks' 
Turning to paragraph 1.3, the second selection of text cited above, the reader is able to 
discern more clearly the same thematic paradox and contradiction that runs throughout 
the Guidance, undermining and subverting it at every twist and turn. Here, the way in which 
homes should be 'used' (para. 1.3) is described in more detail. The pronouncements made 
previously about residential care as a 'positive and desirable way of providing care and 
stability for some children' now begin to seem less likely to be realised in practice. Further 
within the text now, away from the sweeping rhetoric of the opening paragraph, the 
12 To draw a visual analogT, we can look through a window at the street outside, the buildings opposite and the cars 
parked on the roadside. But if we concentrate on looking at the window, the street outside is still there and we are 
still looking at ; equally if we concentrate on the street outside, we are still looking at the window, even though we 
would say that we are looking through it; one inheres in the other, regardless of where our attention is drawn. 
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shadows cast begin to take on a more discernible form. 
Without even a line by line reading, certain words and phrases begin to catch the 
attention which point the reader to multiple, often oppositional significations, always 
already held within the text, 'hidden', but not concealed, ripe for deconstruction. 
Examples are; 'placements', 'care system', 'base for a child growing up', 'specific tasks'. 
Only a very residual notion of 'home' in the usual sense now remains. 'Home' is not 
somewhere first and foremost to simply 'Eve' or even 'stay' temporarily (although it might 
be secondarily or incidentally, it is not the primary function); it is where one is 'placed' as 
the object of concern (concern both for the child as innocent 'Victim' of circumstance and 
about the child as potential or actual delinquent). 'Placements' have both duration and 
specific purpose; nothing wrong in this per se, but it is a distinguishing feature of this 
particular signification since duration and purpose of 'home' are not normally spelled out 
in this way, even if both are features of it. In residential care, duration and purpose are 
particularly significant, so much so as to warrant being mentioned. 11ey have precedence 
over other, more familiar characteristics of 'home' that are in this context, subjugated. 
With a close reading, the statements 'placements are frequently of short duration and some 
are made at critical times when other arrangements arc changing or have broken down' 
and 'Changes elsewhere in the care system ... may also have an effect on the use of 
children's homes' signify how the care system is to be used two main ways. 
Firstly, the idea of residential care as 'positive and desirable' seems increasingly unlikely 
where it is a response to 'critical dines' or where 'arrangements' have changed or broken 
down. 'Arrangements' (broken down or otherwise) implies public care arrangements 
(presumably fostering), as opposed to 'family', in which case residential care may be likely 
to be perceived as the 'depository' for foster placements' failures, rather than a positive 
alternative to family life. On the one hand, Guidance is beginning to define more clearly the 
csome children' (para. 1.1) for whom residential care can be a 'positive and desirable' (para. 
1.1) option, whilst at the same time somewhat ironically allowing the inference to be 
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drawn that the route into residential care is likely to be negative and earmarked for those 
already within the sphere of public care when other, more 'positive' alternatives have 
failed. 
Whilst it should be emphasized that this does not preclude the possibility that in the 
creal' world, residential care is not a first option in some cases, or that this cannot be a 
positive choice or experience for the individual child, the point is that this text 'works' as a 
metaphor for the way in which the 'system' of residential care also 'works' - to ensure a 
particular role for residential which places value, by virtue of what it does not say as much 
as what it does, and with subtlety but sureness, on a particular social ordering which relies 
on the exclusion of some in order to define the 'mainstream'. Language here is not 
reflecting or neutrally describing what is going on in the world 'outside', it is wholly, 
entirely, down to the last letter, active with the reader in constructing the 'social'. 
Metaphor itself becomes almost a misnomer here, it is more than that; we do not 
cexpertly' read the hidden metaphors within the text in order to then turn our attention 
back into the social world, as if it were somewhere else; it is all here; any distinction 
between the literal and the metaphoric has collapsed, dissolved; it was never 'there' in the 
first place. Deconstructive readings must seek to unlock the metaphoric structure of the 
text since 
metaphors are not reducible to 'truth, their own structures "as suchý' are part 
of the textuality (or message) of the text", thus "we come back simply... to the 
awareness that both literature and its criticism must open itself to a deconstructive 
reading, that criticism does not reveal the "truth" of literature, just as literature 
reveals no 'truth'. 
Spivak: 1976: lxxv 
Secondly, we note that children's homes are subject to the impact of 'changes 
elsewhere in the care system'. Once more, this points to homes as part of the overall 
system, changes in which have primacy in the structuring and ordering of those who are 
subjects of the system over the subjects themselves. An example of the sort of changes we 
might expect to effect the 'use' of homes is given as 'the efforts to reduce the use of 
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custody for young offenders'. Here, the previous reference to care as positive and desirable 
for 'some' children is further clarified; in reducing the 'need' for custody, children who 
offend may be accommodated within the 'care system'. This group, then, of children and 
young people will presumably be directed by the courts to reside in the care of the local 
authority and it might therefore be likely, or even desirable that this is seen, at least to some 
extent, if not entirely as an explicitly punitive measure, despite the 'positive and desirable' 
ambitions in the text. We can read this change in the use of the care system as an 
indication of greater humanitarianism as easily as it can be interpreted as a different way of 
controlling, managing and regulating delinquency; a way, perhaps more compatible with 
the current discourse of child welfare and delinquency. At the same time as the Guidance 
stresses in great detail the need for homes to take account of individual needs and 
preferences it always does this in such a way as to emphasise the use of the care system in 
ordering, classifying and regulating 'groups' of children, sometimes openly identifying 
certain groups e. g. offenders, but most of the time by marking out in the language signs' 
that it is regulation, institutionalisation and containment that have precedence over and 
beyond the individual. 
The example of a reduction in the use of custody is but one example of the changes 
that can have 'an effect on the use of children's homes'. It is, however, the only example 
that we are given. Whatever the other changes are, they are changes in The gslemý the 
system is the 'given' here, a changing system to accommodate a changed legislative 
framework for the care, welfare and protection of 'some' children. Shifting, changing, 
multi-faceted, dynamic; a complex interchange of meaning, and of meaning of meaning. 
Children themselves do not seem to figure in all of this change. The final two sentences 
of the paragraph do, however, go on to explain further the range of purposes for which 
children's homes are provided: 'a long-term base for children growing up; 
... accommodation 
for a period while specific tasks are achieved. So, where residential care 
does have a role that resonates with a conventional understanding of 'home, - 'long-term' 
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- it is as a long term 'base'; here, would it not be a prime opportunity to 'set the record 
straight' and establish residential care as, simply 'home' for some children? Instead, where 
long-term arrangements are required, 'homes' arc pmtided for the purpose of a 'base' for 
the 'child growing up. When 'home' in the text gets as close in meaning as it probably could 
to commonly -held understandings of 'home', it is immediately distanced. Even though we 
are no longer talking placements for long-term arrangements, we arc still not talking 'home', 
but institution. This is verified further by the reference to the provision of 
accommodation in order to achieve 'specific tasks'. Here, home is no resting place, escape 
or sanctuary but the place of instruction, training, treatment and preparation for what is to 
come. It is temporary, functional, purposeful and transient; never the place where "when 
you go there, they have to take you in... something, somehow you haven't to deserve" or 
to which, once left, you return. 
Statement of Purpose and Function of ChYdren's Home (pam. M&Mh 
Regulation in Practice 
This further selection from Chapter One of the Guidame relates to Regulation 4 which 
(requires the responsible authority to compile and maintain a statement of the purpose and 
functions of the home' (para. 1.16, p. 5-6). 
Paragraph 1.17 (p. 5) begins to set out the main requirements of the statement and is 
reproduced in full below: - 
As regards the purpose and objectives of the home it may be helpful to note 
that, in general, children no longer spend a large proportion of their childhood 
growing up in residential care. Increasingly, homes have adjusted to meet the 
particular needs of children during a phase of their career in care and have 
adopted various approaches to the care of children. For example, some homes 
work with children to prepare for a definite goal in a task centred manner, other 
homes attempt to reproduce family life and support children into adulthood; 
certain homes attempt to create a therapeutic milieu and work with children 
psychologically damaged by abuse; still other homes are geared to addressing a 
child's unacceptable behaviour by means of a systematic behavioural regime. The 
statement of purpose should describe what the home sets out to do, but should 
not unduly restrict the possibility of development of good practice. It is hoped 
that an increasing variety of imaginative and positive approaches to the residential 
care of children will develop. 
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In this section, the heading itself is noteworthy; it is beneath the bold heading 
'Regulations' that the statement of 'purpose and function' is positioned, immediately 
constructing a particular way of thinldng about the home that catches the attention 
because of the incongruent juxtaposition of 'home' with 'purpose' and 'function'. Not 
until this point in the text has this requirement been made quite so explicit. Even on the 
page itself, the word 'home', at the end of the sentence 'Statement of Purpose and 
Function of Children's Home' (N. B. not 'the' Children's Home) and beneath the yet 
bolder heading 'Regulations' qooks' (appears, 'reads asý somehow 'chased off' to the 
edaes, not central, but peripheral, almost lost, abject, 'other than'. The confidence, self- 
assuredness of 'regulation', 'purpose, 'function" emphasisc and play into perhaps already 
ambivalent notions of 'home'. 'Outside' of the Guidance any such ambivalence about 
'home' may be assuaged by highly charged, emotive but generally positive connotations 
with 'family', 'security', 'autonomy', etc.; here within the text 'home' is loosened, left free- 
floating in anticipation of a reckoning with 'purpose' and 'function'. " 
'Home' is signifying differently and in spite of the Guidanci's previously declared 
intention to ensure the welfare, care and protection of children in residential. And again, at 
one level, any informed professional will doubtless acknowledge the need for advice and 
instruction given that in the absence of either the history of children's homes is blighted 
by incidents of institutionalised abuse, oppressive regimes and the abuse of power by 
adults left to their own devices (Pindown and Frank Beck are among the most obvious of 
the many available examples). However, none of the above diminishes the authority the 
Guidance exercises in constructing and informing a wider nexus of negotiation within the 
milieu of the 'social'. By taking on the mantle of care and protection of vulnerable 
13 If we pause for a moment and imagine Governmental Guidance being sent to every home in the land prescribing in 
such explicit terms that each family home shall have a 'purpose and function' it would, no doubt be met with 
indignation and outrage, a threat to democracy and family autonomy. In this context, however, the effect is merely of 
a questioning, a resignation and an anticipation of the apparently 'necessary' advice to follow. 
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children"), Guidance can legitimately exercise a degree of regulation and control that would, 
in most other contexts, be regarded as unacceptable in a liberal democracy, an affront to 
self-determination and 'freedom'. Instead, within the text, regulation is 'read' as necessary, 
appropriate and as ensuring welfare and protection, even 'rights' in prescribing the need 
for children to exercise 'choice' and have a say in decision-maldng (see particularly Chapter 
2: Arrangements For Placement of Children, para. 2.47: p. 48). 
'ne point is that the Guidance works in such a way as to regulate all of the above; in 
articulating choice, the Guidance proscribes choice, in articulating care, protection and 
welfare, the Guidance serves to regulate notions of childhood and adolescence; not controlling 
as such but trgulating, defining the limits of, setting parameters. The Guidance works 
opportunistically, it seizes upon the otherwise unacknowledged but always already 
absence/presence of the sign and fills it with meaning - provisionally, temporarily, 
contextually. Thus 'home', elsewhere imbued with signification in plenitude, is, simply by 
virtue of its textual (context) setting, unproblematically 'open', empty and amenable to 
reconstituted meaning. 
Problernatising Children 'In Care' 
Paragraph 1.17, regarding the 'purpose and objectives' of the home, suggests that it is 
'helpful' to note that children no longer spend a large proportion of their childhood 
growing up in residential care. To the lay person, it might be inferred from this statement 
that children spend a shorter period of time in public care than previously, and are, for 
most of their childhood, looked after within the family. Vfi-ýdlst this may or may not be 
empirically true, the inference is swiftly rendered irrelevant in the following sentence: 
'Increasingly, homes have adjusted to meet the particular needs of children during their 
carrer in care and have adopted various approaches to the care of children' (my italics). So, 
14 Vulnerable, it might be added, not only by virtue of falling outside of the protection of what 'family' should be, but 
also, more significantly, by virtue of the status of being in the care of the state as evidenced by the aforementioned 
abuses of power within state 'care' 
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wl-ýlst children spend less time in residential care, we infer from the somewhat bizarre 
notion of 'career in care' that when not in residential they arc still in some form of public 
care (presumably foster care primarily but perhaps also in other arrangements, for example 
subject to care orders but living within the family, or in secure accommodation). After all, 
residential now forms part of a 'career' in care as opposed to temporary or short break 
respite arrangements where children are still living within the family. We can only infer 
this, since it is not made explicit, but it seems that once a cud is 'in care', whatever the 
individual circumstances a 'career' has been embarked upon, the child is 'marked out, once 
and for all as falling within the remit of the Guidance. 
In any case, homes have 'adjusted to the particular needs of children' accordingly; not, 
it seems, to the particular needs of some children or the needs of particular children; all 
children experiencing residential 'care' are thus marked out as different, regardless of how 
diverse the circumstances by which they arrive at that experience. So, we might argue, 
residential care is not just identifying groups of children as different, but certain families as 
well that fall within the regulatory framework of Guidance, even (or so it seems) those 
families that might enter into 'voluntary' (Section 20 'Accommodation' in the Children Act 
1989) respite-type arrangements where residential is being presented overtly as a form of 
support to the family which retains primary responsibility for the child. This reading of 
Guidance would seem to be compatible with the idea that beneath the guise of 'support', a 
seemingly benevolent state is permitted to draw more families into widening spheres of 
regulation and surveillance. 
Paragraph 1.17 goes on to give examples of the 'various approaches to the care of 
children' that homes have adopted. In the previous section pertaining to paragraph 1.3, it 
is the 'function' of residential over and above the idea of 'home' simply as a place to 'be', a 
refuge, that has precedence. Whether it be through processes of 'normalisation' 
Creproduce family Efe), 'reform' ('systematic behavioural regime) or 'therapy' (work with 
children psychologically damaged by abuse), the home here is indeed defined as both 
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purposeful and functional. It is clear that Guidance is in the business of classifying, 
categorising, treating, reforming, addressing the apparently muld-various 'needs' of 
children as much as it is about accepting children and providing any semblance of what 
would be commonly understood as 'home'. 
What all the examples Guidance offers have in common is a view of children in 
residential care as problematised; constructions of 'needs' which are often individualised or 
pathologised and where the emphasis of 'home' is on 'function' and 'purpose', segregation, 
adjustment, treatment, rather than acceptance and inclusion. The examples serve to inform 
and negotiate an understanding of 'childhood' in which 'children' are silent as the objects 
of concern and attention, absent, yet constructed conceptually by a variety of referents, by 
'reference to', in their absence, other signs. 'Me examples are all at once lucid, relevant and 
intelligible to the discourse Guidance inhabits in articulating a construction of children's 
needs whilst simultaneously infiltrating the sign 'home' with such dissociative meanings 
that we can by now do anything but take 'home' for granted, indeed, this 'message' and 
weighting of 'home' ensures our continued attention to GuUwce, we need to know more, 
are now relying on Guidance (rather than our own intuitions, experience or knowledge) 
more than ever to elucidate on what children's homes are 'for'. The reader is drawn, 
unassumingly into reconstructing 'home', and crucially in a way that is not in the least 
chaUenging, threatening or which warrants question. Quite the reverse: we are reassuringly 
led into the arena of 'meeting children's needs' wherein there is a familiar, comforting play 
of signification about notions of childhood and children as variously 'innocents', 'victims', 
(potentially delinquent' etc. but all 'in need' of some form of 'moulding, 'shaping', 
'reform'. 
Although we arrive at this renegotiation of our own volition, through a reasoning and 
exchange with the text itself (intertextuality), we areguided 4 the text and we take on and 
construct 'home' in a way that in other 'textual settings' would more likely be met with 
resistance. Further, this received 'knowing', 'emptying' of the sign 'home' (as if it were 'full' 
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elsewhere) as something that, at our peril, we 'take for granted' is subsequently and 
continually played out and replayed in practice, in the context of children's experience of 
residential care in such a way that they too will need to understand that 'home' is 
conditional, provisional, purposeful and functional, not to be taken for granted. In this 
, gulations 
Vol-IV is as much about the way, the Gividance and Re guidance and regulation of 
groups of children themselves as it is about 'children's homes'. This is where the state is 
operating on one level at its most exposed and explicit in relation to the marginalised. In 
marking out difference it is able to legitimate, prescribe and classify in a way that, if 
attempted in respect of those further in from the edges and towards the mainstream 
'[social', would necessitate a much more subtle, not to say delicate, approach if controversy 
were to be avoided. 
Having said aU of the above, paragraph 1.17 seems to be indicating that some purposes 
and functions are more likely to be successful than others. Whereas some homes 'Work 
with children to prepare for a definite goal in a task-centred manner' or 'are geared to 
addressing a child's unacceptable behaviour by means of a systematic behavioural regime' 
and are apparently already in the business of achieving these functions unproblematically, 
other homes only tentatively 'attempt to reproduce family life' or 'attempt to create a 
therapeutic milieu and work with children psychologically damaged by abuse' (my italics). 
Why the sensitivity and uncertainty here and not with other purposes of homes? In our 
reading we cannot simply dismiss this feature of the text as inconsequential, arbitrary, 
incidental and peripheral, on the contrary, this is precisely what should attract our 
attention. Noteworthy that the purposes about which there is no expressed doubt are 
those which pertain most explicitly to controlling and regulatory aspects of the regime of 
residential care. Maybe there is doubt about home's ability to work in a 'task centred 
manner towards definite goals' or to establish a 'systematic behavioural regime' but why 
else qualify two of the examples of purposes with the Preface 'attempt' and not the 
others? After all, without the Preface 'attempt', doubt would never have found a way 
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through the text in the first place. It is Guidance that raises the possibility of doubt, which 
then casts a shadow elsewhere. As it stands, it is beneath the shadow of doubt that some 
purposes wiU be 'attempted'. 
Perhaps here again the text is subliminally, inadvertently and 'against itself' 
acknowledging the implausibility, possibly even the undesirability of homes actually 
'reproducing family life' completely. How far could this 'reproduction' go? A 'copy' of 
family life in its entirety, including the reproduction of offspring? In the first place, 
Guidance would first need to know what family life 'is' in order to offer Guidance to facilitate 
such a reproduction. More to the point, given the (decon-) structuring of meaning in the 
text so far, is not any 'attempt' in this capacity moir likely to reproduce or represent what 
family fife 'is nof than anything, and by the same logic, paradoxically, the more any such 
attempt tried to get close to what family life 'is', the further away it would find itself? " The 
etymology of 'attempt' lies in the Latin temptarr meaning 'tempt', it also has a less familiar 
usage as 'an attack, assault' (OED) ; perchance in these deferred significations in the text 
there is a tempting to or of 'family' life, an aspiration towards what is 'not, absent and 
deferred, pointing outwards to where 'family' 'ought' to be and inwards to what it is 
resolutely not. 
Conceivably, it may be reasoned that in the interests of 'balance' Gmidance would wish to 
offer a set of examples of 'purpose and function' that reflect (construct) a whole spectrum 
of 'needs' children may have. Not weighting the balance too far towards the controlling, 
regulatory aspects of 'care' (with terms like 'prepare for a definite goal', 'task centred 
manner', 'addressing unacceptable behaviour', 'systematic behavioural. regime), Gmidance 
15 As we pursue our line of enquiry of this text we can begin to see more clearly how the text ýýbldsl before us in 
such a way as to show that the ýGuidance' and the 'texe are no longer synonymous. One inheres in the other, and in 
terms of the physical inscription on the page they are one and the same, word for word, page for page, but the text 
also unfolds autonomously, often away from and against what we are 'nan-ling' the Guidance. In this 
conceptualisation, ýGuidance' is but a reading of the text, one which fits into the discourse of social work, whereas 
the text opens itself out interminably to intertextuality, undermining and working against the logic' of the ýGuidance. 
N. B. Although this conceptualisation is a structuring itself, based on the coupling Guidance/text, it is one that is 
immediately susceptible to collapse; the primacy and centricity of the Guidance is shattered by the always/alfeady 
deconstructing text; 'we' do not 'deconstruce the text, it deconstructs itself. 
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includes examples that are connotative with notions of children as vulnerable, passive and 
innocent (reproduce family life', 'support into adulthood', create a therapeutic milieu) 
whilst making them provisional. At the same time as Guidance 'guides' towards purposes of 
the 'home' that are benign, inclusive, responsive, appropriate to a liberalist understanding 
of children as 'in need' in a variety of ways, it also brings in alongside and, more critically, 
gives precedence (by saying what some purposes ail/ be while others will only allemplea) to 
those purposes which emphasise control, reform and regulation. All of this happens in a 
way which seems eminently reasonable; it is only with the contextual insertion of 'attempt' 
that the text begins to fray, little by little at first, and only at the edges, but inevitably 
loosening the meaning sufficiently for the text to deconstruct itself. 'Attempt', no longer 
marginal and almost inconsequential to the grammatical structure of the paragraph, is 
central and pivotal in elucidating 'meaning'. 
The contention that within the given list of examples there is precedence of some over 
others is underscored further into the section headed 'Regulations'. 'Systemised 
behavioural regimes' come to feature again in paragraphs 1.82 - 1.90 under the sub- 
headings 'Good Order and Discipline', 'Disciplinary Measures - General', 'Permitted 
Disciplinary Measures' and 'Prohibited Measures. Unlike the other examples of purposes 
listed, 'systemised behavioural regimes' are the subject of extended discussion in the above 
paragraphs. Nowhere else in this chapter, or in the whole volume are managers, policy- 
makers and practitioners offered any further explicit Guidance about the purposes cited as 
'reproduction of family life' or 'therapeutic milieu. 'Mere is Guidance relating to areas that 
might be seen as components of the said purposes, such as 'Health"J1.92 -1.104), 
'Education' (1.115 - 1.120), 'Welfare' (2.5), 'Consultation' (2.45 -2.46), but none of these 
are contextualised within 'therapeutic milieu' or 'reproduction of family life' purposes or 
placed under headings pertaining to the former or the latter. Whilst health, education etc., 
may clearly also form a part of a systen-lised behavioural regime, it is this particular purpose 
that apparently warrants further explanation and Guilance and is singled out over and 
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above the others. 
The Precedence of the System 
In paragraphs 1.82 -1.90 it is the word-sign 'system' ('a complex whole', 'organiscd 
body' 'principles of procedure or classification' are amongst the OED definitions) and its 
repetition, threading throughout the text and echoing 'systemised behavioural regime' in 
paragraph 1.17 that ensures its primacy even where it is in the context of offering Guidance 
to ensure the welfare of children. For example, 'Difficulties in control win arise where the 
objectives of the home are not well defined and consequently not well understood by staff 
or where children do not understand the reason for their placement. Systems of control and 
discipline cannot be divorced from gstems of management and ystems of care practice and 
planning within the home' (paragraph: 1.82, my italics) and further on; 'there should be a 
system of rewards (commendations, extension of privileges etc. ) as wen as sanctions' 
(paragraph 1.90). In the end, then, all homes should subscribe to 'systemised bchavioural 
regimes' of some End or another, regardless of whatever their 'attempts' may be in terms 
alternative 'purpose and function' or the extent to which that purpose or function is 
consistent, contradictory or in conflict with the 'system'. 'System', then, along with all the 
signifying regalia that goes with it, is the prescribed common denominator, not by virtue of 
Guidance explicitly saying that residential care shall be about the systernised regulation, 
scrutiny, control, classification of groups of children and to an extent, their families, but by 
not saying it and expressing all of those characteristics that are positively, reassuringly 
associated with care, welfare, protection, etc., in telms of and as a function of 'system'. In 
order to necessarily differentiate, construct &fferance, fill the void, the absence of 'family' 
with a 'presence'. 
And yet, notwithstanding all of the above, in the very same paragraph (1.90) and in the 
face of this elevation and pre-eminence of system, we read the following-. - 'Children in 
homes are likely, because of the yslem to be confronted as to the consequences of their 
actions by numerous adults; this often serves merely to compound misbehaviour and 
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undermine the child's esteem'. Here, the role of staff is to limit and compensate for the 
acknowledged 'deficits', or the worst excesses of 'system' as the invariable, inevitable 
constant at the same time as the system is being promoted and endorsed as the appropriate 
means by which unacceptable behaviour and 'acceptable' behaviour' Csystem of rewardsD 
is to be addressed. This is in spite of the fact that the reference is to the 'numerous adults' 
(who will work on a rota 'system) as part of the system of running the children's home, 
not the behavioural regime itself. However, it is still the 'system, (not the number, 
behaviour, attitudes or values of the 'adults' themselves) that will result in children being 
confronted by the consequences of their actions in a way which 'serves merely to 
compound misbehaviour and undermine the child's self esteem'. To this extent, it is in the 
design of the system to compound misbehaviour and undern-dne the child's self esteem, 
the very opposite of what the Guidance is simultaneously supposed to be ensuring against. 
This 'trace' (Derrida: 1976), a 'mark' of what is always already hidden, ffickering in the 
shadowy recesses of the text serves to generate an occlusion of meaning through 
repetition (Bronfen: 1992). '6 
Here is the construction (between the text, reader and 'discourse) of the system as a 
necessag evil (or, possibly more accurately, simply 'necessary) which Guidance aims to 
ensure is implemented within a context of current understandings of childhood and 
children and the consequent need for a balance between 'care and control', discipline and 
reward. It must be sufficiently liberal, but not excessively punitive; humanitarian, 
progressive, but all within the necessary system and with due regard for its Emits. In the 
process of exhaustively describing the need for disciplinary measures and 'rewards' to be 
16 The repetition that succeeds perfectly is destructive, according to Bronfen, because of is an "occlusion of 
approximation and difference". (Bronfen: 1992: 325) For our purposes, the approximation and distance afforded to 
'systene, (that which allows it to signify differently) is through the description of all of those activities designed to 
ensure care and welfare (as against the 'pure' system or perfect institution which organises, proceduralises, classifies 
and has precedence over the 'individual) but is obliterated by the repetition of the term which eventually unmasks as 
self-identical. This contradiction in the text, the perfect repetition (which is destructive, resulting in occlusion) 
occurs, albeit momentarily, at the sentence "Children in homes are likely, because of the system, to be confronted as 
to the consequences of their actions by numerous adults; this often serves merely to compound rnisbehaviour and 
undermine the child's self esteem" (paragraph 1.90) 
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fair and reasonable and what those measures should be, the presuppositions which 'prop 
up' the 'system' both in the text and the context of residential care (in practice) are taken 
for granted, unexplained, assumed and tberrforr 'necessary'; indeed it is the 'system' itself 
which becomes almost synonymous with all that is fair, reasonable and just; all the more so 
for acknowledging its hmitations in ensuring the latter. 
The Simultaneous Promotion and Marginalisation of 'Good Practice' 
There is a resonance here in the final two sentences of paragraph 1.17 which follows 
the list of examples of 'purpose and function'. The paragraph ends: 'The statement of 
purpose should describe what the home sets out to do, but should not unduly restrict the 
possibility of development of good practice. It is hoped an increasing variety of 
imaginative and positive approaches to the residential care of children will develop. The 
cstatement of purpose' itself, is 'outside of 'the possibility of .. good practice' which is 
evidently only a 'possibility' anyway. It should clearly take account of and not 'unduly 
restrict' good practice but it has primacy over it and it may, by implication at least, duly 
restrict it where circumstances require. It must describe what the home 'sets out to do', 
what it must achieve inasmuch as the parameters of the text allow for this; i. e. to the 
extent that certain functions, as indicated above, have precedence over others and within 
the space, the territory that is marked out by the text. 
The notion of 'good practice' emerges latterly in the text, as an adjunct, an caccessory' 
to the alleged purpose, whatever that might be. 'Good practice', that which Guidance 
proposes to ensure, is situated somewhat redundantly and not elucidated. Its status is as an 
appendage, an afterthought, something to be given due consideration beyond and beneath 
primary functions. It is, again, the 'home' that will 'do' and what it will do will not 'unduly 
restrict', but will determine the possibility of good practice. Now, we might safely assume 
that if the purpose did restrict unduly the development of good practice this would meet 
with disapproval and that accordingly most statements will accommodate it; indeed many 
will be immersed in the signifying paraphernalia of 'good practice'; but this is to 
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misconceive the subtlety of regulation whose power Res in a proficiency to furnish itself 
with the emblems and insignia of 'good practice' at the same time as retaining particular, 
regulatory imperatives. 
Hence, it is only 'hope' that is left as far as 'imaginative and positive' approaches to the 
task are concerned: 'It is hoped that... '; a yearning, longing that on the margins of what 
must be, what is always already, a necessary absence, 'good practice' will linger, driven to 
the edges: 
What is hope? nothing but the paint on the face of Existence; the least touch 
of truth rubs it off, and then we see what a hollow-cheeked harlot we have got 
hold of 
Byron: cited in Marchand: 1975 
In a text that reverberates and resounds with certainty, sureness, self-confidence, 
authority, there is more than irony in the prefacing of 'imaginative and positive approaches 
to the care of children' with 'hope'; that which is contemplative, frail, expectant, 
anticipatory. It is only here that the text 'gives way' to the uncertain; the need to guard 
against the uncertain is exemplified by this textual positioning; fear of non-regulation, the 
unrestrained articulation of otherness, outside of regulation, the 'Voice' of exclusion. Not 
that 'good practice' itself gives voice, but that it holds the possibility to concede to the 
other, points outward, entertains that possibility; that concession must be restrained, 
ordered, expressed in a particular way that is secondary to the regulatory imperative which 
must itself be sufficiently imbued and 'dressed up' with the language of 'good practice'. 
It can only be hope (as opposed to certainty) that figures (that which is figured) in 
order to assuage the fear of collapse where the construction of the 'other' is 
deconstructed; without the need first and fommost for regulation, classification etc., 
difference (&fferance) no longer holds up. Even though, on one level, that of a common- 
sense understanding, the Guidance is about ensuring good practice, it says no more on how 
plation and Guidance, much espoused but ill- to ensure it in the context of the necessary Re 
defined, indeterminate and subordinate and not extrapolated. 'Practice', as a playing out of 
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theory, the application 'in reality' of theory, procedure, legislation demands a 'presence', 
one which will inevitably rely upon the day-to-day interaction and relationships between 
staff and children; the reasoning, understanding that takes place in that exchange and in 
the shared experience of children and adults who Eve and work in that context. All of this 
is deferred; the weakness in the text is that in being 'hoped for', it is relegated against all 
the prescriptions that Guidance does offer explicitly, even fhougb all that is other than 'good 
practice' is framed unambiguously, manifestly, in The same terms. 
Conclusion 
To the anticipated rebuttal that Guidance is 'all about' good practice it is possible to 
respond in the affirmative; that is the point; 'good practice' is regulation, but as soon as the 
term itself, the sign, 'stands alone' (appears as a physical inscription in the text itself, rather 
than being alluded to, inferred or assumed to 'be' what the Guidance is 'about) it begins to 
point outwards and signify differently in a way that is dangerous and must be curtailed. 
Indeed in an earlier reference in the introduction to this chapter (paragraph 1.5), Guidance 
provides for itself something of a disclaimer in that "(t)he Regulations and Guidance are 
designed to provide a framework ofpractice for the running of children's homes which 
eVbasises the importance of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of in&ddmal children. 
They are not intended to be a detailed guide to goodpractice" (my italics). First, it is a 
framework 'of practice' (that which 'constitutes the substance' (OED) of the framework); 
second, it is a framework which 'emphasises', rather than one which is exclusively 'for' the 
safeguarding and promotion of welfare (allowing other 'non-emphasised', perhaps more 
subtle constituents of the framework to also ensue); third, the safeguarding and promotion 
of welfare is in relation to 'individual' children, acknowledging that the needs of the 
institution may (perhaps must) override the needs of the individual. It is because of this 
necessity that Guidance must offer a 'framework' which compensates for the deficits in care 
and welfare that it itself incurs; it is in this way self-generating; creating what it must 
proscribe, necessarily. 'nus, concurrent and in contradiction to the above, the Guidance is 
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not a 'detailed guide to' (no longer 'of? ) good practice which is subsequent and secondary. 
This abdication, relinquishing of 'good practice' is at odds with all that has gone before 
and comes after. 
The fact that the Guidance does not set out in the first place to be a detailed 'practice 
manual' is not the issue; in fact it is the alibi. As an alibi, it operates in two ways; first, by 
saying that detailed advice on good practice should be sought elsewhere, Guidance 
contradicts itself in also saying that it is providing a framework 'of' good practice and 
steeping itself throughout in the rhetoric of the latter; second, by positioning itself as that 
which precedes but is also 'of' good practice ensures that other imperatives prevail, 
suitably tempered, indeed justified by the established need for good practice. Promoting 
and safeguarding welfare are not, in the text, primarily and centrally ensured by 'good 
practice', but by the Guidance and Regulations which precede it. They are emphasised, but 
concomitant with other, unspecified, but palpable imperatives and realised in the first place 
anyway, through the framework, not the practice. It is in part the historically demonstrable 
vulnerability of children in 'public care' that permits this otherwise untenable and 
paradoxical position to seem entirely reasonable and necessary. In this way 'good practice' 
is proposed and espoused whilst simultaneously marginalised and ultimately relinquished at 
the moment that the sign becomes too exposed and demands a 'presence' by appearing 
'literally' in the text. This slip in the logic of the text is rendered almost imperceptible by a 
swift resolution as the Guidance goes on, further on in the same paragraph to advise the 
reader to seek detailed advice on 'good practice' elsewhere. Any imminent anxiety about 
the absence of good practice is accommodated and placated by the reassurance that this 
void will be safely occupied, not here, after all, but somewhere else. And so we end up 
with a series of textual contradictions transmogrified into abundant 'common sense'; first 
the framework, then the detailed advice on practice which will occupy that framework. 
The Guidance even helpfully points us to a particular document that will begin to provide us 
with the 'detailed advice' on practice we are lacking: "The National Institute for Social 
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Work (NISVi) has been commissioned to produce with the Wagner Development Group 
further Guidance along the lines of "Home Life -a Code of Practice for Residential Care". 
And yet already, before we even reach a text that is beyond the scrutiny of this reading 
there is a trace of what may be to come ... we note the word 'code' in the title: 'Code' -a 
gstem of words, figures or signals used to represent others for secrecy or brevity; ayslem of 
ged signals I OED). pre-airan 
CHAPYER SIX 
CHILDHOOD POSTPONED: METAPHOR, DIFFERAIVCE, 
REGULATION IN RESIDENTIAL CARE 
"What do you see, my boy? " Padre Emanuele asked Roberto, who, still lacking eloquence, 
replied, "Fields. " "To be sure, anyone can see Fields down there. But you well know that, 
depending on the position of the Sun, the color of the Sky, the hour of the day & the season of the 
year, those fields can appear to you in varying Guise & inspire different Feelings. To the peasant, 
weary after his work, they appear as Fields & nothing more. Similar is the case of the savage 
fisherman terrified by those nocturnal Images of Fire sometimes visible in the Sky & frightening to 
behold: but as soon as the Meteorists, who are also Poets, dare call them Crined Comets, Bearded 
& Tailed, Goats, Beams, Shields, Torches & Thunderbolts, these figures of speech clarify for you 
the clever Symbols through which Nature means to speak, as she uses these Images as 
I-Eeroglyphics, on the one hand referring to the Signs of the Zodiac & on the other to past Events. 
And the Fields? You see how much you can say of Fields & how, as you speak, you see and 
comprehend more: Favonious blows, the Earth opens, the Nightingales weep, the leaf-crowned 
Trees swagger, & you discover the wondrous genius of the Fields in the variety of their strains of 
Grasses nourished by the Streams that play in happy puerility. The festive Fields rejoice with jaunty 
merriment, at the appearance of the Sun they open their countenance & in them you observe the 
arc of a smile, & they celebrate the return of the Star, intoxicated with the gentle Austral kisses & 
laughter on the Earth itself that expands in dumb Happiness, & the matutinal warmth so fills them 
with joy that they shed tears of Dew. Crowned with Flowers, the Fields submit to their Genius & 
compose subtle Hyperboles of Rainbows. -There, my son: if you had said simply that the Fields 
are pretty, you would have done nothing but depict for me their greening- which I already know 
of- but if you say the Fields laugh, you show me the Earth as Animate & reciprocally I will learn to 
observe in human Countenances all the refinements that I have perceived in the fields ... And this is 
the office of the supreme Figure of all: Metaphor. If Genius, & therefore Learning, consists in 
connecting remote Notions & finding Similitude in things dissimilar, then Metaphor, the most 
acute and farfetched among Tropes, is the only one capable of producing Wonder, which gives 
birth to Pleasure, as do changes of scene in the theater. And if the Pleasure produced by Figures 
derives from learning new things without effort & many things in small volume, then Metaphor, 
setting our mind to flying betwixt one Genus & another, allows us to discern in a single Word 
more than one Object. " 
Padre Emanuele to Roberto della Griva in The Island offhe Da y Beforr Umberto Eco: 1995: 89 
Introduction 
Having established in previous chapters the cultural and historical specificity of 
childhood and its 'mythical signification' within discourse, this chapter begins by 
examining the relationship between children's needs and children's rights within 
contemporary professional discourse. Specifically, the discussion sets out to illustrate what 
can be described as the 'naturalising trick; that is, the ways in which, within contemporary 
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discourse, any potential for contradiction between the duality of 'needs' and 'rights' is 
effectively circumscribed and assuaged through universalising notions of the child's nature. 
In this way, contrasting characterisations of the child as, on the one hand, 'needy' in 
nature, one who must be spoken for, pivotal to the natural family, and, on the other hand, 
a 'rights-owning' citizen, holding within the potential for autonomous decision-making, are 
both encapsulated within the same 'whole'. Naturalisation is thus an e . 
Yea of discourse; the 
study aims to show how this trick is pulled off across apparently diverse discourses by the 
veg stmetwing of discourse-making. Any potential for disruption (for example, that the 
autonomous decision-making child with rights might undermine the child of nature) is 
effectively neutralised, making it impossible to 'think differently' about childhood. 'Rights- 
promotion' becomes enclosed within; there may be an extension of dccision-making and 
civil liberties, but only to the fullest extent that discourse reaches, and not beyond. Put 
simply, in striving for children to have more of a say, they paradoxically have less of a say 
since what morr can be said is all the more circumscribed by discourse. It is in this way that 
rights become sclf-validating principles for children 'as citizens' of the liberal state within, 
and only within, cbildhood 
This Chapter also returns to the Guidance and Re n 11 in gulatio s as we as introduc g other 
practice and assessment materials to explore some of the other characteristics of a 
naturalised childhood that have special resonance in public care; its temporal qualitT, the 
idea of progress and development towards adulthood and how, through policy and 
practice the former and the latter have the effect of deferring the 'here and now. The 
discussion will suggest that for the child in public care childhood is effectively deferred or 
'postponed', and arguably, that this is necessarily so in order to maintain the idealized 
natural family. Further, the study will set out to show how children in public care 
constitute a 'captive population' for the imposition of a regulated childhood which should 
otherwise be 'of nature'. It is through their exposure to tWr. implicitly 'unnatural' 
environment that within the theories, policies and practices of socW work, childhood is 
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itself most exposed in its 'purest form' and most explicitly regulated. It is also 
commensurate with the culture of 'performance measurement' in social work and the need 
to measure outcomes based on developmental theory which is itself assumed to reflect the 
child's nature. Not, of course, that this means that children arc necessarily better carcd for, 
more able exercise self-determination, which might seem, perhaps naively, like the logic of 
this circumstance. On the contrary, the discussion will propose that in spite of the 
strenuous efforts of policy-makers and practitioners to provide/substitutc for the 
childhood that sbould have been, or as close to it as possible, the effect of the increasing 
implementing theory and practice which prefigures, presupposes and sees children in a 
state of transit is, ironically, to further remove them from the sphere of the 'here and 
now', with less of a presence in determining 'themselves'. Importantly, the argument 
throughout here and throughout this study is not that by deconstructing 'presence' in the 
text or the 'self-present' adult, exposing it as a myth, a construction, this means it is 
meaningless or without 'value', as if we could do without it. Far from it, to be able to 
articulate a presence, not 'outside' of 'discourse' (which would be impossible), but in such 
a way as to transform, reconstitute, reconstruct makes it full of alternative possibilities. The 
metaphor 'presence', as something contingent, negotiable, not taken for granted, makes it 
all the more available, full of possibility and in this way all the more crucial for children in 
public care in undermining some of the monolithic truths that surround this particular 
childhood. 
Principles of 'Good' Child Care Practice: Unity in Contemporary Discourse 
The idea of childhood as a universal, wholly 'knowable' 'thing' requires discourse to 
hold together its own logic in order to achieve a 'unity' from dispersed and often 
contradicting 'fragments. This coherence can be seen at work in a document designed to 
gulations for the Children Act 1989, The Carr of Child= - accompany the Guidance and Re 
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Piinqýles and Practice in Regulations and Guidance (Department of Health: 1991). In this, we arc 
advised that: 
Child care principles have developed over a long period and have many roots. 
These roots include legal concepts; belief in the intrinsic value of each individual; 
knowledge from child development, psychology and psycl-Ltry-, practice wisdon-4 
social research; prevailing community values 
p. p. 4-5 
Here, then are laid out some of the disciplines that come together, not to 'discover', but 
to constitute contemporary childhood; the parameters of a 'discourse, of "What can be 
said' by and about 'childhood' and the constituting 'subject-in-discourse' or 'object', 'child'. 
Whilst there is a kind of proud, liberal eclecticism here in terms of the range of perspectives 
(which may elsewhere, perhaps be regarded as sometimes in conflict or contradiction) that 
go to inform principles of good child care, this does not mean that 'knowledge' within 
this, highly particularised context, is always provisionalised or qualified. On the contrary, 
there is an implicit 'truth' to be derived out of the coalition that arises. For example, note 
that whilst part of what informs principles of child care is a beAef in the intrinsic value of 
each individual, when it comes to child development, psychology and psychiatry there is 
no equivocation; it is knowkd ge - what is 'known' about the 'nature' of childhood - that 
underpins its execution. 
Child development, psychiatry and psychology are here irrefutable bodies of knowledge 
providing indisputable 'truths' about childhood. This leads us into a number of difficulties: 
for example, the cultural specificity and ethnocentricity of much of this knowledge are 
initially glossed over, although later on in the same text, when the principles of child care 
are listed, account is to be taken of differences arising from precisely ethnicity, culture and 
so on. Indeed this very area is a headline requirement; 'Principle One' of 'Good Child Care 
Practice': "Children and young people and their parents should all be considered as 
individuals with particular needs and potentialities" (p. 7); it is qualified by the following; 
"... All regulations, policies, Guidance and procedures should take into account the wide 
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diversity of ages, needs, ethnic origins, cultures and circumstances that lies behind general 
categories... " (P. 7). 
This 'taking into account, however, is not really 'Principle One' at all, but demonstrably 
secondary and supplementary to the 'rear Principle One, which is already established on 
the basis of 'knowledge' of 'child development, psychiatry and psychology'. The 'taking 
account' is a (no doubt) sympathetic and well-intentioned, as well as politically sensitive, 
deviation from the principle, but decidedly not the principle itself. This liberal approach to 
difference is one of tolerance and accommodation, but structured upon the premise of 
precedence of a prevailing culture-specific (Western) discourse of 'childhood' and its 
interrelatedness with other discourses of 'welfare', 'needs' and 'family' which are equally 
ethnocentric and historically variable. 
Moreover, the differentiation between beAef (in the 'intrinsic value of each individual) 
and knowledge (of child development, psychiatry and psychology) works in two ways. First, 
it establishes a context in which a value-judgement is recognised for what it is - context- 
specific relative to the culture and community it represents and in this sense indicative of a 
discourse which is 'self-aware', 'knowing' and Iberrforr sensitive to alternative 'beliefs. 
Within the discourse of 'liberal professionalism' it might almost be seen as self- 
congratulatory in that even though this particular belief is widely concurred with, we are 
not so naive, so culturally insensitive, as to take it as a truth universally acknowledged. 
Secondly, by provisionalising a value that borders on being a truism, (intrinsic value of 
each individual) in a way that seems almost unnecessary, the 'knowledge' gained from 
child development, psychiatry and psychology - or, more accurately, the staw of such 
knowledge, is actually strengthened, consolidated and therefore all the more 
unquestionable. By setting itself out as 'open' to question and difference this text 
(discourse) thereby paradoxically serves to occlude difference or other forms of knowledge 
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in the very act of 'taldng account'! Becoming 'tolerance in action, the very exemplification 
of the values which it claims to laud. 
The belief in the value of each individual is, in this very precise sense, one redolent of 
Isaiah Berlin's celebrated equivocation over the merits of tolerance itself, compatible with 
the value placed on individual identity, autonomy and responsibility in the liberal 
democracy. It is in part constituted by and through a symbiotic relationship with 
'knowledge' of child development, psychiatry and psychology in contemporary society. 
This 'centred', whole, complete and autonomous individual rrquitrs the 'needy' child, 
variously constructed in order to 'be' 'self-present'; the 'needy' child makes it possible, it is 
the 'history' of the 'intrinsically valued' individual which must be written before the 
individual is complete either by the child's needs being met contemporaneously with the 
'childhood' or, where childhood is interrupted, in retrospect by recourse to psychoanalysis, 
'talking treatments' to 'reclaim' the 'paSt'. 2 
The 'Naturalising Tricle: 'Needs' and 'knowledge of Child Development 
Children's 'needs' then, are at the centre of a discourse of childhood; in policy and in 
practice presuppositions to 'needs' are effectively 'side-stepped' to present an apparently 
progressive, and more pertinently, universal approach to children, childhood and child 
welfare that is constructed out of and between interrelated discourses and psycho-social 
disciplines. However, this does not mean that there are not 'in fact' some 'universal' 
requirements for children's well-being; that is not at issue here. Rather, language is so 
saturated here within the discourse of 'needs' to render 'what can be said' indissoluble 
I This 'taking into accouneor Vking aboue subjects that might otherwise be regarded with ambivalcnce or as 
problematic resonates with Barthes idea of myth (1957)_ as depoliticized speech, an idea we return to later, and the 
notion of 'repetition' in Kristeva's writing (1983). 
2 In the above discussion, we might equally regard 'Child' as the object and 'childhood' as the discourse. However, it 
would be just as accurate to call 'biological immaturity' the object and 'child' the discourse. Equally, we can regard 
Ichildhood'as the 'objectand 'developmental psychology and psychoanalysis' the discourse; the point to remember is 
that the boundaries are artificial; there is no 'starting poine of originating concept or 'thing' upon which to 
'construce. There are only terms and conditions of emergence, coexistence, correlation; spaces between which 
signifiers differ and defer. 
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from the discourse. As soon as children's needs are spoken about, language takes us (the 
speaker: the parent, the child, the social worker, the policy-maker, the theorist) into the 
realms of 'what can be said', the place inhabited by 'childhood'. Certain needs seen as 
inherent to the nature of childhood tend to be derived from a biological/psychological 
understanding of human nature e. g. the need for food. Other needs, however arc 
formulated upon a different kind of knowledge base and superimposed on childhood 
nature. 'Needs' for warmth, security, new experiences etc. often assume a particular 
outcome which may be desirable but which can only be achieved in a particular way. This 
teleological basis for constructing needs and childhood experiences is crucial in 
determining adulthood as the manifestation of the fully formed adult 'self'. Children's 
cneeds', whatever they may be, are taken up in the maelstrom of discourse in such a way as 
to occlude other ways of thinking about childhood and with the effect of mystifying, 
diminishing and obscuringthe child'. 
Further, advanced liberalism's emphasis on children as 'citizens' raises the possibility of 
, rights' arising out of those needs, raising further complexities and contradictions. 
Woodhead (1997) has begun to analyse this apparently innocuous and benign way of 
thinking about childhood, citing the following example from the first report of the House 
of Commons Education, Science and Arts Committee on the subject of educational 
provision for the under-fives: 
Young children need to be with adults who are interested and interesting, and 
with other children to whom they relate. They need to have natural objects and 
artefacts to handle and explore. They need opportunity to communicate through 
music and imaginative play ... These needs can only be met if an appropriate 
environment is provided with adults who understand something of child 
development and are ready and able to listen, encourage and stimulate 
para. 5.1: HNBO: 19883 
Woodhead's point is that 'needs' provide a End of 'shorthand' which glosses over 
uncertainty and potential disagreement about the universality and timeless nature of 
childhood and that 'need' is "endowed with a more complex meaning structure" 
'Educational Provision for the Under-Fives'Vol. 1 (1988) IMSO, cited in Woodhead: 1997: 65). 
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(Woodhead: 1997: 66) than other phrases such as 'want' or 'should have'; any possibility of 
contention is thus ruled out. ' For' this study, there is also significance in the passage 
suggesting that the 'needs' upon which the hypotheses are based can only, be provided with 
adults who have an understanding of 'child development', that being the very theory upon 
which the 'known' needs are based. The theory of child development is thus sclf-verifying 
and in this way constitutes children's needs as self-evident; the theory can be applied 
retrospectively to validate the 'truth' of children's needs which are themselves formulated 
on the basis of developmental psychology. Further, how is this understanding of child 
development acquired, by whom and what implications does this raise for those who do 
not have "something of an understanding"? 
Clearly, anyone involved in child-rearing practices outside of a predominantly Western 
culture is ruled out for a start. But in the context of the Report (the provision of public 
services for the under-fivcs) is it only those people employed in the delivery of undcr-fivcs 
services who will need this 'understanding'? If so, what of the rest of us? Is it assumed that 
this knowledge is somehow inherent within the families to which under-fives return having 
spent time at the nursery or in day care? On one level, this is, perhaps not an unreasonable 
assumption to make given the plethora of literature about child rearing available to parents 
and the amount of material foisted upon them in the media and in ante-natal classes, but 
does this mean that those families who are able and willing to access such knowledge are 
more able parents than those who do not? If so, how 'natural' can the family be as the 
'best place' for children's needs to be met when so much is prescribed and supplemented? 
Now, it is not that the orthodoxy should be completely abandoned, just that it becomes 
increasingly difficult to 'think' anything else when childhood is so effectively and resolutely 
naturalised and closed, to the extent of shutting out other possibilities. So closed off is this 
4 Woodhead uses a formula, X needs Y for Z to follow to show haw Z is rarely made explicit - it is constituted through 
a shared understanding between author and reader. He argues that this construction obscures the individual and the 
cultural towards an objectified, empirical understanding of children. What is understood is what is inferred: 
"concealed beneath the apparent simplicity and directness of 'need' statements is a highly condensed combination of 
both empirical and evaluative claims" (Woodhead. 1997: 67) 
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territory, so clearly marked out that to challenge the orthodoxy can be regarded as 
disreputable, irresponsible, even dangerous. ' 
Moreover, this characterisation of childhood as universal and of the child as 'needy', 
not only places particular responsibilities on those undertaking the role of child-rearing, 
driven by a moral imperative to 'get it right', lest there be dire consequences for the child, 
it also endows the state with the necessary moral authority and legitimacy to intervene 
where such needs are deemed not to have been adequately met. In law, 'who' might need 
the supportive interventions of the state to supplement family life seems to be implied: In 
the Act, Part III, s. 17, local authorities have a general duty to: 
(a) safeguard and promote the welfare of children within their own area who 
are in need, and 
so far as is consistent with that duty, to promote the upbrin&g of such 
children within their families, by providing a range and level of services 
appropriate to those children's needs 
s. 17: sub. s. 1 
In addition, a child 'in need' is defined in the Act if. 
(a) he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity of 
achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without 
the provision for him of services by a local authority... 
(b) his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further 
impaired, without the provision for him of such services; or 
he is disabled. 
s. 17, sub. s. (10) 
On this basis, then, a child will not be in 'need' when all of the above are met within 
the family which has access to and an understanding of those provisions required on The 
basis of knowledge of child health and development and of what the normative standards 
are as derived from the various disciplines that inform the discourse of childhood. Thus, 
despite being the natural sphere for child-rearing, what is required to supplement the 
family to meet the child's needs is likely to be available to the most economically and 
This is especially true when it comes to childhood sexuality and the idea of consensual adult/child relations; here we 
are well out of bounds and a Idnd of self-censorship operates despite the fact that it is only relatively recently that a 
redefinition of such relations as abusive has been conceptualised. 
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educationally 'advantaged', who will not have or require recourse to state provision. ' All 
children are 'in need', even within the family they remain so, but in the terms of reference 
of the Act, supplementary support from the state will be provided for some, but not 
others for whom it is assumed that there will be alternative measures to ensure provision is 
made. 
Since 'knowledge' about 'child development' must be acquitrd in order to meet the 
child's needs, families must either voluntarily engage with the discourse by using whatever 
resources they have (and to varying acceptable degrees) to consult the 'experts', provide an 
cappropriate' environment, buy 'age-appropriate' toys, read the right books, attend ante- 
natal classes. Or, if they cannot or will not do this, they must accept the possibility of 
being subject to state intervention. Thus, while it may be represented as a cnon- 
stigmatising', supportive welfare provision for which they may well be grateful, will 
inevitably draw them into the net of greater surveillance and more intrusive interventions 
if a failure to ascribe to normative practices is subsequently 'identified'. The fact that most 
families enter of their own volition into the discourse of 'childhood needs'via either of the 
above arrangements is beside the point which is that there is no other way to even begin 
thinIdng about doing it. What is an apparently naturally occurring phenomenon (the 'child' 
as needy in nature) is shown to be aqythiq bull, childhood, conceptualised within the 
context of 'needs' is eminently cultural, sodal andpub&-, the means by which we are able to 
constitute, not reflect, relations between the state and the family. The 'inside' of 'family', 
what centres it as a 'natural' sphere for meeting children's needs and child rearing, is at the 
same time the outside, the public place where the 'is' of childhood is constituted and 
renegotiated. Only 'needs' can do this for the family and the state; it is what allows, 
through discourse, the supplement to appear unprvblewatically, within (without) nature, 
resolving the contradiction at the same time as it is the contradiction. 7 
6 Unless, that is, the child is disabled in which case support is universally available. 
7 JbUS, the 'SUpplemene is (under erasure) the 'centre' (see previous discussion in Chapter Ibree). 
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Promoting Rights, Affirming Needs: Circumscribing Children's Rights and 
Entitlements 
More recently, in the context of an increased emphasis on liberalism and autonomy, 
children's rights have entered the discourse, requiring a new accommodation which 
'squares the circle' and alleviates the potential tension between the child as 'rights-owning' 
'citizen' and the child as 'needy-in-nature'. A 'rights discourse' has been constructed which 
has come to encompass both the child as 'citizen' and the child as 'vulnerable'. 
The way in which needs and rights discourses overlap and circumscribe each other can 
be seen at work in statements that differentiate between what 'should' or 'must' happen in 
relation to the care of children in the 'looked after' system and where 'rights' and 
centitlements' are explicitly mentioned and where they are not. The need to establish a 
'right' may arise out of either the universality of the 'need' itself or where the meeting of 
that need is regarded as being intrinsic to the period of childhood for the development of 
the rational adult i. e. where childhood is characterised as a period of dependency, 
vulnerability, development, learning and transition. 
In The Carr of Cbildirn (Department of Health: 1991), Chapter 2 sets out 'Principle 3' of 
'Good Practice' in relation to individual children and their families. ' Principle 3 (p. 7) states 
Children are entitled to protection from neglect, abuse and exploitation ... Young People's safety cannot be assumed just because their care-givers are known to the 
agency and social workers who are responsible for children must remain alert to 
potential risks. 
The issue here is not whether we concur with the principle but that this entitlement is 
associated with a universal need for protection from harm provided and determined as 
such by adults in authority. The matter is closed here without qualification. Other 
principles, however are less clear-cut. 'Principle 13' (p. 9) states: 
siblings sbould not be separated when in care or when being looked after under 
voluntary arrangements, unless tl-ýs is part of a well thought out plan based on 
eet those , 
fa si 6n each child's needs ... a ebild's needs sbould not be saaificed in order to Nobg. 
s My italics thfoughout all of the following citations of text quoted from the said document. 
CAildhood Postpone& Metaphor, Difficrance, Regubtion in RcsidcntW Care 195 
Here, the child's needs are paramount and overrule the possibility of any entitlement to 
avoid separation. The imperative to meet the child's needs 'in childhood' has precedence 
over the 'need' to avoid separation where maintaining siblings together is judged by those 
who decide to be damaging. 
It is possible to extrapolate that non-separation from siblings is not a universal 
requirement for childhood, (though it may often be desirable) and that the judgement for 
making such decisions is to be based on the 'needs' (as judged by others) drawn from the 
various knowledge bases which constitute a 'healthy' childhood, which are themselves 
assumed to be consistent with the child in question. That is, regardless of whether the 
child wishes or feels differently. No room for rights or entitlements here; needs take the 
moral high ground, silencing any 'alternative"knowledge'. 
Moreover, Principle 9 (p. 8) states: 
If young people cannot remain at home, placement with relatives or friends 
should be explored before other forms of placement are considered. Research has 
shown that placements with relatives are usually more successful than those made 
outside the family circle. However, family relationships can be negative and 
placements with relatives should not be made without adequate exploration and 
discussion nor as a way of saving money or keeping 'in care' figures low. 
This seems Odd; why sbould and not mArst explore placements with relatives and friends? 
(The document is rigorous in its use of precise language so this is most unlikely to be a 
grammatical error). If the evidence is that placements with family and friends are more 
successful than 'in care' placements and the agency is sure that necessary checks and 
guidance exist (which it does) to ensure such placements are as 'safe' as is possible to 
know, why not, on the basis of such evidence, requirr their exploration? Particularly given 
the numerous examples of systematic abuse in the looked after system, why all the 
tentative 'qualifiers' ('can be negative', 'should not be made without... " etc. ) about family 
placements and none expressed about 'in care' placements? Is the mask slipping hereýiver 
so slightly? Is there a veiled suspicion of all the friends and relatives of a child who 'cannot 
remain at home'. If so, is it any more warranted than a suspicion of the looked after' 
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system, given the evidence? Perhaps it is even that despite the evidence 'public care' is 
deemed more appropriately suited to meeting the needs of these particular children, who 
cannot remain at home and who come from these particular families, who have 'failed' to 
meet their child's needs. 
Finally, Principle 19 (p. 10) 
Every young person needs to develop a secure sense of personal identity and all 
those with parental or caring responsibilities have a duty to offer encouragement 
,g at 
bome or not - are entitled to and support in this task ... All children - vbefber, 6tin 
expect information about their personal and family history and need to understand 
their past as well as their present situation. They also need opportunities to develop 
independence and see tbemselves as coiVelent in&vidwals. 
This principle is one which is not afraid to express its applicability to both children in 
public care and those living at home; we are in universal territory here; an entitlement can 
be afforded to children since they need information about their past and present in order 
to 'develop a secure sense of identity', and 'independence', and become 'competent 
individuals'. Childhood, as a period of development towards the fully rational adult, must 
have a past of which to 'make sense' out of in the formation of the adult. This is essential 
for the development of the 'independent', 'competent' individual in adulthood. Thus, a 
right to information can be established, a right which far from challenging the orthodoxy 
about childhood, will serve to strengthen it as the child 'comes to terms' with what may be 
a 'difficult' history with the support and Guidance of the 'psy' experts. They can 'find' 
'themselves' in childhood through the discourse. This temporal quality to childhood is 
fundamental to developmental psychology and the idea of children as 'becoming adults'; it 
is also, nonetheless, socially and culturally constructed and as such cannot be taken for 
granted in any study of childhood. 
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Temporality, Transition and Differance 
Time exerts sets of constraints upon our biological selves, which are 
interpreted in different cultures as different 'times' of life. Western societies, for 
example, might be thought of as constructed out of the following sequence: 
childhood follows infancy and is succeeded by adolescence, adulthood, middle age 
and old age. Each 'time of life' is understood to confer particular qualities and 
attributes upon its incumbents so that cultures can have their own periodizations 
and draw such boundaries differently. 
James and Prout: 1997: 230 
Time is culturally constructed and embedded in the very 'sense' of 'Being' within each 
period of life; the phrase 'having the time of your fife' epitomises this concept. Whilst each 
period of life denotes its own characteristics, James and Prout (1997) explain how the 
passage of time in life, expressed through 'age' has particular significance in childhood, 
shown through the obsessive curiosity about how old children are when at other times of 
life this would be regarded as intrusive and discourteous. Not only are themes of 
transition, development and sequencing 'at one' with a construction of the passage of time 
as cnatural' in childhood, but also and more crucially, they are what enables the structuring 
of the fully 'present' and rational adult. 
Childhood is not from birth to a certain age and at a certain age 
The child is grown, and puts away childish things. 
Childhood is the kingdom where nobody dies. 
Nob(: )dy that matters, that is. 
Edna St Vincent Mi1lay (1934) Childhood is thelangdom whm Nobo, # Dies 
There is always one moment in childhood when the door opens and lets the 
future in. 
Graham Greene (1940) The Power and the Glog 
The relationship between childhood as 'time past' (that upon which 'adulthood' 
structures presence through a variety of means) and 'time future' (as the period of 
'investment' towards the fully present 'adult') is one that is mutuaUy referential and 
6.1 
dependent Games and Prout: 1997). Either way, children themselves are effectively 
'projected' somewhere else altogether, 'out' of time, into the imaginings and fantasies of 
adults, within a 'sanctuary' and haven which transcends the ravages of the 'real world', 
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universalises their needs. They are not 'in' but 'of childhood', a place defined and 
determined on their behalf which prefigures, and then defers their 'presence' within it. 
"Like primitive man, the child as prin-iitive adult is in harmony with nature, set free from 
the ravages of the time driven modem world. It is an attractive ideology which casts 
children into a mythical past or a magical present... " Uarnes and Prout: 1997: 242). 9 
One way or another, children themselves are subjugated and deferred to the 'Presence' 
of adults (how often arc children asked; 'what do you want to 'be' when you grow up? ); 
this has been true of adults as 'subjects' in 'relation' to children directly (as parents, 
teachers, relatives ctc) and as anthropologists, sociologists, theoreticians of 'childhood'. In 
the 'public sphere', for those on the margins, the potential for instability and disruption (of 
the sign in language/discourse, of the child 'in care), regulated through childhood, is most 
vulnerable and most exposed; transposed from the relational dynamic of accommodations 
and re-negotiations within and between the state and family and the child (and the various 
discourses that constitute 'subjects' within) to the 'external', imprecise, 'homogenising' 
machinations of the state, and all in the 'best interests' of the child 'in need' who is looked 
after'. 
In childhood, then, temporality becomes the means by which regulation is itself 
'naturalised'. Nowhere is this more manifest than in the public care of children. It is here 
that through the playing out of theory, policy, procedure and guidance (the written) the 
gnon-presence' of childhood 'everywhere' is most susceptible to deconstructive readings 
(at the 'other side' of what childhood 'ought' to be). Temporality is indicative of childhood 
as 'postponement' (of presence), 'deferment' (to the fully present adult), compounded and 
're-enfolded' in public care as a postponement of the 'natural' childhood within the 
'natural' family to which it must a, &o defer, be supplementary to and in a relation of 
secondariness: 
9 James and Prout go on to cite Ennew's depiction of A. A. Milne's Christopher Robin as " the archetypical innocent 
childhood whiled away in complete isolation in the Hundred Acre Wood, accompanied by sexless woolly animals" 
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... the 'a' of diffirance also recaUs that spacing is temporization, the detour and 
postponement by means of which intuition, perception, consummation - in a 
word, the relationship to the present, the reference to a present, the reference to a 
present reality, to a being are always deferred. Deferred by virtue of the very 
principle of difference which holds that an element functions and signifies, takes 
on or conveys meaning, only by referring to another past or future in an economy 
of traces 
Derrida: 1981: 26 
In public care this 'referring to another past or present' (we cite what Derrida writes 
about &fferance to illustrate metaphorically what is Wterally' the case in public care) is 
uncompromising, relentless; deferment is ubiquitous, omnipresent; its 'raw' 
presence/absence is there for all to see. It is necessarily, essentially, characteristically, how 
the Guidance is worked out in practice. In public care, postponement and deferral (&fferance) 
become exposed and through a construction of childhood which relies upon them, are 
most acutely realised within the 'lived experience' of looked after' children. Temporality is 
the primary manifestation of &fferance, articulated in discourse through metaphor; in 
cpractice' this can be illustrated from the moment of inception of the intervention (the 
child's removal from the family) right down to the minutiae of daily life. 
The Child 'in waiting, ' 
10 First 'family life' is deferred and postponed; the child is 'looked after'. Being 'looked 
after', the resumption of 'family' is deferred and postponed whilst 'work' is undertaken to 
secure 'rehabilitation' or 'restoration'. (Me experience of young people who are not 
returning home is examined shortly). The child is 'in waiting, in anticipation of this 
resumption. Second, decision-making about the length of placement needed, the 'nature' 
of the placement, the contact arrangements with family, the 'needs' of the child during the 
placement are all deferred and postponed to the 'planning meeting' or 'review'. 
Third, decisions about things like how much pocket money, clothing, what time the 
child must come in at night, where the child can go and who with may, in general terms, 
(Ennev, r 1986: 11, cited in j2rnes and Prout- 1997) 
10 A reminder this mctonyrn (looked after) for public care is necessary since, unlike in 'family', looked after' does not 
inhere in, for example, 'state administered accommodation; it is, therefore standing for something else, an absence as 
well as a possible 'presence' 
Childbood Postponed: Metaphor, Milrerance, Regubtion in Rcsidcntla Care 200 
be decided at the review but any flexibility or change on a day to day basis is likely to be 
delegated to the homes manager or an allocated linkworker' (as suggested by the Guidance); 
these decisions will thus be deferred and postponed until the appropriate member of staff 
is on duty; if they are on duty at the time a request is made, they may still prefer to consult 
with colleagues first and ask the child to wait. Fourth, where disagreements arise between 
children or young people about perhaps the most trivial of matters - who goes to bed at 
what time, say, or who uses the washing machine, who needs to use the bathroom first, 
any resolution is likely to be deferred for discussion either amongst the staff at staff 
meetings or by young people in residents' meetings. Meal-times, supper-timcs, times for 
cleaning bedrooms may all largely be dictated by the organisation of the home; a 
spontaneous request to stay the night with a friend will need to be 'risk assessed, checked 
out, before it can happen 'in the future' thus deferring 'spontaneity', opportunism -a sense 
of being present in the present. 
These are all measures which secure a deferral and postponement; the 'condition' of 
childhood which in public care is manifested as 'necessary' regulation; 'necessary' for the 
'well-being' of the child and the smooth running of the home (as it often may well be; that 
is not the issue here). But these 'deferrals', particularly about all the little things' in daily 
life arise so easily 'in context' (sometimes with neither rhyme nor reason) that they are 
taken often for granted; or at best regarded as unfortunate but necessary constraints. This 
is because they are consistent and self-validating within a discourse that absents children 
from the self-occupying present. In public care, discourse consumes everything; filtering, 
diffusing, deferring presence through and to a qogic' of its own that can sometimes mean 
any 'sense' of 'common-sense' is disoriented, forfeited in the very pursuit of meeting the 
'needs' and protecting the 'welfare' of the child. 
Listening to Children: 'Age and level of Understanding' 
Given the above, it is not surprising that when it comes to the requirement to 'listen to 
children' it is only inasmuch as hearing what can be said about childhood and in terms 
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which are age-specific. For example, Section 1 of the Children Act states that when a court 
is determining any question with respect to a child's upbringing, welfare is the paramount 
consideration. One of the particulars listed in determining welfare in this respect is "the 
ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the fight of his age 
and understanding)" (S. 1(3)a)). Note that it is age that implicitly detcrn-dnes both the ability 
to make 'rational' choices and the extent to which that ability is 'ascertainable', that is, as 
something to be found out as a 'definite fact' or to 'get to know' (OED), where 'knowing' 
is the realm of adult rationality. Note too, however, that age is qualified by 'understanding'; 
at first glance, a reassuring recognition that perhaps age alone cannot only relied upon. 
However, by linking age and understanding in this way, although allowing for the 
possibility that (presumably) a younger child than might be expected will occasionally have 
the necessary 'understanding'; the inference is that 'understanding' remains essentially 
something that is correlated with 'intellect', if not always chronology, where 'adulthood' as 
the fully rational state of being. So, what the child 'understands', whatever his age, is 
constrained and particular; it must make 'sense' in the context of the discourse, it is a 
specific understanding that will be heard and that permits entry to the discourse as an 
active subject, not any alternative 'understanding' that is discontinuous with the discourse, 
with history and with the structuring of adult/child. " 'Wishes and feelings' and 
cascertainability' are thus located and constituted within the realms of what it is 'possible to 
say'; even if what is 'found out' or said does not coincide with the responsible authority or 
is contrary to the views of that authority, it will be 'heard' within these terms i. e. of what 
'children' can say within the discourse. 12 
That is not to say that children do not of cannot 'say' challenging, disruptive or 'discontinuous, things; they obviously 
can. Ibc point is that they will be either disregarded, accommodated within the discourse in a way that 'neutrahses' 
them, or construct the child within an alternative discourse. 
12 TJIiS means that even if what is said is contrary to the 'welfare' of the child in that, say, the child expressed views 
incompatible with their 'welfare' as determined by the and through the discourse, they would still be heard, but re- 
constituted, reconstructed as, for example, (and obviously depending on what was said) imma 'or 'dysfunctional', 
'disaffected', or located within an interrelated discourse of say, psychoanalysis, criminal justice etc. 
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, gulations 
it is stated that Further, in the QUince and Re 
the social worker should be aware and acknowledge that there may be good 
reasons why the child's views are different from those of his parents or the 
responsible authority. The more mahire the chiI4 the morrfull y he sill be able to enter into 
&scmssion aboatplans andproposals andparfidpate in The dedsion-makingprocess 
CIL2: para. 2.47: p48 (my italics) 
Again, the more mature the child, the closer to full, rational adulthood he is, the more 
likely he will. be able to 'enter the discussion' about 'plans and proposals'. (For this read 
center the discourse). The terms on which he or she will be 'heard' (in being 
commensurate and consistent with the discourse) are already being set before the cud has 
even spoken, as are 'who' can speak (the mature child, ready and willing to enter the 
discussion) and what can be said (within the parameters of the discussion about 'plans, 
I 
proposals). The whole is structured upon a regulated 'emptiness' of what 'child' is 'not' 
(unwilling or unable to enter the discussion upon these terms). They will enter the 
discourse about plans and proposals within the context of and parameters set by the 
Guidance (which, because it goes on subsequently to detail what should constitute 
appropriate plans for the child, leaves little room for manoeuvre here). Maturity, linked to 
proximity to adulthood, but only defined as such where the child is one who will be willing 
to enter the discourse, take on a 'subject-identity' as the child 'in need'. Not entering is a 
non-option; that of either the immature, inarticulate, irrational child or the "non-child'. 
The discourse of 'needs' is inextricably linked to this temporal condition; 'needs' in 
childhood and in child development (as tez*orao binds childhood to nature, obscuring the 
normative 'subtext' in the discourse beyond 'recognition'. In the public sphere, 'regulation' 
must therefore take a particular form and shape; to elucidate these matters we must 
creturn' to the text. 
'Leaving Care': 'Coming to Terms' with the 'SelP 
In this section issues of temporality and transition are examined in relation to the 
preparation of young people for leaving care', detailed in Chapter Seven of the Guidance 
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gulations 'After-Carc: Advice and Assistance'. This chapter is selected for scrutiny and Re 
because it deals with those who are on the point of transition between childhood and 
adulthood; they are on the 'edge' of care; on the ma%in of The Magin so to speak, what the 
Guidance has to say here will say as much about how the local authority is to deal with all 
children who are 'looked after'. 
Chapter 7 deals with the duty of local authorities to: 
prepare young people they are looking after for the time when they cease to be 
so looked after and the powers and duties of local authorities to provide after-care 
advice and assistance to such young people... 
p. 97: para. 7.1 
At the sub-heading 'Principles Underlying Preparation for Leaving Care' paragraph 
7.18 states that: 
Services for young people must take account of the lengthy process of 
transition from childhood to adulthood, to reflect the gradual transition of a 
young person from dependence to independence. The support should be, broadly, 
the support that a good parent might be expected to give. 
p. 101: pam. 7.8 
Despite the duties of the local authority under the Act to provide 'after-care advice and 
assistance', we note in the sub-heading that the principles established in the Guidance are 
underlying 'preparation for leaving care. Is this leaving care, 'as we know it', in the sense of 
, being' 'in care', the institution, the metonym for 'public care', a particular type of 
intervention, form of child-rearing and regulation? If so, does this not undermine all of the 
pronouncements, reassurances and principles articulated in the Guidance up to this point 
about continuity of care and the role of the local authority as a 'reasonable parent'? On the 
one hand, Guidance 'says' throughout that 'care' should not be regarded negatively, as a 
euphemism for institutionalisation and control, but as a benign signifier and in practice as a 
'positive option' (albeit, as previously discussed provided for particular children and in a 
systernised way); on the other hand, children are now required to leave it behind and to 
prepare for doing so. Perhaps what children are really preparing for is to leave the 
'discourse' of public care, to prepare for a sbift in meaning and jignz)kafion where regulation no 
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longer (or not necessarily) inheres in 'care', preparing for a place where ? ý: gulafion no lon ger 
needs lcarr'as an alibi, where 'care' may signify differently in 'fully present"adulthood'. 
Remember we are not leaving 'the home' here, the individual physical and metaphorical 
place where, good, bad or indifferent, children may have been cbrought up' or looked 
after', but 'care'. From child-in-childhood, where 'best interests' can be provided for if not 
in the family, then 'in care, to young person-in-young adulthood; 'semi-present' adult, 
where crational choices' are becoming the responsibility of the 'self-regulating' individual. 
Now the 'care-leaver' (as they are often designated) must leave 'care' behind and take 
responsibility; this is, in the words of the Guidance "the culmination of a young person's 
experience in being cared for by a local authority" (p. 97: para. 7.3). This is despite the fact 
that the support must be 'what a good parent might be expected to give'. To leave care 
behind? Would not the 'good parent' be more likely to be emphasising the continuity of 
care, despite the transition from child to adult, home to elsewhere? 
Further, it is 'services' that will be provided to reflect the 'transition' of cchildhood' 
which is from dependence to independence. What presence does the child have here, 
contained within this process and where, in what space, is the qualitative creladonship' with 
any care-giver validated, other than within the 'corporate body' acting to provide the 
support of the 'good parent'? cServices' must take account, not of the young person, but 
of the process of transition from dependence to independence, a process which precedes 
the child and which will no doubt enable the agency to measure and assess the appropriate 
nature and level of support to facilitate this prefiguring transition from child to adult. 
Measured against this scale, and no other, children and young people's 'presence' win be 
determined, their proximity to fully rational adulthood will be commensurate and 
consistent with the quality and level of support given. 
This emphasis and structuring of childhood, of its characteristics of temporality, 
development and transition towards a mythical 'independence', objectifies childhood as a 
determinable 'truth' and tberrfoir manifests in practice in the only way it can; as regulation 
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(and in the Guidance, only, Iben, as we shall see, accounts for 'differences' of a 'recognisable' 
kind, of disability and culture). Whereas in other settings children's resistance to this 
progression (perhaps in a child's family, community or, indeed any other 'non-signifying' 
network of supportive relations) will not necessarily be accepted, but may, at least hold the 
possibility of being in some way positively accommodated, even validated, here it will more 
likely be individualised or in some way interpreted problematically. By attempting to 
facilitate a smooth, supported transition from childhood to adulthood, by even espousing 
the need, Guidance may have the reverse effect, effectively propelling them inappropriately, 
unprepared into a 'mythical' sphere of 'independent', 'rational' adulthood with detrimental 
consequences that may well maintain young people after leaving care on the margins, 
reproducing and reconstituting their exclusion as adults. This seems all the more 
concerning when it comes to the nature of the 'preparation' that is required. 
PreParing for 'Leaving Care' Behind 
At one level, the Guidance does give due consideration to many aspects of young 
people's lives, albeit in the context first of transition towards 'independence' and second, 
in preparation for qeaving care'. These are so embedded in thinking about childhood in 
public care as to seem hardly worthy of consideration, they can seem like 'inevitable' 
realities; to debate them at all the vagary of the theorist, removed from the realities of the 
world. But it is not just that 'contexts' delineate and circumscribe, it is also that in public 
care, even where an 'holistic' accounting is taken of young people, the 'system' will favour 
'measurable progress' and some measures over others - those which are most amenable to 
'measurement' - and will facilitate the 'process', that being leaving care'. Thus whatever 
mitigation Guidance offers, this 'stage' of a life in 'public care' is irredeemably characterised 
as 'a process', one that is in correspondence with the 'natural' transition from childhood to 
adulthood as irreversible, inevitable. Having embarked upon the formalised process of 
leaving care' which corresponds to 'nature' not only is there no going back, but everything 
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must from then on be measured, assessed and judged in those terms; that is, how far, to 
what degree or extent the process is progressing towards its completion. Any deviation, 
disruption does not, therefore fit within this paradigm and can only be judged 'as such' - 
that is to say within the paradigm (discourse). 
Paragraph 7.45 (p. 105) of Chapter 7 sets out 'three broad aspects' to preparation for 
leaving care: "enabling young people to build and maintain relationships with others, (both 
general and sexual relationships); enabling young people to develop their self -esteem; 
teaching practical and financial skills and knowledge" (p. 105: para. 7-4). In each of these 
areas, - which the 
Guidance goes on to elaborate in turn, the study win now expose the 
precedence of transition, temporality and development which occlude 'presence', deferring 
it always to the 'future' formation of the fully present adult. 
Area One: 'Enabling the Young Person to Maintain Relationships with Others'. 
In the first area; 'build and maintain relationships with others' this capacity is 
recognised as: 
crucial to thefuturr well-being of the young person. With such a capacity, he is 
much more likely to cope with the franjifion to adulthood and the sbedal &Jiculkies 
assodated j; ifb leating carr. 
p. 105: para. 7.46 (my italics) 
Again, the problem is not whether this is 'in fact' 'true', but that fact and truth are 
constructed out of a particular discourse of childhood which defers the 'presence' of 
children to their future as adults; this is where the investment must be made; in terms of 
the process of transition, towards an 'end'; 'now' is subjugated to this imperative and it is 
the process, not the child, that has precedence. 'Well-being' is for the future, or if it is in 
the 'present', is manifest in terms of the degree of 'preparedness' for this transition. 
Further, given the 'special difficulties"' associated with leaving care' this preparation is all 
the more crucial. What are these 'special difficulties'? Perhaps the 'stigma' of being a 'care- 
13 'Special Difficulties' may also include those associated with children corning into care in the first place, and which, by 
implication in the text rmy not have been (may not be able to be) 'resolved' at the end of the care experience. 
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leaver', the likelihood of low educational achievement and difficulties reflected in the over- 
representation of care leavers within the unemployed, those on low incomes, the prison 
population and mental health institutions? What of the possibility that these 'special 
difficulties' which, after all (as the Gividance itself admits) arise out of an assodation 'with 
leaving care', are to do with the 'process' itself? 'Special difficulties' may arise in a context 
where the 'natural' 'transition' from childhood to adulthood is expressed in its 'purest' 
form (as regulation) and where the process itself takes Precedence over the individual. 
In taking account of the 'needs' of children in childhood, relying on professional 
'knowledge' and theory to determine the 'best possible' 'care' that a 'good parent' might 
provide in public care, the state may, albeit inadvertently, more effectively maintain 
children who are 'on the margins' as adults who remain so. The more 'knowledge' that is 
acquired, the more certain we become about the 'needs' of children and young people 
within a constructed state of 'transition', the more likely, paradoxically, some children and 
young people will be maintained on the 'other side' of what 'is' 'childhood, or 
subsequently 'adulthood'. In this way, a narrow and prescriptive pursuit of aspirations and 
expectations (however laudable these may be) for children that may be inconsistent with 
what children either want or may be able to achieve may mean that they become more 
susceptible to the scrutiny and intervention of the state if their actions and behaviour are 
not consistent with expectations both within the present and into adulthood. 
Further, it is noteworthy that since all of the Guidance towards building and maintaining 
relationships is subordinate to the process of transition in which 'building and maintaining' 
inheres, it is expressed in terms of what 'should' happen, not what 'must' happen. In other 
words, the process must prevail, one way or another; it may be subject to some delay or 
postponement, no doubt depending on the 'age' or qevel of maturity' of the child (or may 
indeed be speeded up a lack of co-operation disrupts the system) Ultimately, however, 
young people must move on since they do not have a 'presence' here other than that of 
'diminishing childhood' (diminishing 'needs' that can be met in childhood), a 'transitory 
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status', if they are to occupy the 'future. This also means that the emphasis, in terms of 
'preparedness' will be on the quantifiable, what can be 'seen' and measured, what is done 
rather than 'how' it is done. In this circumstance, the 'building and maintaining of 
relationships' will be desirable, but difficult to measure; moreover the youthful objects of 
attention may well (probably will, even) resist the advice as to what constitutes an 
'appropriate' relationship anyway, and form relationships regardless. As an area for 
preparation then, there is limited value here, the practitioner may well be drawn to more 
'fruitful' and quantifiable endeavours with the young person, such as 'teaching' 'skills' for 
'independent living' such as cooldng, budgeting, to arrive at some 'measures' of 
preparedness. 
Area Two: 'Enabling the Young Person to Develop Their Self-Esteem'. 
The second area for 'preparation', 'enabling young people develop their self-esteem' 
begins with the following paragraph which is reproduced here in fun for reasons that will 
become clear: 
Many young people who are being, or have been, caird for, have described 
feelings of shame about being carrd for. These are frequently compounded by 
misunderstandings on the part of others, e. g. that most young people being cared 
for have committed criminal offences, or that there is something wrong with them, 
or that their parents are inadequate and unable to cope. It is therefore all the more 
necessary to encourage young people, from the day they begin to be caredfor, to 
value themselves; to regard their experience of being carrd for without 
embarrassment; and to be able to explain calmly to other people why they are 
being caredfor and how they feel about it. p. 107: para. 7.51 (my italics) 
What seeks scrutiny here? A deconstructive reading must ".. search within the signifying 
phenomenon for the aisis or the unsettAngpimess of meaning and subject rather than for the 
coherence or identity of either one or a mullofido of structures" (Kristeva: 1981: 125). First 
and foremost there is the use of the term 'cared for'. It appears six times in three 
sentences. Whereas elsewhere in the text phrases like 'in residential care', 'in the care 
system', 'for the duration of the placement', 'care placements' proliferate, not to the total 
Childhood Postponed Metaphor, DItTerance, Regulation in Residential Care 209 
exclusion of 'cared for', but more frequently and as interchangeable with it, here they are 
noticeable by their absence, as 'cared for'is noticeable by its sudden appearance. 
Unlike the aforementioned designations, 'cared for' rrquirrs that we are firmly and 
securely located within the text, within the discourse, in which 'cared for' can signify the 
particular in a particular way. To read the text otherwise, to remove the paragraph from 
the Guidance completely and place in front of us 'decontextuahsed', makes somewhat 
alarming, incongruous reading. (Reading the paragraph as if it were talking about 'family 
life', for example makes for startling reading). It does not appear to 'make sense'. It must 
be read 'in context'. This incongruity is immediately 'chased off' within the body of the 
text; it 'makes sense' once again. 
There is more here, though; even from 'within' we can read it in the Guidance in two 
ways. If 'cared for', in its 'literal' (metaphorical) sense, signifies 'benignly', a positive 'cared 
for' arrangement equal amongst others, standing for the benevolence of the state, freely 
given, without qualification or judgement, without 'signifying' anything else but this, why 
on earth the 'shame', 'misunderstanding' and 'embarrassment'? Would this not be a mark 
of ingratitude on the part of the young person, hardly warranting the empathetic tenor of 
the surrounding text? For the sign to 'make sense' within discourse we mmst know that it is 
signi4ring differently here; its metonymic and metaphoric condition must, can only, mark 
an absence. It does not 'mean' what it 'says, even though it 'says' what it 'means'. It is, in 
this 'sense' (if we can keep hold of it) signifýing everything that 'cared for' 'is not'. "The 
sense of 'cared for' as familiar, 'close to home' is both necessary and necessarily displaced 
at the same time. It has to be to 'make sense'. At the point where meaning is 'breaking out' 
discourse reasserts itself determinedly, firn-ily, even reassuringly, effecting a 'closure' on this 
particular subject (in care' is 'cared for) and achieved through iteration. In acknowledging 
141fWe tried for a minute to substitute 'cared fofwith, say 'subjected to a childhood regulated by the state' (not that it is 
as simple as that, but for the sake of argument) the paragraph begins to make a different sort of sense; one thatwould 
indeed seem consistent with some of the stated characteristics of the 'leaving can? experience e. g. low self-esteem, 
stigmatisation, isolation etc. 
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many of the negative connotations of care, Guidance must establish, re-enfold, circumscribe 
the possibility of a disruption, of a rupture in the text. Meaning must be immediately 
'closed off; as readers of the text 'cared for' requires us to 'batten down the hatches' of 
discourse at the possibility of an impossibility; the text achieves this through the stark 
juxtaposition of 'cared for' with 'feelings of shame', 'misunderstandings' and 
'embarrassment'. In trying to describe this we recaU Derrida: 
I skid and I drift irresistibly. I am trying to speak about metaphor. To say 
something proper or literal on the subject, to heat it as my subject, but through 
metaphor Cif one may say so) I am obliged to speak of it more metaphoHco. To it in 
its own manner. I cannot treat it (en traiter) without dealing witb it (sans traiter avec elle) 
without negotiating with it the loan I take from it in order to speak of it. I do not 
succeed in producing a treatise (un traiti) on metaphor which is not treated NdIb (fraiti 
avec) metaphor which suddenly appears intractable rintraitable). 
Derrida: 1987: 103 (Derrida's italics) 
Moreover, these 'feelings of shame' do not 'originate' in 'misunderstandings on the part 
of others', but are derived from 'being cared for'. Does this mean that 'being cared for' is, 
however regrettably, intrinsically 'shameful'? Apparently not, given the misunderstandings. 
But what about what is not apparent? The text states that feelings of shame are coiVoivnded 
by (not 'originated inD certain misunderstandings, e. g. that most young people being cared 
for have committed criminal offences, or there is something wrong with them or their 
parents are inadequate or unable to cope. Leaving aside 'inadequate parents' and what may 
or may not be 'wrong' with those being cared for, is the reader left to infer that those 
young people who have committed offences sbould feel ashamed, if not about offending 
then about being 'cared for'? Do we also infer that those young people being cared for 
whose parents feel they cannot 'cope' should also feel a sense of shame? Who is deserving 
of this sense of shame? If 'being cared for' carries within it a degree of shame, as the 
Gividance seems to be inferring, how is a young person to know whether it belongs to them 
or not. What of the young person who is being cared for because his parents are deemed 
'inadequate' but who subsequently offends? These 'other than' (what childhood 'ought to 
be) 'misunderstandings' of 'others', articulated in the way they are in the text, seem more 
likely to ensuir a sense of shame than alleviate it. Perhaps that is why, ultimately, these 
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feelings of shame cannot be counterpoised, qualified or remedied in the text; they do 
indeed derive from 'being cared for'; they can, however, be compounded and it is this, and 
only this, that the Gmidance will ensure against. This is why it becomes necessary to 
encourage young people to 'value themselves', to accept their destiny and to be able to 
cexplain calmly why they are being cared for. Above all, to explain calmly, to have 
acquiesced, to have entered the discourse, to have unproblematically inherited the 'shame' 
that inheres in being 'cared for', in a place where you 'ought not' to 'be', where to 'be' is 
deferred, postponed, left only with all that 'being cared for"is' 'not'. " 
Finally, in this area of 'preparation' advice is given as to how young people may achieve 
this sense of valuing themselves: 
In doing this [referring to the preceding paragraph] it is particularly helpful if 
young people are told as much about their fatrOy background and about all 
aspects of their cultural and individual identity, e. g. race, language, culture, sex, 
religion and any physical or mental disability ... A young person's individual identity and his cultural background should be presented to him in a positive light 
and not as something about which he should feel defensive. 
p-107: para. 7.52 
Remember that much of what lies in the preparation for leaving care' so far is as an 
investment in the future, displacing the possibility of childhood as 'present' and advancing 
children along an unstoppable route to 'independence' in 'adulthood'. Here, in relation to 
the formation of the 'present' adult; the 'sense of self, of 'identity'is to be found for those 
at the point of transition in the past. 'Being' 'in care' is again deferred to the past, the 
temporal quality of childhood is what requires this; collecting up the past, whatever 
fragments of knowledge about family, culture or whatever, in order to 'discover' as the 
emerging adult an 'identity' and 'culture'. But this is not only a journey of 'self-discovery'; 
the young person's 'individual identity and culture' is to be prrsented to bim in a positive light 
and not as something tofeel defensive about. Signs of the fear of instability. 'Identity' is not 
IST'his bleak scenario urgently needs qualifying. Of course, many practitioners, many children, even managers and 
policy-makcrs resist and work against this imperative (which is Of regulation) and many children and staff may find 
the experience of residential care consequently positive and rewarding. 17he point is that it is 'there' to work against; 
not as some residue of the Workhouse but alive and well in the Guidance that is the very means by which 'progress' 
out of history is supposed to made. 
Cliffdhood Postponed. Metaphor, Difierance, Regulation in RcsidcntW Care 212 
'rrpresented' to him or even 'presented in a positive light', but presented to him; it is a 
'present' (as in gift) of sorts. 'Identity'is constructed, on behalf of the young person out of 
the information given to him and what he is 'told' about all aspects of family background 
and 'cultural and individual identity'. In one sense at least, this 'identity' then, is ready and 
waiting-, it must simply be told, and told in a particular way C'the use of fife-story books 
may be helpfiT' (para. 7.52). Aspects of cultural and individual identity are listed as race, 
religion, language, culture, sex or any physical or mental disability; these must be 
accommodated within the one identity, the self-present self. 'Differences', whatever might 
disrupt the cohesion of this identity must be 'smoothed out', accommodated, made to 
cohere for the young person to 'value themselves', to be of value as the 'adult'. Above all, 
the young person must not be made to feel defensive, but not just,, it seems, about 
individual identity, but also about 'cultural background' (not cultural identio, not family 
backgmmnd, but cultural background). 
Why is this singled out in this way? Why should the young person be likely to feel 
defensive? Perhaps because any difference (not previously validated) must be made 
amenable to the identity which is being presented, manifested as 'coming to terms' with 
one's 'past' and 'cultural background' lest differences provoke instability, fulfil the potential 
for disruption; a fear, possibly, of 'racial tension' arising in the adult. How to master all of 
these aspects that constitute 'identity' in a highly regulated environment which 'presents' 
'identity' on their behalf? Not surprisingly, Guidance suggests that "some young people may 
need considerable counselling before they do come to accept themselves" (para. 7.53); 
more 'specialist' knowledge may be required before the young person becomes fully 
conversant with the discourse and is able to articulate 'themselves' as having a coherent, 
constituted 'identity'. 
Again, in this area as with the previous, the suggestion is not that all of this 
cpreparation' must have taken place before the young person is 'moved on'. On the 
contrary, since determining things like 'identity, 'accepting ones self and the like are 
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hardly susceptible to quantification, attention and focus for decisions for 'moving on' are 
more likely to be on the basis of, for example whether the young person has a job, the 
possibility of accommodation and suchlike. 'Identity'is not something tangible that we can 
point to; it is, of course, not 'there' to be found anyway. But this is not to say that children 
and young people will not be 'judged' in some way or another; the point again is that in 
the pseudo-scientific application of a 'childhood', the presence of children is obliterated 
(only arguably too strong a term); all that prevails is regulation, rigged and manicured in 
the attire of 'good practice' in the Guidance. 
Area Three: 'Practical and Financial Skills and Knowledge. 
The Guidance has less to offer on practical and financial skills and knowledge (devoting 
less than a page to this area) but in doing so, perhaps says more. The Guidance begins by 
setting out a list of all the practical and other skills that are regarded as necessary for 
leaving care. These include (p. 108: para. 7.55): 'how to shop for, prepare and cook food'; 
'Eating a balanced diet'; 'Applying for social security benefits; 'Applying for housing and 
locating and maintaining it'; 'Registering with a doctor or dentist' etc. Here, the Guidance is 
concerned with what is more clearly measurable and ascertainable; perhaps then it is 
primarily these matters that will be attended to and on which emphasis is placed. Not that 
each and every s1dH will be acquired by the point at which the young person leaves, but 
that achieving 'independence' comes to define and characterise the experience of being 'in 
care' through the acquisition of these skills. 'In care', the young person is always 'in 
process'; practical skills are the tangible reminder that this is so. Guidance goes on to state 
that : 
ys a sign of Some young people who are being cared for [note 'caredfor'berr; alwa 
something to come that will stirtch the parameten of meaning], particularly those in 
children's homes, do not have the opportunity of learning such skills. It may 
therefore be necessary to change the regime [beirý wby 'caredfor, was neede4 at the 
homes concerned to give them that opportunity. Young people who are being 
cared for should - like any other young people - start to learn these skills at a basic 
level when in their teens and should be well advanced by the time they leave care. 
p. 108: pam. 7.56 
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'Like any o1beryoungpeo plei but not, prrdsel, .$y, 
because they are 'cared for'. Not like other 
young people in that leaving care will statistically take place at a much younger age than the 
rest of the population will leave home and whose skills, even then, may be far from 
'advanced'. Further, Guidance admits the possibility of care as institutionalising where it 
states that children 'do not have any opportunity of learning such skills' and 'it may be 
necessary to change the trgzýne`. It is the regime that must change in order to advance firstly 
the proposition; like any other young people' as an affirmative (that is, 'like others' when 
it comes to acquiring skills towards 'independence', but not always; for example, when 
other children in say, a family, do not subscribe to a sequenced transition and contravene 
'progression' by not acquiring these shills, with or without the approval/concern of the 
'good parent); and secondly, in order to place emphasis in the environment on a 
regulatory progression towards independence (thus also requiring the reinstatement of 
ccared for' as a 'safety measure' to close off any possibility of regulation becoming too 
exposed, too 'raw'in its 'presence). 
Of course, it is not that learning practical shills, building self-esteem and building 
relationships are not important things to 'do'; the issue is what is done 'in The name' of all of 
the aforementioned, how they are done and what happens 'by default' in the process as an 
unintended consequence. 
Independence? 
The idea of the developing child in care being constantly progressed and in some ways 
'processed'. ready for the day on which they can be 'discharged' is one which both 
constructs and is reflected in the way in which children and young people are looked after' 
within the residential setting where the focus is on achieving targets and goals, task-centred 
practice, emphasising linearity and progress towards the idea of 'full independence'. 
Because of the need to 'measure' such progress, the focus is on acquiring practical skills 
despite the stress on an holistic approach: how to cook, clean, shop, budget money. 
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Reluctance to co-operate with the goal may often be seen in terms of individual failure; a 
lack of interest between in adhering to prescribed targets often interpreted as indolence; 
active pursuit of other activities and interests, especially where those interests do not 
coincide with those prescribed may be more easily construed as problematic or even 
delinquent. Pressures on limited residential resources compound the sense that a young 
person may have of having 'outstayed their welcome'. Achieving any sense of being 
'looked after' is thus conditional upon the degree of conformity a young person is wining 
or able to demonstrate according to the organisation. Demonstrating a degree of 'self 
sufficiency', in terms of holding down a job or employment scheme, making limited 
demands on the organisation and on the professionals within it is rewarded with the 
gradual withdrawal of 'support' and progression further towards the goal of 
'independence'. In material terms, 'independence' may mean access to self-contained 
accommodation outside of the 'care system'where individuals are able to meet the criteria 
and win the confidence of professionals within and external to the organisation, or 
accommodation of a lower quality where it is felt that a young person still represents a 
degree of uncertainty with regard to their ability to conform. 
'Independence' is the prize and the goal; anxiety expressed through unco-operative 
behaviour is not often met with reassurance and more time but with greater pressure to 
move on. Notions of independence, packaged into care plans and programmes are 
designed to prepare young people for the so-called 'reality' of life in the community but 
can be seen as achieving the very opposite. Who, after all, is independent? What does 
independence mean? How many social work professionals and policy-makers would regard 
themselves as 'independent'? It is more than possible that the very notion of 
independence, rather than 'enabling' and 'empowering' an individual to exercise greater 
control over their lives., increases anxiety and uncertainty about what the wider community 
is all about and their individual ability to cope within it. Most adults rely on a variety of 
individuals or groups both within their immediate familial setting and beyond in order to 
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achieve any sense of 'coping' with the pressures of living in the community. Young people 
in the care system are required to achieve a level of self-sufficiency and self-containment 
well beyond that which is expected of others. Further, where they are unwilling or unable 
to do so, they may be disregarded and effectively punished by the withdrawal of further 
support. 
It may well be the case that young people 'looked after' often 'know' a very great deal 
about 'independence' in that they may have come from environments in which they have 
had to exercise autonomous decision-making or been faced with a degree of responsibility 
for themselves or for younger siblings which would not be the expectation of other 
children. To this extent, it may be more productive for the social worker to enable a child 
or young person to develop a degree of dependency and inter-dependency, rather than any 
facile and mythical notion of independence. Further, 'independence' may be associated 
with notions of not asking for help, that doing so implies failure, letting people down. The 
young person must strike a difficult balance; on the one hand full co-operation, despite 
any personal anxiety, will hasten a departure from a qooked after' environment and is likely 
to result in isolation in a fully independent setting, on the other hand a lack of co- 
operation may stall the inevitable for a while, but if prolonged, and involving behaviour 
that is deemed problematic, this will also result in a hasty exit from care. Something in 
between, enough conformity to maintain the support and sympathy of the organisation 
for a while may postpone a move, but combined with intermittent wavering - but always 
ensuring that non-conformity does not include behaviour implying ingratitude or 
arrogance, or which threatens the smooth running of the institution. A step too far in the 
wrong direction may not only result in expulsion, but also criminalisation or a mental 
health categorisation. Young People 'in care' are thus caught up in a 'double bind', a 'catch 
22', a Cuckoo's Nest, which ensures that at either side of the fence (deserving/non- 
deserving, innocent/depraved, victim/perpetrator) they are enclosed within discourse and 
maintained 'on the margins', articulated on behalf of the cmainstream', signi4ring the 'is' of 
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'family' and childhood that is otherwise non-present. 
'Looked After' children are a captive audience; 'knowledge', expertise and theory (the 
more, the better) can be applied in a controlled experiment in the name of the liberal and 
benevolent state (where welfare is the means by which, the 'common humanity' of the 
community at large, is expressed). All that is 'known', all that has been discovered about 
childhood can be put into practice in order to ensure the 'best possible' care; here 'in 
childhood' children arr the future; the investment and inauguration of the rational, 'surface 
competent' adult. It is this interpretation of 'good quality care', one designed to ensure the 
'best possible outcomes' for children which is the aspiration of the 'Looking After 
Children' materials examined in the following section. 
'Looking After' Childbood - The 'LAC' System 
The 'Looking After Children' ('LAC' hereinafter) system (Parker etal: 1991) is designed 
to provide a range of materials (information-gathering forms, assessment forms, training, 
management and implementation guidance and materials) to improve "parenting 
experiences and outcomes for children looked after" (Management and Implementation 
Guide: DoH: 5: 1995). Whereas the Guidance claimed "to provide a framework for good 
practice" in respect of residential care and was not "intended to be a detailed guide to 
good practice" (Guidance and Regulationx 2: 1991), LAC provides for all qooked after' 
children the possibility of introducing ideas "about child care outcomes into social work 
practice" (DoH: 5: 1995). 
For this study it has been argues that 'looked after' is not a straightforward sign; its 
abundance and repetition indicates that it is part of complex networks of meaning and 
signification, often justifying contradictory actions. Within LAC, the practitioner is not 
only working within a 'framework' (which can itself produce unintended consequences) 
but is required to implement Imowledge"systematically', and in a much more explicit way 
than in the Guidance. In LAC, looking after' is not only in the sense of 'attending to', or 
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'caring for', but literally' looking' Cseeing) children 'after' (beyond children, childhood) 
towards 'outcomes', measured against the rational adult. As Garrett suggests "... this 
notion of results, and a more general preoccupation - even fixation - with quantativc 
analysis and the 'measurement' of 'performance', is one of the defining characteristics of 
the LAC systems 'outcomes discourse" (Garrett: 1999: 30). On the basis of 'supporting 
research', (Parker et al (1991); Ward, H. (ed) (1995); Moyers, S. (1997); Ayres, M (1998)) a 
majority of local authority social services departments have now introduced the LAC 
system. By aiming to improve 'parenting experiences' (children's experience mediated 
through the particular, the child's experience of being 'parented' by the corporate body, not 
experiences 'other than), children are more effectively manoeuvred into a childhood 
commensurate with their 'needs'; needs which are articulated, unambiguously through the 
LAC system. Thus, the materials provided "set out a number of aims that a reasonable 
parent might be expected to hold for child ... they also require that plans are made ... and 
that these are rigorously acted upon" (DoH (1995): 5: para. 1.2) and further, at paragraph 
1.3: 
Used systematically, the materials also benefit the local authority ... to produce 
an aggregate picture of the characteristics of children looked after ... and the 
outcomes of their experiences. They also collect the data ... to complete the SSDA 
903 return required annually by the Department of Health 
These 'secondary' benefits which coincide with a nquinment to produce data further 
reinforce an emphasis, albeit unintended, on actions, rather than actors, on what is done, 
rather than how it is done, despite the stress in the materials against seeing LAC as simply 
a 'form-filling' exercise: 
Although responses to many questions Cin the Assessment and Action 
Records) can be given by simply ticking a box, completing the Records is not 
intended to be a mere question-and-answer, fact-finding procedure. The questions 
encourage discussion about issues that are known to be important to the long- 
term well-being of children 
p. 27: para. 4.19 
The main 'toor provided in the documentation is the 'Assessment and Action Record' 
which is designed to assess children's progress, monitor care and plan improvements 
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across seven 'developmental dimensions'. These are: Health; Education; Identity; Family 
and Social Relationships; Social Presentation; Emotional and Behavioural Development; 
Self Care Skills. The records aim to help practitioners to "assess all aspects of children's 
development from birth to adulthood" (DoH (1995): p. 9: para. 2.15) and within each 
dimension age-specific aims are identified "which carers should encourage children and 
young people to meet" (p. 10: para. 2.17). A series of detailed questions will then establish 
"whether children are being offered the experiences which research suggests arc necessary 
for their satisfactory progress" (p. 10: para. 2.17). Experiences must be consistent not only 
with progress, but with aims that are age-specific; other experiences are occluded and 
children only occupy a Idnd of 'present' in a mythical space; whilst their actions and 
behaviours are 'in the here and now' as measurable manifestations of transition towards 
adulthood, they 'themselves', whatever 'sense' they make of all of this (and of 'filling' the 
"space' of 'presence' with other possibilities) and the rest of the social world are 'outside' 
of time; relocated in a 'childhood' bereft of rationality; innocent but dangerous, of nature 
but requiring the supplement; their actions of observational value and 'in' childhood, their 
cselves' rendered of childhood and of Wue' only inasmuch as they manifest 'childhood' 
(either as 'complete' or as qacking' in some dimension or other). 
Whatever 'outcome data'is derived from the assessment can subsequently be used not 
to re-evaluate the presuppositions that may belie the system, or to 'intercept' the progress 
of the child through development (though it may make 'improvements' towards achieving 
this for the individual), but, on an aggregated basis for "evaluating the service provided" 
(para. 2.14). The Management and Implementation Guide goes on to state that the 
"records can ensure that children receive a standard of care that helps them achieve 
satisfactory outcomes wherever they are living" (p. 12: para. 2.24). Does this mean that 
when children are living at home they are assumed to be achieving satisfactory outcomes, 
and that it is only wherever children are living 'in care' that the Record will ensure 
coutcomes? The phrase 'wherever they are living' signifies 'innocuously', reassuring the 
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reader of the benevolence of the system in improving outcomes 'everywhere'. For a 
moment, an 'unqualified' configuration of signs allows a lapse into passive acceptance of 
the value and worth of LAC universally (this can only be a momentary lapse; just long 
enough to entertain the possibility of universal application, which must be swiftly 
dismissed before the implications can be realised). But the language seduces the reader, 
briefly, but necessarily, in order to continue thus: "When children change placements ... a 
copy of the most recent Record should follow them in order to preserve continuity of 
care" (para. 2.24). So it is, of course not 'children everywhere', but children in public care 
who are subject to a degree of observation and surveillance that would otherwise be 
unpalatable, even intolerable in the liberal state. In context, the system can signify 
benignly; out of 'context' it represents the excessive intrusion of the state into individual 
liberty and family autonomy. 
This ambivalence and duality in signification is further manifest when the Guide 
addresses the arrangements for children receiving respite care; those situated somewhat 
more precariously between public and family care, where sensitivity to excessively 
regulatory processes is more acute and perhaps more likely to be challenged by the 
carticulate', 'educated' parent, particularly where such care is normally provided in a 'purely, 
supportive and non-stigmatising capacity, e. g. for families with children who have a 
disability. Here, use of the Assessment and Action records "will be a matter for discretion" 
(p. 12: para. 2.25); indeed, they "may not prove helpful for children who receive short and 
occasional periods of respite accommodation", but they are recommended where 
"children receive more than 120 days respite care within a twelve month period". Not to 
have suggested the use of the records in respite care would be too anomalous, too stark a 
juxtaposition of difference; again, LAC must represent itself as 'universally' positive, at the 
same time as targeting a specific group of children. In fact, in its implementation, many 
local authorities make only limited use of LAC in respite care, but this does not matter, the 
principle is already established; application is now appropriately a matter for 'discretion'. 
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The 'positive' value of LAC in either looked after or respite arrangements is not the 
question here; it is completely beside the point. This study is an examination of how LAC 
works as part of a wider process which differentiates and regulates particular children in a 
particular way beneath the alibi of the 'is' of 'childhood', child development, 'needs' and 
'best interests'. Indeed, the very fact this study is required to qualify the argument all along 
the way is indicative not of its inherent 'weakness', but of the inherent strength and 
inclusive power of discourse; any challenge to the orthodoxy can be swiftly dismissed with 
derision as abandoning 'self-evident' imperatives about the need to improve standards of 
care and outcomes for 'looked after' children. 
In addition to the Assessment and Action Records, the system provides information, 
planning and review forms to support the sequential assessment and review process; these 
comprise; Essential Information Record, Placement Plan, Care Plan and Review form, all 
of which, in combination, fulfil all of the requirements of the Children Act (1989) in 
respect of looked after children and those of the Guidance and Regulations. Overall, LAC 
represents a comprehensive attempt to 'get beyond' legal, policy and guidance 
'frameworks' and into 'practice' 'itself. It is as if the LAC system is appealing to our very 
sense of 'common sense' (that which is so often 'uncommoný by presenting a 'practical' 
approach to ensure all of those things that we should all aspire to for all our children; an 
appeal to liberal professionalism to 'get a grip' on 'childhood' and 'child care' on the basis 
of what we all rrally, 'know'; to abandon any abstruse, 'esoteric abstractions' of childhood 
and provide a firmer footing in 'reality' (see also Garrett: 1999). 
In auditing progress towards implementation Noyers: 1997), it was thus: 
... important to know whether and to what extent, the 
forms were being used 
in local authorities (so as to enable) audited local authorities to identify successful 
implementation ... ; identify and clarify 
issues that help or hinder implementation 
in order to make necessary adjustments; identify whether local authorities are 
likely to collect sufficient data about children that can be collected together and 
used as management information. 
Moyers: 1997: 4 
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There is a self-confidence here, an unqualified certainty about 'What needs to be done': 
the key lies merely in the effective implementation of the system. In one sense, 'theory' is 
no longer 'theoretical' (hypothetical, conjectural, suppositional, debatable), within a 
contested field of study and interpretation, but 'actual', truthful, authentic and most of all, 
verifiable (being based on 'supporting researchý, seff-veHjing within discourse and through 
the operation of the system. Within the LAC discourse, the fear of a disturbance, of the 
potential for instability of the signs 'child' or 'childhood' is thus regulated. 
The Ubiquitous 'Corporate Parent' 
In Chapter Four the Guide describes LAC as a means of "setting down on paper the 
process by which ordinary parents make plans and monitor the progress of their children, 
(it) enables agencies to fulfil both their parrntal obkýafions and their statutory dudes towards 
the children and young people they look after" (P. 23: para. 4.3, my italics) and later (p. 23: 
para: 4-3): 
... research has shown that when responsibilities for care are divided between a 
number of people, important pairnfing tasks can be overlooked unless they are 
x, ritzen down. If the materials are viewed as a bureaucratic exercise they will not be 
used properIT, on occasions supervisors may need to encourage staff to think 
bgond the meebanics offom-filliq to the dynamic process it represents. (my italics). 
Encouragement to 'think beyond' form-filling not only retains the primacy of form- 
filling (that which must be 'thought beyond), it also displaces the presence of the child 
further, subjugating them to the 'dynamic pmees? form-filling represents. At the risk of 
bureaucratising the care of children, the system points the practitioner not to the child, but 
to the process that the system prescribes; 'dynamism' is encouraged between process and 
bureaucracy, not between 'child' and 'practitioner'; process and bureaucracy prefigure 
both; it is the actions of the monitored and the monitor that find a 'presence'. Further, by 
transcribing 'parenthood' into the corporate body, a central proposition of the LAC 
system, the sign 'reasonable parent' does not signify 'freely', but in a particular way; 
cnature' and the supplement are 'made one'; the 'reasonableness' of parenthood is in both 
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its compatibility and constitution within the discourse; 'reason' resides not in the 'parent' 
'themselves', but in LAC and is to be meted out by the corporate body. " 
The effect, as Garrett (1999) suggests, may be perceived as "marginalising, even 
disparaging a child or young person's actualparmt(s) with whom the local authority is 
supposed to be working in partnership" (Garrett: 1999: 32). 'Reason' is not the property of 
the family of the child who is looked after', they are on the 'other side' (at the same time 
as managing to be constructed as 'partners); as such they do not represent, but constitute 
the absence not only of 'reason', but of other signifiers in the text (discourse): 'family', 
ccare', looked after', and 'childhood'. This appropriation of meaning and signification is 
what allows all of these to signify 'other than'; and to signify this 'otherness' not only 
un pmblematically, (and 'unrecognisablyý, but 'appropriately', above all, meanheull, y (as in 'full' 
of 'other' meaning) within the discourse of public care". 
Indeed, their very potency and 'fullness' of meaning, their resonance within the text 
(discourse), becomes itself a mythical sign in the Barthesian sense of 'second order 
signification' (Barthes: 1957), not of excessive intervention and/or regulation, but of 
'progress'. Such is the power of language. The 'dynamic process' referred to is in this way 
one of re-constituting meaning, reconstituting subjects within discourse. 
It is in this way that the Assessment and Action Records are able to identify "the aims 
of a reasonable parent for a child at each age and stage of development" (P. 26: para. 4.13), 
regardless of what an 'actual' parent might or might not do. The process will also ensure 
that the child in question is "being offered the type of experiences and quality of care 
which research has identified as necessary to long-term well-being" (P-26: para. 4.13). 
Quality of care and experience are inextricably linked with the aims of the 'reasonable 
parent' where reasonableness is derived from within the discourse and 'parent' is an alibi 
for the corporate body. 'Long-term well-being' is in turn the culmination of a particular 
16 As discussed previously, this notion of the 'reasonable parene was derived from the Children Act 1989 (s. 31) 
17 In other words and cm context; they metaphorically and inetortyrnically 're-presene the 'unfamiliae. 
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construction of childhood for which 'research', relying upon all of the same 
presuppositions of LAC, is able to identify the necessary 'care and experiences'. 
The 'foundation' here, of 'reasonable parent' which arises in discourse, is thus further 
self-verified by the 'research' that subsequently and continually (through data collection 
and outcome measurement) goes to inform and validate the framework for LAC (see also 
Garrett: 1999). That this 'reasonable parent' bases child-rearing activity broadly upon 
'developmental psychology' with an appropriate degree of 
accommodation/sensidvity/acquiescence to 'rights' (normally a nod towards the child as 
, citizen), cultural differences and the 'sociological' - just enough to remain 'within' 
discourse and 'on message, is hardly surprising. Structuring the Assessment and Action 
records around developmental areas and age bands "mirror(s) the teleological approach 
which characterizes developmental psychology" (Garrett: 1999: 35) and creates the risk (or, 
perhaps, necessity) of children being regarded more as 'human becomings' than 'human 
beings' (see Qvortup: 1994: 4, cited in Garrett: 1999: 35). 
A 'Meaningful' Conversation 
We have already pointed to the stress placed in the I-AC system on the need not to 
regard the process as a form-filling exercise. In the Guide this need is further explained: 
"Assessment and Action Records are designed to set an agenda for xeanhýrýl conmrsation 
between children and young people ... in order to ensure that all the necessary tasks of 
parenting have been addressed" This 'getting beyond' the form-filling and 'beneath' the 
surface of paperwork, process and information-gathering towards what we might call a 
'depth encounter' is, however, only meaningful in a particular sense, not least because any 
conversation will be 'meaningful' in some way or another; here, though the 'value', 
cmeaning' and 'presence' of conversation is in relation to the completion of 'parenting 
tasks'within the discourse of public care, and LAC in particular. 
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Any 'depth' then, is to be experienced not 'beneath' the surface or away from the 
system and towards the child, but 'upon' the surface (to extend the metaphor); it is 
structured upon the surface as a temporary refuge for the child to 'inhabit'. just when the 
practitioner, weighed down by the paperwork, might feel a way 'out', the discourse 
anticipates and subsumes any encounter within its field of signification. By 'helpfully' 
encouraging the practitioner towards creative ways of 'engaging' the child, 'meaningful 
conversation' is particularised and circumscribed in ways that attach meaning not only to 
the conversation, but to the 'system', and thereby the discourse; meaning derived from the 
conversation is thus destined for appropriation to the production and sustentation 
(sustenance) of the system (discourse); it is its very 'lifeblood'. In this way, any 
cappearance' of the 'child' at the 'centre' is only inasmuch as their constructed 'needs' 
present themselves and the extent to which the child's superimposed 'development' can 
assessed, 'measured', 'addressed' in one way or another and subsequently 'inputted' 'on an 
aggregate basis' into the data bank of the Department of Health. We can see a possible 
modus operandi where the Guide proffers an example from the Assessment and Action 
Record relating to the diet of children qooked after': 
... the dietary questions could be answered in isolation, providing accurate infortnation about the food offered to a particular child. However, those 
completing the records need to appreciate that the value of asking questions is the 
opportunity tbg createfor exploihýg xilb a ebild or yom)%person the nalm and iiVortance of 
a balanced Xet, and for considering what new foods s/he might like to try. Such a 
conversation could take place between carer and child in an inforrnal setting, 
perhaps while preparing a meal. The child could then help the carer transfer the 
conversation to the Record at an appropriate time. Responses about such issues 
xdllpmtide a live, snapsbotpidurr of a ebild at apartimlar qge. 
p. 27: para. 4.19 (my italics) 
Perhaps it is significant that the Guide selects dietary questions as the example of an 
opportunistic use of LAC; not only because preparing food will be one of the regular 
occurrences in the daily life of the placement but also because the need for food, as an 
uncontested universal 'need' provides an innocuous 'way in' to the 'needs discourse'; 
where this extent of prescription about the nature and context of 'meaningful 
conversation' might seem excessive, overly paternalistic or too explicitly 'value-laden', here 
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it seems eminently reasonable and appropriate. The 'subject matter' of the conversation 
makes the form and context (LAC as the 'vehicle' for the conversation) more amenable to 
the reader. Indeed, later in the Guide, it is acknowledged that more 'emotionally charged' 
issues such as 'sexuality and contraception'will require preparatory work where supervisors 
may also need "to alert practitioners to local agency policies for addressing sensitive 
issues ... before raising them with children" (p. 29: para. 4.28). So the example relates to the 
relatively 'neutral' topic of diet explicitly (almost) to illustrate the extent to which it is 
anticipated that LAC will nevertheless infiltrate in all 'areas of development' the 'everyday', 
informal encounter between carer and child. 
It is in the very fact of reaching into the minutiae of daily life, presented as a positive 
means of avoiding an over-bureaucratic approach that LAC occludes the presence of the 
child and 'fragments' the 'carer subject'. Again, 'interaction' and the 'experiential' are 
structured to the extent of rendering each and every encounter potentially devoid of 
spontaneity and creativity since the carer must, at all times, even in an 'informal setting' 
retain the possibility of filling in the form appropriately at a 'later date' and sensing 
whether or not to take a 'live snapshot picture of the child at a particular age', not unlike a 
photo-journalist always on the ready for the next event in the picture-narrative, 
anticipating, one step removed from surrounding events and people. The relationship with 
the child is not only mediated, filtered and diffused but constituted as such through the 
system - behaviour, action and events; 'what' is done becomes the 'presence' of childhood; 
one which is permanently and irrevocably recorded on the forms. Such is the productivity 
of discursive practices. 
Moreover, the creative and the imaginative, far from being banished from the 
discourse, are also embraced within; thus, at p. 27: para. 4.20: 
experienced practitioners will use the Records creatively and imaginatively, they 
will discover that each question can stimulate a further 20 ... If the records are to 
used to maximum effect, each question needs to framed according to the child's 
understanding and stage of development ... discussion should be allowed to move 
from one dimension to another in whatever sequence is most helpful to the child. 
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Far from subvert or challenging the system then, creativity and imagination can be used 
to extend the discourse further; 'experience' will enable the practitioner not to be guided 
by the child, but to use imagination and creativity to 'helpfully' enable the child to move 
sequentially through the landscape of their pre-determined childhood from one dimension 
to another. 
'Dumbing Down' Child Cate Ptactice 
Where the role of the supervisor may have been one of engaging in an opportunity to 
discuss productively some of the uncertainty, relativity and situational condition of 'theory 
in practice', within LAC the Guide suggests that: 
Ihe Assessment and Action Records introduce a number of issues which 
supervisors should raise with staff. They give a comprehensive picture of child 
development with which practitioners undertaking child care work should be 
familiar. Social workers are sometimes so swamped by crises in a child's life that 
they forget to monitor everyday matters. Moreover, their understanding of 
developmental norms may become eroded by unremitting contact with situations 
where standards of care are not reasonable. 
p. 28: para. 4.25 
Certainly, a familiarity with 'child development' is pertinent to the practitioner, but the 
problem here is that what might have been 'theories of child development' (and, perhaps 
even other understandings and theories) are now singularised and made definitive; 
discussion is only about the comprehensiveness of the social worker's 'picture' compared 
with that of the system; with certainty versus uncertainty, familiarity with unfamiliarity. 
The possibility of being 'swamped' by crises is cause to revisit the 'everyday' on the basis 
of this knowledge, to re-assert 'truth' and 'monitor', not to question how such crises, and 
the response to them may themselves be constituted in part by such knowledge. Again, the 
question might be asked how familiar the 'reasonable parent' would be with the 
comprehensive picture of child development presented by LAC? - and how, they too may 
be so 'swamped' by crises of one sort or another that they 'forgot' to monitor everyday 
.d are 
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matters - even if they had the 'knowledge', certainty and the self-enclosed vacuum with 
which LAC provides social workers. 
In the same section the reader is advised that "Moreover, their (social workers) 
understanding of developmental norms may become eroded by unremitting contact with 
situations where standards of care are not reasonable" (p. 28: para. 4.25). This is just to 
confirm that we are within a discourse of public care; 'reasonableness' means something 
else here than it does elsewhere. Accepting that many children in many familial situations 
are looked after 'reasonably' who never come into contact with the social services and that 
within those situations many adults involved in child-rearing do not, in fact, have as 
extensive a knowledge of 'child development' as that provided by LAC, 'reasonable' must 
mean something else for these 'families'. However, once within the scrutiny of the local 
authority, 'reasonable' stands for the measures of developmental norms in LAC; an 
understanding of which may be eroded where the standard of care does not match up to 
these measures. 
But perhaps it is the possibility of thinking &fferently, about 'standards of care' that is 
eroded when 'reasonable' must signify the 'corporate parent' and the 'standards' presented 
by LAC. Other standards of care, reasonable or not, seem more likely to be judged on the 
side of unreasonable in this circumstance. This is the case particularly when the task is not 
to encounter the child or family on their own terms, or acquire different understandings of 
child-rearing activities, or to engage with differences of 'knowing' of or about childhood, 
but to measure, measure, measure, always guarding against the possibility of becoming 
desensitised to standards that may have slipped, or which, within discourse, are simply on 
the other side of reason. The presumption of 'unremitting contact' with 'unreason' is thus 
self-validating and may ensure that the most marginalised and vulnerable children and 
families remain characterised as such and that the social worker will inevitably see more 
and more standards of care which are 'unreasonable' the more that LAC is unashamedly 
driven into the 'everyday thinking' about the 'everyday matters' encountered by the social 
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worker. This is not only about an occlusion of differences arising from culture, class, race 
or ethnicity, but differences between ag one child and the next, a)! y one 'family' and the 
next, given the way in which 'knowing' and encountering each and every child and family 
is circumscribed by discourse. 
Within LAC then, there is little space for alternative interpretation. 'Re-readings', whilst 
they always/already inhere in practice, will not find a place in the system. Whilst based on 
'theory', LAC represents and constitutes an example of increased anti-intellectualism in 
social work by presenting child care work (and childhood) as predictable, determinable and 
devoid of contradiction, complexity and relativity despite occasional protestations to the 
contrary (see also Dominelli: 1996). In doing so within this 'safe haven' of childhood, it 
also lends itself to some of the anti-intellectual sanctimony of the 'do-gooder' (politicians 
and the like) set resolutely on securing children within a childhood that through the self- 
interest of some adults enables a particular view of the world to prevail. 'Theory' can be 
acquired in qualifying courses and then dumped on the doorstep of practice as the 
practitioner goes armed with a briefcase full of checklists, forms and outcome measures. 
It is worth pausing to consider how would it be (however implausible) if the state 
required Action and Assessment Records to be completed on behalf of all children? What 
to make of an individual 'childhood' then, with it there, before you, displayed and 
dissected into areas of development, a new booklet for each developmental milestone? A 
'self' disaggregated, appropriated into discourse explicitly, unequivocally, leaving nothing 
implied; disseminated into elements, mini 'objects', constituents of enquiry and 
assessment? Whence the "wild imaginings' or the 'obstinate questionings of sense' of 
childhood (of adults about childhood) out of which the possibility of the 'presence' in and 
of the moment; of making a sense of 'self' out of a childhood that is public property? As a 
remaining vestige of the project of Modernity, LAC is inflicted experimentally upon some 
children and may consign them to the pursuit of a 'presence' as adults that is constructed 
out of a 'truth', a 'childhood' that was never really 'there' but superimposed upon them 
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much more explicitly, unprovisionally and definitively than for other children; placing 
them in the unenviable position of always 'going against' and resisting, rather than 're- 
inventing' themselves 'freely'; either rejecting and defining themselves as 'other than' or 
accepting 'fate'. 
Of course, LAC is not meant for all children, but some children in particular; those 
who represent, on bebalf of all children, the threat of instability and disruption; those who 
must therefore, be irredeemably secured in childhood. 
Moreover, given this comprehensive, all-embracing 'accounting for' of children's 
'needs' in public care, what then of those who resist; the 'continuing-to-be' 'wayward' 
child, the offender, the care-leaver whose previously 'deserving nature' (in childhood) has 
not been matched as 'becoming-adult' by co-operation, conformity and 'gratitude'? Nfight 
they not be more resolutely, justifiably, 'appropriately' pathologised and/or contained (in 
their own and the community's interests) or otherwise excluded of their own volition (and 
therefore non-deserving)? And who, that will be 'heard' aitbin the 'continuitv' of &scourse, in 
the absence of any 'depth' encounter, and in the 'presence' of all the 'evidence' (LAC) will 
say 'something else' about childhood; That it was not 'like Mat? 
Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that the temporal quality of childhood, characterised by 
postponement and deferral, has consequences for all children, but particular consequences 
for children in public care. Whereas in Chapter five, the study searched for the marks of 
incoherence in the Guidance, suggesting the arbitrariness of the 'truth' presented therein, 
this chapter has examined some of the particularities that are manifest in public care; the 
ubiquitous deferrals and postponements that are all the more accentuated for children 
'looked after'. Paradoxically, by even striving for children in public care to have 'more of a 
say', they in actuality end up with less' of a say (or more, but more of the same thing), 
since 'what can be said' is all the more circumscribed by discourse. To this extent, the 
harder the well-intentioned practitioner tries to engage or include the child through the 
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further deployment of knowledge, expertise and social work 'tools', the less opportunity 
there is for the child to 'say' anything for themselves that is not either more of the same (a 
repetition that occludes difference) or different and therefore not counted. By imposing a 
quasi-scientific rationality to looking after children in public care, children are perpetually 
deferred to an 'other' presence; indeed, they may well be active themselves in this process. 
LAC can thus only ever signify a kind of self-generated absence as children constantly slip 
away to the margins and re-inscribed within discourse, only to again slip away. The purer 
the theoretical model of childhood that is imposed, the less it can be realised in actuality. 
We do not understand ebildirn by virtue of the knowledges that constitute the discourse of 
childhood; rather, we make sense of children irtmspediveyl, that is, we view them 
retrospectively IbmuSb the discourse of childhood which we as adults inhabit (albeit in the 
nano-sccond between experience and meaning). Children are somewhere else altogether, 
unbeknown to us, signifying freely. 
On the other hand, LAC may ironically provide a prime opportunity, one that arises 
out of its very positioning and exposure; it leaves itself open, perhaps much more so than 
the Gmidance and ReSmIalions, to deconstruction; the possibility remains to engage 
deconstructively with the process, with children and with others responsible for 'looking 
after' children. After all, the LAC enterprise is an impossibility, it seeks to position itself in 
a tsocial and economic vacuum' (Garrett: 1999: 42) and sets itself down, centre stage for an 
to see, wearing the emperor's new clothes; without nuance or subtlety (so often the 
characteristic of regulation); what is often inferred is now made explicit; LAC provides for 
itself the opportunity for the 'incoherence' to 'speak for itself'. Competent practitioners 
may, with children, reverse the 'incoherence' in the text(s), away from the prospect of 
unregulated childhood that is the 'sub-text' of the LAC system, towards the system itself 
and thus positively and affirmatively assert 'themselves'. 
CHAPTER SE TIEN 
POSTMODERNISM, NEO-LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL WORK 
VALUES 
Introduction 
This chapter will attempt to draw together some of the current themes and dilemmas 
this study and other postmodem/post-structuralist approaches pose for residential care 
and social work theory by setting the discussion of children's needs and rights against the 
political backdrop of neo-liberalism, first set out in Chapter One. In particular, the 
contention posited by some social work academics that there has been an 'erosion' of 
values in social work which is itself an effect of the profession becoming inevitably caught 
up in "neo-liberal reactions against social action, communitarian. values and state-led 
interventions based on the insights of the social sciences" (Howe: 1996: 87) will be critically 
examined. ' Clearly, there is much within the dcconstructive work of this study that would 
support the idea that valucs-bascd practice (that is, practice which emphasises a sense of 
tnutuality between professionals and 'servicc-uscrs', one that is based on a 'qualitative', 
relationship-bascd encounter, drawing on the social worker's interpretative skills and based 
on broadly psycho-social understandings of family life) has been marginalised in favour of 
outcome-oncntatcd action and performance measurement; however, the study win 
challenge those analyses that suggest the way forward can straightforwardly be a trassertion 
of valmes within the profession. This challenge is made on two main grounds; firstly, that 
such critiques of nco-libcral welfare seem to imply that postmodernity and neo-libcralism. 
can largely be regarded as synonymous (as if the former were an 'era', rather than a set of 
Postmodernism, Neo-Ebernfism and Social Work Values 233 
ideas) and secondly, as a consequence, the idea of a 'return to values' is flawed, as a 
nostalgic plea for the reassertion of certainties within Modernity (that is, a leftward swing 
back of the pendulum within the binarism of individualism and communitarianism) which 
would inevitably and necessarily maintain the 'other', the excluded on the margins. For this 
study, the legitimate reassertion of values-based practice can only have 'value' where values 
are not fixed, but open, negotiable and articulated in a context where uncertainty, 
ambivalence and difference are not resisted, but embraced. 
Proceduralised Caring, Children's Rights and the Invisibility of Values 
To be sure, in residential care, personal interaction, discretion, creativity and the freely 
experiential have become increasingly restricted by proceduralisation, guidance and the 
professionalisation of the caring task, the encounter in this study with the Guidance and the 
LAC documentation is, of course, testimony to this. These are, however, only one of 
many other procedural documents that are required, by the Guidance itself, to have a 
presence in Children's homes. Chapter One of the Guidance, para. 1.39 'Written Guidance' 
requires that "staff in all homes should clearly understand their duties and should have, as 
a minimum, a written job description. In addition they should receive written guidance on 
important procedures"(p. 9). Ile Guidance goes on to list 30 separate areas for which such 
important procedures 'may' be required including- 
Admission and Reception of Children; Methods of Care and Control; Care 
Planning; Statement of Safety Policy:, Child Protection; Care Practices towards 
children of the opposite sex to staff; Dealing with Sexuality and Personal 
Relationships; Arrangements for Regulating and Vetting Visitors to the Home; 
Dealing with Aggression and Violence; Risk Taking; Log book and Diary 
Recording. (p9-10) 
Such a comprehensive regulation and proceduralisation that encompasses not only the 
purely administrative and organisational details, but also the interpersonal, inevitably means 
that any spontaneity or discretionary interaction or decision-making are, at best, inhibited, 
and at worst 'administered' and 'proccduralised' to the extent that they are rendered 
See also flowc: 1994, Paftoml998 and Smith 1997. 
Postmodeinism, Neo-liberafism and Social Work Values 234 
'empty' of any 'common-sense' meaning. From the suggested list of procedure documents 
the Guidance provides (above) it is not only fire procedures and financial procedures that 
are covered but 'care practices towards the opposite sex', and 'dealing with sexuality and 
personal relationships'. The difficulty here is the same as that discussed in the previous 
chapter; that child-care practice becomes more about the rigorous and sequential 
implementation of procedures rather than the quality of relationships with the child. This 
is despite the fact that Guidance is supposed to ensure against this: 
Regulations and procedures have to be drafted in terms of the best interests of 
the child. However, children do not develop in isolation but through interaction 
with others. So whatever the specific purpose of a child care regulation or practice, 
it is always necessary to set consideration of an individual cbildý needs into a social 
context in which relationships are of central significance 
Cbild Cate Prind ples. 1991: 4 (my italics). 
But it is already too late; setting the 'individual child's needs into a social context' (as if 
they could be seen otherwise) through the framework of Guidance becomes itself another 
procedure for which practitioners will require yet more guidance. The qualifier (individual 
child's /best interests) to Guidance and Regulations does not open the door to other 
possibilities but secures it all the more firmly. As in the previous chapter, where children 
themselves may have had 'something to say' they are, again preceded by their 'needs' 
which serve as shorthand for "what can be said. The 'individual' is at first accounted for in 
terms of the Guidance and second within the discourse of 'needs' and 'best interests', the 
parameters of which are based upon universalised presuppositions and then set out 
through discourse and by reference to documentation that surrounds the child in public 
care (i. e. Guidance, LAC and other frameworks of reference). 
This, then, is an example of iteration, a statement repetition which acts as an occlusion 
at the veg same time as it masquerades as 'progress'. Moreover, whereas what Guidance SYS is 
that the child should figure centrally and not peripherally in all of these matters, the effect 
is not to turn the attention of practitioners towards the individual child, but, ironically, away 
from them in order to 'find out' more about how to 'look after' them in the best way 
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possible; that is, to find out more about a construction of childhood that may, or may not 
bear some relation to children themselves. In a Foucauldian sense this is significant for this 
study in terms of how the Gmidance is played out as 'discipline in practice'. In this case, a 
legitimate consensus about the need to regulate public care is the vehicle for further 
regulation of childhood; childhood, as a construct, transcends this, or any discussion, 
about the actuality of child rearing practices, rather than being itself the focus for a more 
open debate. It is knowledge about childhood (child development) that will help to resolve 
the problem of trying to see children as individuals within a regulatory framework; the 
practitioners attention is actively turned away from the child in childhood (i. e., as constructed 
out of 'needs', 'best interests'. etc. ), rather than towards the child 'in actuality', freely 
signifying, full of possibility, because the child as constructed is not, in fact, there, it must be 
visited da discourse to be seen for what it 'is' (not). To do otherwise may precipitate an 
incursion of the discourse. 
Similarly, a preoccupation with children's rights in which the notion of children 
themselves as 'citizens' is given form and shape has enabled some of the aforementioned 
focus on action, rather than meaning, to be accommodated within the discourse of 
childhood. Whilst the logic of neo-liberalism was inevitably required to acquiesce to the 
child as citizen and recognise a legitimate 'claim' to rights, these have been expressed in a 
particular way. Children's rights have become something else that now can be said about 
childhood, but only inasmuch as those rights largely serve to reinforce and maintain the 
discourse. This study has explored some of the ways in which children's rights are 
articulated and constituted out of and in relation to their needs, embracing the spectrum 
of understandings and discourses about childhood, needs and rights, not contradicting 
each other, not cancelling each other out. Where needs are 'given', rights may be 
established without the threat of disruption. Any extension of liberty, autonomy and 
decision-making for children is mitigated and counterbalanced by emphasising 'needs' 
(where needs are universal and largely self-evident 'truthsý; needs which, more often than 
Postmodemism, Neo-libetafism and Social Work Values 236 
not will need to be met in a precise and regulated way (either through the family or 
through the state). Both needs and rights are thereby conceptualised within the same 
discourse, despite the inherent tension. What the inclusion of a rights discourse does is to 
codify and express needs and values in a way which is more amenable to a focus on 
measurable outcomes, rather than the less tangible 'quality of relationships', for example, 
which may be motivated out of a more holistic appreciation of the individuals' value and 
self-worth. "Rights, however, only serve as motivating principles in the sense that they 
impose a moral obligation to act, or in some circumstances, to refrain from action" 
(Smith: 1997: 5). In this way, where rights constitute a codification of needs regarded as 
universal, and combine with an imperative for either action or inaction, the 'advancement' 
of children's civil liberties and of children 'as citizens' is further secured within discourse 
(nithin, not external to, the 'given", 'childhood); it thus becomes possible to promote such 
tights without a threat of instability. 
Problems with Seeking a Return to Values: a Post-Structuralist Critique 
Certainly, rights are more amenable to being codified where, for example 'values' are 
not. Rights aim to ensure compliance; they fit within a proceduralised, legalistic framework 
which lends itself to quantitative measure. Smith (1997) argues that rights have 
consequently become 'dislocated' from values which are increasingly 'invisible' in practice 
where practitioners become, rather than autonomous professionals working with the 
cexperiential' and qualitative, more like technicians than engineers. The incorporation of a 
'rights discourse' into social work is seen as commensurate with the shift towards 
performance measurement and 'outcomes' and the erosion of 'value-based practice'. 
Increasingly, and in the context of a new emphasis on individualism and autonomy, 
families on the receiving end of social care are encouraged through 'partnership', 
participation and 'empowering practices' to assume responsibility for their actions - to 
make the 'right' choices available to them, rather than focus on underlying 'causes'. For 
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social work practitioners, the role is one of collecting information on families in order to 
determine their eligibility as 'service-users', or identify and manage a variety of 'risk 
factors', acting as brokers or technicians in accessing services and measuring performativity 
and 'outcomes'. Thus, Howe suggests "it is the visible surface of social behaviour which 
concerns practitioners and not the internal workings of psychological and sociological 
entities" (Howe: 1996: 88) and that this preoccupation with 'surface', rather than 'depth' 
considerations is consistent with a wider fragmentation and diffusion of long-established 
monoliths about the 'nature' of the 'social' and the 'psychological'. 
Of course, there is one sense here in which values in social work have not been eroded 
at all; they are just different and differently expressed, implied and not explicit. They are 
those of 'action' and 'surface', performance, target-setting, outcome, quantification, 
procedure and codification and an emphasis not on bow things are done but wbat is 
achieved. For Smith, it is argued that in finding the way out of this dilemma a "renewed 
commitment to values is essendZ' (Smith: 1997: 12), expressed through personal 
interaction. In the context of residential care the trick for Smith is in getting the balance 
right between 'needs' and 'rights' through a reaffirmation of 'values': 
Children may receive a formal recognition of their rights, but there is a danger 
that thýis will occur in an emotional vacuum which fails to meet their most 
significant needs. One way to avoid this potentially and and damaging situation is 
to reaffirm the crucial importance of values to professional caring. 
Smith: 1997: 13 
This return or reaffirmation is to be found in a re-negotiation of the rights and needs of 
children enclosed in childhood, between children as citizens and children 'in need' in the 
context of a changing social and political milieu. A plea for a return, against the excesses of 
advanced liberalism; a swing back of the pendulum that hangs between collectivism and 
individual responsibility. Moreover, for Smith, this re-affirmation is not naive, but 
constructed in the light of 'knowledge' and the recognition that 'rights' sbould have a place 
since an over-reliance on needs may lead "back to the original problem of discretion and 
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potential oppression in relation to making decisions for and about children" (Smith: 
1997: 13). The 'original' problem presumably being one of not sufficiently understanding, 
or actively ignoring the universality of children's needs which in turn required the 
establishment of measurable 'rights'. Smith's aforementioned fear that children may 
receive recognition of their rights in an 'emotional vacuum' that fails to meet their 
tsignificant needs', may be justified (and justification is not the issue here), but it also roots 
childhood back within discourse at the 'moment of possibility'; that being of incursion. It 
is fear that drives us back within discourse, albeit with all the necessary amendments and 
caveats to assuage against an overstatement of 'needs'. The 'most significant needs' that we 
may 'fail to meet', even where they may be as basic as for food and shelter or, in Kellmer- 
Pringle's terms, love and security, new experiences, praise and recognition' (Kellmer- 
Pringle: 1975), re-route (root) us back, out of instability into recognition; the 'self- 
evidential' 'truth' of certain needs is what 'in language, not 'reality', steps into the breach 
and re-locates, secures, constrains and generates all that can subsequently be said about 
childhood. Childhood is thus constructed as an occlusion of 'otherness. It is not 
therefore, unfettered liberalism and an over-emphasis on rights which presents what Smith 
calls a 'potendaUy and and damaging situation', it is the possibility of infraction and rupture 
of the discourse (of professional liberalism), that which contains and regulates the 
instability of the signifier (childhood). From thereon in, it is through the anchorage 
secured within the triangulation 'values', 'needs, and 'rights' that, in Smith's terms, the 
ccrucial importance of values in professional caring' may (only) be reaffirmed. 
In a similar way, Howe (1996) suggests that social work policy and practice have 
become caught up in a swing towards unfettered liberalism, away from communitarian 
values that characterised practice for much of the twentieth century, he seems to imply a 
link between this critique of neo-liberalism and a somewhat gloomy vision of 
postmodernity, as if it were an 'era' that we are now in, rather than a set of ideas or 
possibilities. For example, it is suggested that social work clients now arrive "without a 
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history" (Howe: 1996: 89) where only the present is pertinent and where 'actions' (how 
people respond to advice, support etc. ) take precedence over 'actors' (social worker and 
client construct a narrative account of problems and look for causal explanations) and 
where there is a preoccupation with 'surface, rather than 'depth. This is seen as consistent 
with an increasing culture of performance measurement (what is done, rather than how it 
is done) in social work. There is much here with which this study would concur. However, 
in a plea for a return to communitarian values it is suggested that: 
Ihe stability of marriages, the rearing of children, the behaviour of 
adolescents, the morals of the successful and unsuccessful, the caring of others, 
and the integrity of the psychological self can aH be upset in times of heightened 
arudety and increased emphasis on the individual 
Howe: 1996: 95 
Further, that at such times (of heightened anxiety): 
violence and racial strife increase, more people seek personal counselling in an 
attempt to give their lives meaning, there is a revival of religious fundamentalism 
which delivers a social order, a sense of belonging, an ordained certainty and the 
removal of anxiety of being responsible for one's own destiny 
Howe: 1996: 95 
Now, whilst it may be the case that the "disembedded self corresponds with 
postmodernity's recognition of the plural and diverse, the different and the contingent in 
cultural and political life" (Howe: 1996: 94-95), from the perspective of this study, this does 
not necessarily correlate with, for example, a lack of social cohesion, nor does it mean that 
some people will necessarily lose a sense of 'belonging. The idea that 'depth' has been 
neglected in favour of 'surface' is 'within' Modernity, not postmodernity (and not at all to 
do with post-structuralism). To this extent, contemporary concerns about an emphasis on 
surface 'actions' in social work, rather than 'depth encounters', are more symptomatic of 
neo-liberalism than any notion that we have entered a 'post-modern era'. From a post- 
structuralist point of view, 'communitarian values' arejmst as inscribed in the 'present' as 
they were in the 'past'. Moreover, notions of the integrity of the 'psychological self, 'social 
cohesion', 'stable marriages', 'a sense of belonging' etc., are simply ways of conceptualising 
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individuals and social problems in laiýTmqge that are no more or less 'real', fixed and/or 
contingent than the "disembedded self', a 'fragmented' vision of welfare or a focus on the 
individual rather than the collective. This study has suggested throughout that it is the very 
pursuit of universal welfare, emancipation, truth and certainty, in eitber a communitarian or 
individualist guise, that requirrs the exclusion, subordination or disenfranchisement of some 
in order to achieve those goals. Put plainly, where there was consensus about ideas of 
welfare and a commitment to collective responsibility, groups and individuals then, as now, 
experienced exclusion in order to define the mainstream and the centrality of those very 
values. The 'instability' that may ensue in times of 'heightened anxiety' is thus articulated 
by leaning towards one side of the opposition which, again, may be characterised as 
communitarian values versus individual responsibility. Any resolution to the constructed 
disequilibrium implies, therefore, a return, one way or the other; a re-establishment of the 
cccntred' discourse which encompasses the neo-liberal and the communitarian. All that 
then remains is the need for an 'adjustment' on the basis of the contemporaneous social 
and political milieu which will, in turn, require a re-classification of the excluded, 
dysfunction, asocial or anti-social. This means that in Howe's terms, things like 'the 
stability of marriages', 'the rearing of children"the behaviour of adolescents', 'the caring of 
others' and the 'integrity of the psychological self' will have always and will continue to be 
'upset' and 'de-stabled'. But they will be upset not by postmodernity, whatever we decide it 
is. In a sense, we could say it is what they are for (to be upset and destabled, that is); as 
calibrators (signifiers) for the moral 'state of the nation'; the state of the 'psychological 
self', the state of the 'child', the state of the 'adolescent, the state of the 'married', the state 
of the 'others' (who need caring for), all are there to give a measure of moral, social and 
psychological stability based upon presuppositions of what counts as 'stable', or 'Whole', 
ccomplete', 'social cohesion', 'other' and so on, within the frameworks of understanding 
and reference points provided by intersecting and constituting discourses (of which 
childhood is but one). 
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From the perspective of this study any possibility of a 'return' to values must be 
qualified when those values are based on universalising notions of childhood, and, indeed 
of parenting and the gender relations that inhere therein. The problem is not only one of a 
potential to fail to account for structural inequalities but of remaining enclosed milbin 
discourse and milhout a re-evaluation of, for example, 'childhood' as a culturally and 
historically variable concept. Whatever has happened in the past is only understood in 
terms of the present; that is, that childhood is the fixed invariable about which we now 
'know' more than ever, and that it is only the actions, behaviour and understanding of 
adults that have to change in AS& of that increased knowledge. The question is reduced, 
within discourse, to one of merely stress and balance, rather than of beginning to think 
differently about childhood altogether; this never enters the equation, within discourse it is 
a non-possibility. 
Conclusion 
This study would resist the idea that 'postmodernity' is an 'era', or that postmodern 
thinking has become the dominant discourse of welfare, or that it is somehow an alibi for, 
even synonymous with, the rise of neo-liberalism. Rather, postmodernism is a set of 
conceptual apparatus, elements of which, it can be argued, work equally well for neo- 
liberalism. To characterise postmodernity (and here we regard the term as metonymic with 
post-structuralism) as commensurate to an 'era' of neo-liberalism and to react against it 
accordingly is to remain within metaphysics, as if 'postmodernity' were 'in opposition to' 
Modernity. If it verr'in opposition', it would not be post-modernity. It is not an historical 
claim or a reversal of modernity, but a 'suspension' (of teleological thinking). This does not 
mean that we cannot mitigate 'neo-liberalism', but that in doing so postmodern thinking 
would suggest that we resist a little a 'full return' (to 'values', 'truth', 'certainty) where what 
is on the 'outside' will remain as such (the 'other, the excluded), albeit articulated 
Postmodemism, Neo-Eberafism and Social Work Values 242 
differently. It is fear of instability that provokes a longing for the security of constructed 
'past'in thepresent'; a kind of nostalgia for a time when we'knew'where we were going. 
Whatever the future holds, it lies not in some transcendental schema which prioritises 
continuity over change, polarising progress and retrogression, an inevitable treadmill of 
history and logic in whose wake we can, at best offer a palliative amelioration until the next 
ineluctable resurgence. Rather, our 'destiny' may he in our dreams; while we remain, 
'within discourse', tiny, almost imperceptible acceptances and differences can be permitted 
and repeated; we can choose to decide these; to repeat, not to 'occlude', but 'transform' - 
and make a 'world' of 'difference'. 
The remaining question then, is 'what place do values have in social work from a post- 
structuralist perspective? ' Clearly, emphasising values may well allow for the kind of 'depth' 
engagement (emphasising values of empathy, personal interaction, psycho-social 
knowledge) that Howe argues for, but the difficulty hes not only in determining exactly 
what it is which is worth placing value on; i. e., what is desirable (though this is itself highly 
contentious), but in what is Men deemed 'equivalent , what it is that either manifests or is 
representative of the value or, in its absence, what can be re pirsented by or may be substituted 
for that which is valued ie. its veg lvalueý For example, the values that are generally 
espoused in these terms are those which will tend to hark back to a previous 'era' when, 
perhaps, there was greater a sense of collective responsibility and care, when 'communities' 
supported 'their own', when 'family' was the cornerstone of an inclusive and more caring 
society, a time before the alleged disintegration of 'family, where the sanctity of childhood 
was somehow better appreciated and more secure. The problem this presents from a post- 
structuralist perspective is all too apparent. Any 'Value' must be measured by its worth in 
"lation to what can be represented or substituted for it, otherwise it has no value. So, the 
value placed on an 'intact' childhood within the family which emphasises the essential 
attachments and developmental benefits for children derived therein, is substituted by 
public care which must, in turn, substitute for all of the deficits of the family it is replacing. 
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By aspiring to provide an 'equivalence' based a perceived lost' value (in this case, the value 
of a natural childhood within the natural family) that is itse#*constructed and contrasted by 
and through what or who is excluded (what it is noý, those subject to the equivalence or 
substitution (in this case, children in public care) find the absence of 'the real thing', their 
deficit, their loss', all the mom accentmated Indeed, at times of heightened uncertainty and 
anxiety about a loss of 'values' in society, they may be ironically all the more exposed 
symbolically, as an exemplary focus for what 'good parenting', 'children's needs', 
'childhood' shom1d be and all the more vulnerable to the determined efforts to keep 
childhood 'intact' in the midst of a wider disillusionment and concern about an 
increasingly fragmented 'vision' of society, and all that this may entail. This ispirdseyl the 
difficulty manifested in the Guidance and LAC that the deconstructive work in this study 
has attempted to convey. Put another way and in broader terms, it is not that sociological 
and psychological knowledge has somehow been 'forgotten' in social work, rather that it 
has become taken forgranted, the 'rational' adult is, in a climate of neo-liberalism, 
increasingly expected to take responsibility for his/her own 'psychology' and 'sociology'; 
the narrative has not been lost but is, in a sense, told for everyone, universally, 
., 
ýfor cbildnn. It is simply the weight given to certain values that has un equivo cally and expedall, 
changed combined with a distinct absence of contingency about knowledge. The place for 
values must therefore be in finding 'equivalences' that are 'other than' those inscribed 
within signifiers that constrain and inhibit differences by deconstructing the taken-for- 
granted knowledge claims of discourse. This means values in social work are all the more 
important as open, negotiated, particularly if they are able to transcend the trappings of 
tneeds' and 'rights'. If, for example, empathy, nurturing and personal interaction are to be 
valued in terms of the care of children, they must be reclaimed from the precepts of child 
development knowledge and the discourse of childhood which would locate the primary 
source for these within concepts of 'attachment", children's needs and highly particularised 
maternal and paternal roles which mean that substituting with an 'equivalence' will always, 
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inevitably signify an absence and loss, despite good intentions. The 'regulated instability' of 
childhood must be renegotiated, the instability allowed to manifest itself; something &ffennt 
needr to be 'Yaid'abomt cbildbood As things are, much of what in discourse it is 'possible to say' 
about childhood not only diminishes children and their possibilities, it diminishes all of us. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing is the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the dwelling place of the other in 
me ( ... ) that tears me apar4 disturbs me, changes me, who? -a ferninine one, a 
masculine one, some? - several, some unknown which is indeed what gives me the 
desire to know and from which all life soars. 
H61ine Cixous: 1986: 85-86 The New# Born Woman 
9 The problem this thesis has identified is that, in social work at least, childhood is 
il 
invariably taken for granted as a fixed, universal period of transition with specific and 
definitive qualities and characteristics. This is especially true in public care where children 
are exposed to sets of practices, policies and ways of thinking that regulate their daily lives, 
decision-making and longer-term opportunities on the basis of an idealized version of 
what childhood ought to be, signiFying this for all children and families. The effect of this, 
albeit inadvertently, is to ensure that children in public care are therefore marked out for 
the childhood they cannot have, in spite of, and paradoxically, becamse ofa plethora of policy, 
guidance and practice materials which emphatically promote the needs, rights and 'best 
interests' of such children. 
* The texts discussed work productively in a way which ensures regulatory imperatives, 
maintaining certain children 'on the edge' in order to define the 'centre', of what 'is' 
childhood. All of this happens not in sbite of a discourse of public care which interrelates 
with 'needs', - Wgbts' and other discourses, but thmugh and nithin the way 
in which they all 
intersect to construct 'thinking' about childhood, about what is, and what is not possible 
to say. 
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* The text is not, therefore a self-enclosed system in which all signifiers point toward 
some transcendental signified, extrapolated from a sovereign presence or 'authorship", 
(where author is the 'originator of an event' (OED), sharing an etymological root with 
'authority'), rather, the text is fluid, open, perforated, provisional. The logocentric 
orientation of the discourse espoused in the Gmidance and Regulations was revealed in the 
attempt to cohere arbitrary elements which operate as signs in such a way as to 
correspond with constructed 'truths' about the world. In striving for such objective truths 
the text strains to avoid the metaphorical use of language; in failing in this project it is its 
very use of metaphor that undermines and reverses the logic that is at work within the 
text. The closure of a concept is then both arbitrary and contingent. 
9 In this way, reading the text is as productive as writing the text; the text does not 
'stand for itself, otherwise there would be no critique or interpretation, no 'writine. 
Further, there is no 'primary' text, supplemented, added to by a secondary reading "the 
latter inserts itself within the interstices of the former, filling holes that are always already 
there ... the text belongs to language, not to the sovereign and generating author" (Spivak- 
1976: Ixxxiv). That is, language in 'universal' terms, constituting the 'social' as well as 
particular Ianguage' or discourses which are subsumed within. There is no congruence of 
language with the world; no correspondence of presence to presence. The relationship is 
ever changing and shifting, in this way, metaphor as language 'as a whole' and in the 
particular sense warrants our scrutiny; not as discovering a 'detour' to 'truth', but in its 
very structure. The structure and form of metaphor is not then, an 'alibi' for 'truth' but 
part itself of what the text is 'meaning to say'. This is intertextuality; open, fluid; 
weaving/unweaving the fabric of Tberal professionalism'. 
9 To take a step 'beyond' the discourse means decidedly and explicitly positioning 
within a state of contingency and indeterminacy, moving alongside the text in order to 
'Or in the case of the Guidance 'non-authorship' (governmental authority). 
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"occupy the interspace..., the "without" that is also "within"... to acknowledge that one 
never moves dcfinidvely beyond the Emit's of one's own discourse, that one never arrives 
at a point of absolute or final transcendence" (Begam: 1996: 177). And in so doing, 
paradoxically and out of the remaining 'fragments', reconstitute 'thinking about' social 
work, childhood, family, etc.; move 'beyond' the 'possibilities' of 'what can be said' within 
discourse to the possibility of 'transforming' thinking (discourse), towards that which is 
always/already inscribed within the 'discontinuity'. This means thinking other possibilities 
and configurations that may not be new, but which are not validated within the prevailing 
discourse. 
e The aim of this exposition is not to promote 'non-regulation' of public care or to 
suggest that in children's homes, for example, a measure of 'regulation' in relation to 
residential 'care' and cbildrrn, (rather than cbildbood in the definitive LAC sense), win not be 
required; rather, there should be more consideration of complexity and uncertainty of 
knowledge and truth in devising regulatory frameworks. 
* Further, more consideration could to be given to the relationship between intention 
and effect in devising and implementing Guidance and Regulations. This is because, as the 
study has shown, anticipated responses to presupposed 'potential' problems presented by 
children in public care inberr MmmSbout the Guidance, effectively reconstructing residential 
child 'care' as 'regulation'. For example, 'systen-ýised' measures, whether explicitly (in parts 
of the Guidance) or implicitly (in all of LAC) regulatory, may rarely achieve the desired 
effect of making residential care a positive, non-stigmatising experience, or eliminating 
'unacceptable' behaviour; indeed, the reverse may become more likely, arguably even wben 
aggregated outcomes are deemed 'successful' and the actual 'quality' of 'care' is raised. Not 
only does locating and constituting children as 'becoming adults' on the margins actually 
serve to keep them there, but also by prescribing what 'ought to be' without any sense of 
contingency about 'knowledge', rather than eliminating 'exclusion', compensating for 
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'disadvantage', accounting for 'differences' and redressing the balance, inadvertently 
ensures each of these. 
* Moreover, circumscribing and regulating behaviour in the very particular way 
described in the Guibnee and the gcneraliscd way in LAC, may not only fail to provide for 
the best environment and/or apprehend behaviour deemed inappropriate, it may even 
initiate 'delinquency'. 'Knowing' that failing to adhere to prescribed norms or rules within 
a prefiguring and definitive childhood can lead to 'permitted disciplinary measures', 
ostracism or punishment is not necessarily a precondition for 'stopping' individuals 
behaving unacceptably; it may, however, be a precondition for varfing. In other words, 
children will, one way or another, make a 'presence' felt, a 'presence' that will signify 'other 
than', that will say 'I am here'for lbemselves, if not for anyone else. 
* It was suggested at the end of Chapter 6 that as far as LAC is concerned, there may, 
after all, be some positive opportunities to 'get beyond the form-filling' as LAC intended, 
if not with quite the same outcome. Whilst the greatest 'danger' with LAC currently is the 
degree of professional confidence and broad consensus that surrounds it and its central 
positioning in the theatre of 'public care', by setting itself self-assuredly on a pedestal, LAC 
may also become too exposed and vulnerable to sustain itself as complete, whole and 'self- 
enclosed'. Those working and living in the sphere of public care need to work to positively 
challenge the presuppositions (about 'childhood', 'family', 'adulthoodý that lie therein, to 
actively subvert and transcend the closure it attempts to effect on childhood. 
Paradoxically, by making explicit what is often inferred or implied, LAC seems something 
of a crude and unsubtle attempt to almost 'catch hold' of 'childhood', borne out of 
widespread concern about the fragmentation of 'family' and mediated through the 
discourse of children's needs. As previously suggested, as soon as an attempt is made 'once 
and for all' to say 'this is what childhood 'is" definitively (as LAC does for qooked after' 
children), it slips away, defers signification and becomes obviously, patently, conspicuously 
'0 
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cnot', in a way that cannot be ignored for long. Here lies the fatal flaw that may enable 
LAC to be used as a tool not for 'securing' childhood, or children in childhood, but as a 
means of liberating and transforming both children's experience and our own (adults) 
framework for understanding of their 'needs', ultimately causing policy-makers, academics 
and theorists to 're-think. In other words, not to 'escape', or transcend but extend the 
parameters of contemporary discourse. 
e Children too must be able to articulate a 'presence', how ever 'contingent' - that is, a 
presence 'outside' as well as 'inside' of any prefiguring 'theory' that imbues the 
environment in which they live. The 'fear of instability', that which causes the regulatory 
imperative to take a particular and occlusive form in terms of children's 'presence', must 
and can be 'confronted' by both individuals encountering children in public care and, 
ultimately, legislators and policy-makers. 'Risking' a little instability (in even small, almost 
imperceptible ways) may prove 'transformative' not only in terms of children's experience, 
but also for adults as they discover fears to be ill-founded, illusory, figments of the 
collective imagination of adults (about children). 
* The study has also aimed to set the textual analysis against the backdrop of advanced 
liberalism and post-modem perspectives associated with a loss of confidence in the idea of 
'progress'. Here, the failure to realise the ambitions of the welfare state, the fragmentation 
of social work and consensus about the role of welfare is seen as part of a more 
widespread undermining of some of the 'monolithic certainties' within Modernity. The 
effect in practice is for knowledge to become more diffuse and, at the same time, taken for 
granted, particularly where the focus for child care professionals is on determining 
eligibility, assessing needs, measuring performance and outcomes, where theory and 
knowledge are to be unequivocally applied, rather than critically analysed, debated or 
reflected upon. The LAC system was presented as a prime example of this. The problem is 
that from within modernity there is an inclination towards resisting ambivalence and a 
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tendency to stabilise uncertainty - at worst this is manifest by targeting those 'on the 
margins', or wherever 'instability' threatens, through the increasingly rigorous application 
of social-scientific 'knowledge', in order to secure 'stability' at the centre of things. This 
resistance and tendency - rather than an approach which might seek to embrace 
uncertainty as offering multiple, diverse interpretations which validate difference - has had 
particular consequences for children in public care. For the present, childhood remains, if 
anything, even more emphatically immersed in a 'needs discourse'; the imperative to meet 
such needs in childhood is all. the more accentuated when the autonomous, rational adult is 
expected to assume responsibility and perform to anticipated outcomes. 
o Whilst it may true to suggest that in social work narrative accounts of family and 
children's lives, offering 'causal' perspectives which draw on psycho-social understandings 
have been sacrificed in favour of a more episodic, action-oriented or task-centred 
approach, this study has argued that the solution to this difficulty cannot simply reside in a 
reassertion of traditional social work values of mutuality and communitarianism. 
Any return to values becomes highly problematic in c dhood and es e 17 hil p day so for 
children in public care where what 'stands in' for what is valued may place us back on a 
circular detour to where we started, and back again. In childhood, values underpin needs, 
they signify particular configurations and sets of social relationships that 'make sense' 
within discourse. Equally, in this context, rights, whether they be 'to protection from 
harm' or the extent of participation in decision-making are either derived directly from 
needs or indirectly compromised by the 'best interests' of the child, or some other such 
qualifier. This symbiotic relationship between needs and rights is thus self-validating and 
self-perpetuating; the issue becomes merely one of stress and balance. 
* Whilst many would largely endorse a return to values in social work it is as if, they 
are at the 'origin', the start, as if they transcend and can be conceptualised 'beyond' the 
reach of discourse. Again, the argument here is emphatically not that we should abandon 
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'values', 'rights' or 'needs'. Indeed with values it would not be possible to abandon them, 
but they can be talked about, negotiated, made explicit in social work as part of the day to 
day playing out of law, policy and procedure and decision-making. Values must be at the 
fore of practice, they must be contemplated not on the basis of irrefutable 'truth' but 
through open and negotiated 'truths, where individual narratives are not abandoned, but 
pluralised, where uncertainty figures not as a threat to the order of things, but as part of 
human experience. It is through uncertainty that possibility arises, such possibilities have 
yet to be explored. Resistance to uncertainty is at both ends of the spectrum; it is the 
tension arising from this resistance that keeps discourse taut, coherent, 'making sense'. 
* Rather than seeking to either deny, repudiate, disown or eradicate 'ambivalence' 
about 'childhood' (from either side of the culture/nature opposition) or, alternatively, 
acknowledge it but regard it as problematic, we should instead validate, even embrace 
ambivalence and, above all, risk a little instabih6r. Policy-makers, parents, practitioners would 
be well advised not to begrudgingly accept, but to embrace a little 'self-distrust'; to 'open 
up' the discourse and perhaps avoid some of the 'cul-de-sacs' of thinking that come, in 
social work, from being a little too sure or certain about what is or ought to 'be'. To be 
able to say something about childhood within an alternative field of signification, and 
especially about 'children's needs'. It is only here that we may begin to think differently 
about childhood, family and 'child-rearing' and children may begin to speak about their 
'needs' or 'rights' (or anything else) 'outside' of a childhood that is 'within' a discourse in 
which they are deferred to the structured presence and regulation of adults, and 'inside' a 
discourse in which they have a constituted 'presence' 'themselves'. In turn, this may create 
the possibility of thinldng about children in public care outside of a framework where they 
are marginalised to a childhood in families. 
* This approach may also allow different understandings of, for example, the 
relationshiý ýetwqen 'public' (state) and 'private' (family) child rearing arrangements tot be 
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articulated. To try and illustrate think of 'family'; of husband, wife or partner, son or 
daughter, aunt or uncle, grandparents. How ever 'extended' or 'alternative', truncated, 
abridged or condensed, 'family' remains 'family'; thus 'one parent' family, 'lone parent' 
family can only be expressed in relation to 'family' signifying in a precise and particular 
way. 'Affiliates' to the family without a blood-tie may acquire the title 'aunt' or 'uncle' to 
designate a particular and qualitative relationship to family. There are no other words that 
appropriately denote the relationship so they are borrowed, reflecting an intimacy with the 
recipient that ties them in emotionally with the 'real' family. Beyond the networking of 
conventional 'family' ties terms like 'friend', 'close friend' even 'best friend' are outside of 
this fan-ýdly discourse, often highly significant but not regarded in or of themselves as 
substantial enough to sustain the cohesion needed for child-rearing or the 
(community'/society as a whole. Such relationships may provide an kinds of bonds and 
linkages with or without a child rearing component, with or without any kind of 
procreative or sexual relationship. But they will not find a language that reflects 
qualitatively the character of the network or which gives it recognisable shape and form 
within discourse, or, for that matter, within the spheres of the civic and the legal other 
than perhaps as 'subversions' of or 'caricatures' of family. Consequently, how ever strong 
and cohesive such networks may be they cannot be articulated nitbin, sometimes not even 
by those who are part of them. ' They are always on the periphery. 
* Within the liberal democracy, this lack of recognition, validation and articulation of 
the 'other' means that times of social incohesion are expressed in terms of fragmentation 
'of the family' and all that it entails. Again, this may, 'in actuality' be true but the point is 
I 
that 'solutions' are derived from a reinvestment in 'family', 'community' rather than 'saying 
something else'; there is then, a rrinvestment in confinuiD, (where 'family' and 'community' 
2 An example of this at work in social work is the widespread use of the genogr2m, a diagrammatic 'family tree' used on 
case files and in case discussions to give the unfamiliar reader an understanding of a child's relationships. Genograms 
rely on the blood-tie, regardless of their significance. There are no syn-Iols to reflect friends, neighbours or other 
networks of relationships within the presupposing configuration of the genogram. 
>o 
ýr, f, 
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etc., far from being benign, signify particular social configurations of relations that not 
only shut out other possibilities that might be equally, if not more, 'socially cohesive', but 
necessarily rely, on the exclusion of other lives as marginalised 'others). It is out of the 
inherent tension between collectivism and individual autonomy that the liberal state is 
derived; instability and tension create the necessary friction which drives the discourse on. 
And as with family, so with childhood, children, children's needs and children's rights. A 
start would perhaps be to validate such configurations and networks that provide for 
children that do not presently 'count' as either 'family' or 'alternative family' - to 'think' 
these possibilities and articulate them, give them a 'presence' - not 'public care' or 'family' 
but somewhere else altogether, perhaps where the boundaries were more blurred between 
'family and 'other than' - somewhere where the difference would not matter; not because 
it was not fbeir, but because it was eregwberr. 
* It is indeed ironic that all of those procedures, guidance and regulation requirements 
set up to ensure the 'qualitative', the care of the child and performance of the practitioner, 
point the worker awg from the subject (the child), the interpersonal, the discretionary and 
the subjective and towards the checklist and form-filling and the procedure. There is a 
sense here for the practitioner of fragmentation, of dispersal, diffusion along the surface, 
buoyed up by procedure which inhibits the spontaneous, 'here and now' encounter with 
the child. 'Presence' is deferred; the 'space' is one of 'constitution-in-progress' within 
discourse for both for the worker (as subject) and child (as object). A relationship defined 
by the professional context, constituted by professional knowledge and mediated through 
various procedures, guidance and frameworks for practice. As if childhood were almost 
'pure science'where theories, rules and procedures are applied, reapplied and revised with 
each encounter and where any unpredicted event or incursion is 'risk assessed' and 
proceduralised. Here, childhood is at its most regulated; in one sense 'complete' and 
'present' (as unqualified knowledge of child development), in another all too 'empty'. The 
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only way 'out' is 'in'; good child care practice is constructed as a series of encounters about 
the 'terms of entry' (to the discourse), a negotiation which requires the child to 
understand, apprehend and articulate the 'difference' (of 'not being' in childhood) in order 
to arrive ultimately at their complete and fidly present adulthood. 
* Of course, the practice of deconstruction is, itself, in the moment that we speak, 
taken up into the realms of what can be said. There is a centring of sorts going on here 
that is 'centred' around the value placed on deconstruction by those who engage (and 
indeed, by those who deride it) in the 'practice. But nevertheless, pulling gently at the 
loose threads of discourse can be reconstructive rather than destructive, offering the 
possibility of validating different social and textual configurations. In social work at least, 
the way 'out' of the impasse of Modernity is not a 'return' as such, but in part an 
acceptance and in part a possibility, perhaps yet to be realised to articulate and validate 
differences that are, as ever, always/already there in the past/prescnt. In this way it is 
possible to use deconstructive thinking not to reveal as 'truth' a self-rcflexive 'cul-de-sac', a 
'diverticulum' of meaning, but to free our 'thinking' up; where metaphor represses a lack 
of coherence in the 'text' deconstruction can unlock the provisionality of meaning and 
signification. Meaning may thus be reappropriated, knowledge may become 'open', rather 
than closed on a subject. an both senses; 'topic' and 'constituted subject) 
9 In giving way to deconstruction we can 'mean what we say' as 'something we do' 
(and children 'doý and are engaged in. As such, meaning is not empty and vacuous, but 
detived, always emerging and re-emcrging-, it is 'arrived at'; this is its veg 'value', the value of 
meaning is in how it is derived; it always was; it is all the morr, valuablc' for this being so. 
Despite the ultimate provisionality of all texts; deconstruction is, itself as empty a concept 
as it is full, as 'purposeful' as it is meaningless; but no more or less than any other 
endeavour; it simply 'names the game' and allows, out of indeterminacy, the reconstituting 
subject to take form and shape transformativcly. 
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